Sustainable Development Law & Policy
Volume 9
Issue 1 Fall 2008: Global Food & Agriculture

Article 1

Sustainable Development Law & Policy Volume 9
Issue 1
Sustainable Development Law & Policy

Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/sdlp
Part of the Agriculture Law Commons, and the Food and Drug Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Sustainable Development Law & Policy, Fall 2008, 1-80.

This Entire Issue is brought to you for free and open access by the Washington College of Law Journals & Law Reviews at Digital Commons @
American University Washington College of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Sustainable Development Law & Policy by an authorized
administrator of Digital Commons @ American University Washington College of Law. For more information, please contact
fbrown@wcl.american.edu.

Volume IX, Issue 1

Fall 2008

Sustainable
Development
Law & Policy

Exploring How Today’s Development Affects Future Generations Around the Globe

In This Issue: Global Food & Agriculture
1

|

2

|	An Overview of This Issue:
by Siwa Msangi

4

|

13

|	Two Global Crises Bring Opportunity in International Tobacco Control
by Chris A. Bostic, M.S.F.S., J.D.

19

|	Sustainable Soils:

25

|

Editors’ Note by Lisa Novins & Addie Haughey
Closely-Linked Nature of Global Food and Finance

Biofuel, the Environment, and Food Security: A Global Problem Explored Through a Case Study

of Indonesia by Nicola Colbran & Asbjørn Eide

Reducing, Mitigating, and Adapting to Climate Change with
Organic Agriculture by Meredith Niles
The Growing Supply of Ecolabeled Seafood: An Economic Perspective

by Nicolai V. Kuminoff, Darrell J. Bosch, Dan Kauffman, Jaren C. Pope, & Kurt Stephenson

31

|

The Global Food Crisis: Urgent Need and Emerging Solutions
by Terence P. Stewart, Stephen J. Norton, Jumana G. Madanat, and Hanna E. Stewart

36

|

Adding Biofuel to the Fire: A Sustainability Perspective on Energy Policy in the 2008 Food,
Conservation, and Energy Act by Jeni Lamb, Andrew Rogers & L. Leon Geyer

45

|

Conserving Farmland in California: For What and For Whom? How Agricultural Conservation
Easements Can Keep Farmland Farmed by Kendra Johnson

51

|

The Case for Green Food Labels by Emily Alves & Mark Edwards

57

|

Commentary: Genetically Modified Organisms and Global Hunger: A Real Solution?
by Simon Nicholson
http://www.wcl.american.edu/org/sustainabledevelopment

Editors’ Note

T

he food crisis has been at the forefront of the global consciousness for much of this year. Although food inflation
is nothing new, the combination of rising commodities
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prices, increased fuel costs, greater consumer demand, and shifts
from food to energy crops has made the cost of food an issue at
every table. The issue brings with it a myriad of questions about
not only the cause of rising prices but also how global food and
agriculture impacts sustainability, climate change, and individual health and consumption decisions.
Our global agricultural system is about much more than the
food we eat. On a large scale, it is also about how domestic and
international agricultural policies impact our air, water, and soil.
On a more local scale, it is also about working landscapes, urban
sprawl, and rural livelihoods. And individually, it is about our
health, nutrition, and lifestyle choices. Finally, it is about the
access and equity necessary for everyone to realize the potential
benefits of a thriving and efficient global food and agricultural
system.
As we considered putting together an SDLP issue on food
and agriculture, the wide range of potential topics was striking.
We hope to provide a broad overview of some of these issues
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An Overview of This Issue:
Closely-Linked Nature of Global Food and Finance
by Siwa Msangi*

T

he tumultuous economic events of the past year have
given us all a stark reminder of the closely-linked nature
of the global food and financial economy, and the ability
of market-level ripple effects to quickly spread from one corner
of the globe to the other. In the case of the food crisis, the origin
and underlying causes of these ripple effects are both diverse
and complex in nature—as they include ‘drivers’ of change that
are both socio-economic and environmental. While the role of
crop-based biofuels in certain OECD countries might explain
part of the rapid increase in prices for commodities like corn, the
underlying causes of rapid increases in rice prices in East and
Southeast Asia stem from a very different set of policies—some
of which, in themselves, helped to magnify the original market shocks, and worsen the effects. Among such policies were
export bans and unilateral trade actions, which tend to allow
less room for flexibility in the system just at the time when it is
needed most, and distort the market signals that might help to
bring about needed corrections and adjustments.
Production-side shocks to food economies were driven by
droughts, floods, or other extreme weather events that coincided
with a much ‘tighter’ set of market conditions in many countries,
where historically abundant stocks of grain reserves had slowly
been run down over time, and demands had slowly been ramping upwards. The relatively low level of global grain stocks is
largely due to either policy neglect or the desire to privatize the
operation of the food system, so that a ‘just-in-time’ principle of
inventory management could be exercised for the sake of efficiency. Some of these changes were driven by the incentives of
structural adjustment regimes, others were brought about by a
more laissez-faire attitude towards how food economies should
be managed and the persistent belief that there’s always plenty
to be had from the market at low prices—which is clearly no
longer always the case.
One of the deficiencies in the world socio-political and economic infrastructure that the food crisis has helped to bring to
light is the widespread lack of compensating mechanisms that
can provide social protection to those most in need of help. The
‘low-hanging’ fruit of price controls turned out to be a favored
policy instrument for many governments eager to suppress the
inevitable discontent that high food prices cause among highly-vocal, urban populations, and who lacked any other form of
social protection programs. These price controls, while easy to
implement, tend to dampen the very incentives and signals that
food producers need to receive in order to boost their output, and
help prices ease towards the lower levels that we’re now beginning to see. When these highly-vocal populations begin to suffer
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the effects of high food prices, they also tend to be more cantankerous and critical of other less-desirable aspects of government
policy—which is why low food prices are often the opium that
poorly-performing governments prefer to give to their constituent masses.
The overall conclusion that we are forced to draw from
these lessons of the recent past is that we live in a much tighter
and more volatile world food market situation, where the failure of certain countries to maintain consistently high exports,
for whatever reason, will result in a rapid escalation of prices
and deterioration of socio-economic welfare for the world’s
poorest and most vulnerable. There may not be the ‘fat’ in the
system that we might have taken for granted in the past, that
might help us to stave off the worst effects of food price volatility for long enough to make the corrective measures needed
to avoid high inflation. As we anticipate the growth of today’s
nearly 6.2 billion people into a global population of over nine
billion in 2050—many of whom will be more wealthy and
sophisticated in their diets and lifestyles—and contemplate the
implications for global food supply, and the constraining effects
of land degradation and climate change, we are given reason to
pause. Malthusian doom is not upon us yet—but we must work
to prevent his herald from appearing. Much work is yet to be
done in strengthening agricultural production, distribution, and
marketing systems in regions which have the worst-functioning
infrastructure, and weak systems of agricultural extension and
research. Multi-lateral effort needs to be applied, at a global
level, to bolster the mechanisms of trade and commerce which
can help smooth periods of turbulence and uncertainty. These
efforts would allow for free movement of goods to where they’re
most needed and valued, but the markets, by themselves, cannot
save us entirely. Good systems of governance and well-targeted
public interventions need to be made to fill in gaps, as they arise,
and step into the widest breaches that might suddenly appear on
the path of development.
Such are the competing (and sometimes conflicting) demands
of governance within these trying and turbulent times—to let the
market-based incentives work when they’re most useful, and to
protect those who are least served by the market at the same
time.
* Dr. Siwa Msangi is a Research Fellow in the Environment and Production Technology Division at the International Food Policy Research Institute (“IFPRI”).
Dr. Msangi’s current research focuses on the major socio-economic and biophysical drivers affecting agricultural production and trade, and their impacts on
nutrition, poverty and the environment. A Tanzanian national, he completed his
undergraduate and doctoral studies at Stanford University and the University of
California at Davis.
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Biofuel, the Environment, and Food Security:
A Global Problem Explored Through a Case Study of Indonesia
by Nicola Colbran & Asbjørn Eide*

T

Introduction

his paper examines the environmental and food security
controversies over the production and use of biofuel for
transportation. During the last decade, tremendous interest has been paid to biomass refined into biofuel (mainly ethanol
and biodiesel) and used to power transport vehicles. It is widely
claimed that the use of biofuel can contribute to the solution of a
range of problems, both environmental and social in nature.
In the face of the growing
threat of global warming caused
by greenhouse gas (“GHG”)
emissions, it has been argued that
biofuel used for transport can
partly or wholly replace gasoline
and lead to a significant reduction of such emissions. Another
often made claim is that biofuel can provide a renewable, and
therefore sustainable, energy source with positive consequences
for the environment. Some also claim that production of biofuel
can increase the agricultural income for rural poor in developing
countries.
If such achievements could indeed be made, there is a very
strong ethical argument in favor of liquid biofuel production, but
are these claims justified? Do they correspond with reality?
In recent years, grave concerns have emerged and during
the last year have particularly grown in strength and significance. There are well documented claims that there can be serious harmful environmental and social consequences of biofuel
production and that these have been grossly underestimated. It
also appears that the alleged benefits of biofuels have been exaggerated. The growing concerns are strikingly reflected in the title
of a recent working paper for the Organization for Economic
Co-operation and Development (“OECD”): Is the cure worse
than the disease?1
This debate has received increasing topicality due to the
food crisis caused by a steep increase in prices without a corresponding increase in income for the food insecure. One cause
of this crisis arises from the production of biofuel which competes with food production for the use of land and water. In this
article we examine the situation in one large country which has
engaged massively in crops for biofuel production: Indonesia.
Liquid biofuel is primarily produced as ethanol or bio
diesel. The feedstocks for ethanol are generally sugar cane and
maize, and to a lesser extent wheat, sugar beet, and cassava.

The feedstocks for biodiesel are oil-producing crops, such as
rapeseed, palm oil,2 and jatropha.3
Brazil pioneered the production of liquid biofuel well before
World War II, using parts of its vast sugar cane plantations for the
production of ethanol. The second major producer is the United
States, starting its production of ethanol from maize in the 1980s.
Around the turn of the millennium the European Union became
heavily involved, mainly using
rapeseed and to a lesser extent
soybean and sunflower oil for
biodiesel production. In 2006,
Indonesia developed its own
policy on the production and
use of biofuel.
The United States and
the European Union consume
the whole of their own biofuel production internally, but they are far from meeting their
own targets of consumption through self-production. They will
therefore be increasingly dependent on imports from developing
countries if they are going to rely heavily on biofuel. The European and American demand for liquid biofuel has motivated
substantial production in other countries, particularly in Indonesia and Malaysia, which both engage in biodiesel production
from palm oil. Indonesia has also focused on biofuel production
from jatropha plantations as part of a strategy to meet its own
biofuel needs.
As of today, liquid biofuel has contributed only a tiny part
of overall energy consumption. In 2007, it provided only 0.36%
of the total energy consumption in the world. To achieve this
very modest fraction of the total energy use, twenty-three percent of U.S. coarse grain production was used to produce ethanol and about forty-seven percent of EU vegetable oil production
was used to produce biodiesel.4 It is estimated that in 2008 the
ethanol share of the gasoline fuel market in the United States
will be about 4.5%, with a quarter of the coarse grain production in the country devoted to biofuel. The U.S. National Academies of Sciences made a calculation, using 2005 as an example,
showing that even if all the corn and soybeans produced in the
United States in 2005 had been used for bioethanol production,

Biofuel production
raises rather than reduces
GHG emissions.
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* Nicola Colbran is the legal adviser at the Indonesia Programme, Norwegian
Centre for Human Rights. Asbjørn Eide is Professor Emeritus, former Director,
and now Senior Fellow at the Norwegian Centre for Human Rights, University
of Oslo.
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this would only replace twelve percent of the country’s gasoline
demand and six percent of its diesel demand.5
If consumption of biofuel were scaled up enough to significantly reduce the need for fossil fuel (gasoline), enormous land
areas would be required with serious impacts on the environment and food security.

Environmental and Social Consequences of
Biofuel Production
Environmental Harm
Monocultural production of feedstock for biofuel can cause
a number of environmental harms. With the possible exception
of sugarcane production for ethanol, there is increasing evidence
that when the whole life-cycle of the production, distribution, and
use of biofuel is taken into account, and when direct and indirect
effects are counted, biofuel production actually increases GHG
emissions and thereby intensifies rather than mitigates global
warming.6
The Joint Research Centre of the European Commission is
now largely endorsing the view that biofuel production raises
rather than reduces GHG emissions. It has done so partly on the
grounds that the GHG effects of the use of nitrogen fertilizers
have been underestimated and partly because land use changes
could release such quantities of GHG that it would negate the
savings from EU agrofuels.7
Compounding these negative environmental effects of biofuel production is the claim by critics that monoculture production is harmful to biodiversity, which in turn has considerable
consequences for the necessary dietary diversity required for
adequate food. Furthermore, the production of biofuel causes
both competition for water and the pollution of remaining water
resources. Palm oil for biodiesel is heavily dependent on water.
The jatropha bush is less dependent on water and can grow in
marginal and dry areas, but its yield is low compared to what can
be obtained when grown in more fertile land or with more access
to water. It is likely that even with jatropha, the competition for
water can be severe. Pesticides connected with biofuel production are also reported to contaminate remaining water resources
and give rise to health problems.

Impact on Food Security
The second issue with biofuels is the impact on food security. In their paper prepared for the OECD, Doornbusch and
Steenblik have argued that government policies around the
world to replace oil with ethanol and other liquid biofuels could
draw the world into a “food-versus-fuel” battle. They focused in
particular on the impact on food prices. “Any diversion of land
from food or feed production to production of energy biomass
will influence food prices from the start, as both compete for the
same inputs.”8 It is not only the conversion of traditional agricultural land that may spark the “food-versus-fuel” battle. Following conversion, areas like forests and marginal land previously
used as common property resources, and which are traditional
suppliers of food, fodder, fuelwood, building materials, and
other locally important resources, are now no longer available to
5

communities. The impact of such conversion on food security is
outlined below in the case of Indonesia.
Putting it starkly, the “food-versus-fuel” game makes it possible for a car owner in a developed country to fill a 50 liter tank
with biofuel produced from 200 kg of maize, enough to feed one
person for one year.9 The purchasing power of the owner of the
car is vastly higher than that of a food insecure person in a developing country; in an unregulated world market there is no doubt
who would win this game.
Concentration, eviction, and transformation of the living
conditions in rural areas exacerbate the impact of liquid biofuel production on food security. Production of feedstock for
biofuel is by its very nature best suited for large tracts of land,
and it is a monoculture production, with all its negative implications. Large-scale monoculture production opens the land for
foreign and outside investors on an unprecedented scale. Traditional, small-scale agriculture in developing countries is not
attractive for investors, but biofuel is—as long as there is a guaranteed market. The implication of this is ominous: it may lead
to a process of marginalization or eviction of smallholders to
an unprecedented degree, transforming them either into badly
paid workers or to the swelling number of urban poor. The longrange consequences can be even more serious than the impact of
the soaring food prices. The impact of marginalization of local
communities on food security is examined more closely below
in the case of Indonesia.
There are many other problems associated with the production of biofuel that are outside the scope of this article. These
include the particularly negative effect the process of land concentration, monoculture, and eviction or marginalization are
likely to have on women’s role in agriculture. In many developing countries, women have the most important role both in
production and preparation of food. A recent Food and Agriculture Organization (“FAO”) study analyzes the risks that women
will face if large-scale production of feedstock for biofuel goes
ahead.10 The authors argue that liquid biofuels production might
contribute to the socio-economic marginalization of women and
female-headed households in several ways. For example, largescale plantations for such production require an intensive use of
resources and inputs to which smallholder farmers, particularly
female farmers, traditionally have limited access.11
Returning to the main topic of this article, the impact of biofuel on the environment and food security, we have decided to
use Indonesia as a case study to explore these issues in more
depth.

The Case Study of Indonesia
Oil palm plantations, and to a lesser extent jatropha plantations, are two of the main sources of bioenergy produced in
Indonesia. Oil palm plantations were initially established by the
Dutch colonial government between 1870 and 1930.12 Since
then, the development of oil palm plantations has expanded rapidly, and Indonesia is now the largest producer of crude palm
oil (“CPO”) in the world, producing almost half of the world’s
palm oil.13
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In early 2008, Indonesia had 7.3 million hectares of oil palm
plantations,14 with a further 18 million hectares of land cleared
for expansion but not yet planted.15 Regional development plans
have allotted an additional 20 million hectares (an area the size of
England, the Netherlands, and Switzerland combined) for plantation development mainly in Sumatra, Kalimantan, Sulawesi,
and West Papua.16 One million hectares have been allocated
for jatropha plantation and production. By 2009, this area will
increase to 10 million hectares.17

Driving the Demand—Domestic and International
Domestic and international demand for biofuel is one incentive for plantation expansion. At the international level, as discussed above, the EU and United States promote biofuel as an
alternative energy source for transport and for use in power
stations.18 In 2006, Malaysia and Indonesia announced their
intention to supply twenty percent of the market in Europe and
declared that they would set aside forty percent of their palm
oil output for biodiesel.19 This commitment requires about 12
million tons of CPO and plantation acreage of around 4 million
hectares.20 China is also considering palm oil from Southeast
Asia as a main source of alternative energy and has made large
investments in oil palm development.21
At the domestic level, in 2006 the Indonesian government
announced an ambitious policy targeting the development of
renewable energy as a priority, especially the production of biofuel, with the production of biofuel having two equally important stated benefits: the alleviation of poverty and the creation of
employment.22 To support its policy, the government has passed
legislation for the production and promotion of biofuel;23 established a National Team for Biofuel Development;24 provided
financial incentives; and made efforts to simplify licensing procedures for biofuel plantation and production. Since the policy
was announced in 2006, twenty-two companies have been set up
to produce biofuels.25
While biofuel provides an incentive to develop and expand
plantations, it is only one of a number of potential uses for palm
oil. The oil is used in a variety of non-biofuel products,26 and
demand for these products is sky-rocketing. Since the 1990s,
economic growth in China and India alone has meant that one
quarter of the world’s population depends on palm oil as its preferred vegetable oil.27 Demand for palm oil in the United States
has also increased as food manufacturers try to reduce transfats
associated with soy oil (U.S. palm oil imports have quadrupled
in two years).28 Global demand is expected to double by 2020
with four percent annual rate of increase per year.29 This means
that irrespective of the level of demand for biofuel, any consequences on the environment and food security of such crops are
likely to continue.
The EU, China, and Indonesia have embraced biofuel as a
clean, reliable alternative energy source. But are these claims
justified? Do they correspond with what happens in reality?
Does biofuel fulfil the claims of environmental benefits once factors like land use change, air pollution, the use of agrochemicals,
water course diversion, and pollution are taken into account?
Does it cause food insecurity as feared by many?30
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The Environmental Effects of Biofuel
Production
Land Use Change Through Deforestation
Indonesia has 120.35 million hectares of forest, which is
the largest forest area in Southeast Asia and the world’s third
largest after the Amazon and Congo Basins.31 Its forests are
home to around 10% of all species of flowering plants, 17% of
all bird species, 12% of all mammal species, 16% of all reptile
species, and 16% of all amphibian species.32 In large part owing
to its rainforests, Indonesia is among the world’s ten most mega
diverse countries. Importantly for food security, which is discussed later, its forests are also a source of food or the means to
procure it for an estimated 60-90 million people.33
However, in 2008 Indonesia became “the country which
pursues the world’s highest annual rate of deforestation” with
1.8 million hectares of forest cleared each year between 2000
and 2005.34 Today, oil palm plantations are a primary cause
of deforestation, as Indonesia acknowledged itself in its Third
Implementation Report on the Convention on Biological Diversity (“CBD”).35

Figure 1: The Extent of Deforestation in Kalimantan 1950-2005,
and Projection Towards 202036

The destruction of primary and secondary forests on such
a scale places enormous pressure on biodiversity and species
such as the Sumatran tiger and orangutan found in the forests of
Kalimantan. In the last decade their habitat has declined while
the plantation area in Sumatra and Kalimantan has increased rapidly.37 An oil palm plantation can only support up to twenty percent of the mammals, reptiles, and birds that a primary rainforest
supported prior to its conversion. To survive, wildlife (especially
mammals) must share the same environment as humans. Plantation workers and local communities encounter orangutans, tigers
and other wildlife for some time after deforestation, leading to
often serious and sometimes fatal consequences.38 According to
Greenpeace, 1,600 orangutans were killed on oil palm plantations during 2006.39
6

The loss of natural forests around the world each year contributes more GHG emissions to the atmosphere than the global
transport sector.40 Indonesia’s primary (old growth) forests are
estimated to store around 230 tons of carbon per hectare,41 while
secondary (re-growth) forests store around 176 tons of carbon.42
By contrast, oil palm plantations only store around 91 tons of
carbon per hectare, meaning there is a large deficit of carbon
when primary and secondary forests are converted to oil palm
plantations.43
Although the Indonesian Environment Minister has publicly promised that “we are not going to sacrifice any trees for
biofuels,”44 a substantial part of Indonesia’s planned oil palm
expansion continues to be in forest areas. This is not surprising
given Presidential Instruction No.1/2006 concerning the Supply and Utilisation of Biofuel as an Alternative Fuel directs the
Ministry of Forestry to make “unproductive” forests available
for conversion to plantations, and requires the Ministry of Home
Affairs, provincial governors, regents, and mayors to encourage communities to turn land over to biofuel development. It
is further complicated by conflicts of interest within the government. In Aceh, fourteen of the twenty-three district Heads of
the Department of Forestry, who implement the mandate of the
forestry department to protect forests from illegal loggers and
plantation companies, are also the Heads of the Department of
Plantations, whose priority it is to develop plantations.45

Land Use Change Through the Draining
of Peatlands
In addition to its vast forests, Indonesia has 22.5 million hectares of peatlands,46 which is most of the 27.1 million
hectares of peatlands in the Southeast Asian region.47 Peatlands
act as a natural carbon store, but release carbon when drying out
or oxidizing. According to Wetlands International, about a quarter of palm oil originates from drained peatlands48 and over fifty
percent of new oil palm plantations are allocated on peatlands.49
Conservative estimates indicate that each year around 660 million tons of carbon is released from peatlands that are drying out
and oxidizing.50 Over ninety percent of these emissions originate from Indonesia. Recently calculated GHG emissions place
Indonesia as the world’s third largest emitter,51 although some
oil palm companies and members of the government dispute the
figures.52 Adding to this bleak picture is a study by Wetlands
International which has shown that palm oil produced on tropical peatlands contributed more CO2 to the atmosphere than the
use of fossil fuels.53 When peatlands in Indonesia are converted
into oil palm plantations, studies estimate it takes 423 years to
pay off the carbon debt.54
In 2007, the Indonesian Agriculture Minister ordered provincial governors to stop awarding new permits to palm oil
companies in peatlands, but according to Greenpeace, there
have been no changes since the Minister’s order. 55 Palm oil
companies oppose any moratorium on forest and peatland conversions, arguing that it will negatively impact on the industry
and on Indonesia’s economy, causing job losses and increased
poverty.56
7

Land Use Change Through Fires
Forest fires to clear land for plantations are a regular source
of haze in Southeast Asia, posing serious health problems, traffic
disturbance, and substantial economic costs. Fires are a quick
and cheap land clearing technique that save almost twenty percent of the cost of establishing an oil palm plantation once the
land has been clear felled.57
The worst forest fires in Indonesia to date were those in
1997-98, which affected at least six percent of the country’s
total landmass, causing smog to cover large parts of Indonesia, Malaysia, Brunei and Singapore for at least three months.58
Indonesia’s Third Implementation report on the CBD states that
large-scale land conversion was the largest cause of the 1997-98
fires, which burned nearly 5 million hectares of forest and
caused approximately $8 billion in economic losses in Indonesia
alone.59 Of the larger 1997-98 fires, 46-80% occurred in plantation concessions, around three-quarters of which were oil palm
plantations. Although it is difficult to prove, most fires were
likely lit by company staff or locals paid by the company. Arson
as a result of conflicts between local communities and plantation
companies was apparently another cause of the fires.60

Water Pollution, Soil Erosion, and Pesticides
and Fertilizers
Biofuel plantation establishment and management also
effects the environment in ways felt most acutely by the local
communities whose land is converted into plantations.
The establishment of plantations diverts water from local
communities, disturbs stream flows, and pollutes water resources.
This also impacts water resources as a source of food for local
communities. As oil palm is a monoculture crop, the land must
be cleared of all vegetation. Roads and drainage canals are constructed using heavy machinery.61 This reduces the permeability
of the land, causes a loss of soil faunal activity, and compacts
the land, all of which increases top soil runoff and causes soil
erosion. Sediment loads in rivers and streams increase significantly. Flooding escalates in the rainy season, while there are
water shortages in the dry season due to interrupted or reduced
water flows.62
Oil palm plantations also cause the deterioration of water
quality. The cultivation of oil palms requires pesticides and
fertilizers for optimum production, which often leach into rivers, contaminating the water.63 In the oil palm plantation sector,
around twenty-five different pesticides are used, but monitoring their usage is difficult as it is reportedly not controlled or
documented.64 The most commonly used weed killer is paraquat
dichloride, which is very toxic and accumulates in the soil with
repeated applications.65 Its toxicity and accumulation in the soil
negatively affect the ability to use the land as a source of food
and income.
Water quality is worsened by the overflow or dumping
of untreated palm oil mill effluent (“POME”) into waterways,
which threatens community health and reduces aquatic diversity. POME is a mixture of water, crushed shells, and fat residue.
Most CPO mills have outdoor waste tanks to store and detoxify
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POME by adding oxygen, but the tanks can overflow in heavy
rain or during intensive production periods. Some companies
also allow the effluent to flow directly into the rivers.66 A mill
with a capacity of sixty tons of fresh fruit bunches (“FFB”) per
hour can produce 1,200 cubic meters of liquid waste per day,
equivalent to the sewage produced by a city of 75,000 people.67
As FFB needs to be processed within twenty-four to forty-eight
hours of harvest, one palm oil mill is usually built for about
every 4,000-5,000 hectares of plantation.68 There are 7.3 million
hectares of oil palm plantations in Indonesia.
Jatropha is also dependent on water. Although in principle
it can grow in marginal and dry areas, the yield is low compared
to what can be obtained when grown in more fertile land with
access to increased water. In areas such as Sumba in East Nusa
Tenggara, where extensive jatropha plantations are planned,
there is no precedent for water management on the scale required
for productive and profitable large-scale jatropha plantations.69
Contributing to potential environmental issues is that no
jatropha species have been properly domesticated and, as a
result, the long-term impact of its large-scale use on soil quality
and the environment is unknown.70 Jatropha has been banned in
the Australian state of Western Australia, as it is claimed to be
an invasive plant that is highly toxic to livestock.71
Without change in the way biofuel crops are planted and
managed in Indonesia, there are no sufficient ethical justifications for biofuel use that override its harmful environmental
implications. We are still far from the situation where all alternative energy sources are exhausted. There are other more efficient
ways of using energy, and there are better ways to address the
reduction of GHG emissions and urban pollution than by way of
biofuel production.

The Impact of Biofuel Production on
Food Security
On May 2, 2008, in his background note calling upon the
UN Human Rights Council to convene a special session on the
current world food crisis,72 the Special Rapporteur on the Right
to Food pointed to the demand for biofuels as one determining
factor in the crisis. An increased production of crops for biofuel
has contributed to higher prices as less food is produced in order
to fill gas tanks. This has caused evictions and marginalization, thereby undermining the livelihood of the most vulnerable
groups. The result is that many individuals, either alone or in
community with others, no longer enjoy physical and economic
access to adequate food or the means for its procurement.73

Transforming Traditional Agricultural Land
into Plantations
In Indonesia, both traditional agricultural land and forests
have been converted into plantations. This denies individuals the
possibility of feeding themselves directly from productive land
or other natural resources.74 In regards to traditional agricultural
land, between 1993 and 2003 there was a decline in the number of staple crop farmers in Sumatra (3,140,000 to 3,080,000)
but a steep increase in plantation smallholders (1,766,000 to
2,831,000).75
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Land conversion impacts productive agricultural land by
increasing flooding and landslides. In Aceh Tamiang in eastern
Aceh, oil palm plantations were identified as a main reason for
flooding in recent years, as a result of which “at least 128,028
hectares of farmland will become swampy when the rainy season arrives, and during the dry season will suffer drought.”76

The Impact on Food Security of Plantation-Style
Monocropping
Communities dependent on forests as a source of food are
well-off in terms of food security, sovereignty over production,
and management and stability in supply and income. Such communities create secure livelihoods through a range of strategies, including planting a variety of annual food crops as well
as perennial cash crops. In addition, community economies are
supported by ecosystem goods and services and common pool
resources—a source of monetary and non-monetary income.77
Land made available for biofuel production through deforestation transforms areas that once supported forest-dependent
communities into areas dominated by monocropping. Once
monocropping is introduced, there is a loss of biodiversity, and
a loss of ecosystem goods and services, as well as common pool
resources. It also introduces a new crop requiring intensive management through permanent cultivation, which many local communities are unfamiliar with.78 Traditional rotational farming is
no longer possible because there is no natural forest left to fertilize the poor rainforest soils, which are needed for the planting
of crops.
As the transformation destroys indigenous peoples’ traditional food sources, it leads to food insecurity, and endangers the
dietary diversity of local communities. Such a transformation
of biologically diverse areas takes away the local community’s
sovereignty over production and management, as well as stability in supply and income. Dependence on a single crop commodity may also increase the vulnerability of those working in the
palm oil industry. For example, CPO prices on the international
market fluctuate widely. In May 2007, CPO prices were $400
per ton, but in May 2008 were $1,150 per ton.79 In August 2008,
they had fallen back to below $800 per ton.80
Communities also find that their overall cost of living
increases once monoculture has been introduced. This increase
affects the ability of local communities to procure adequate
food. They need more cash to survive as communities can no
longer harvest food and products from the forest and do not have
land to grow their own crops. To meet this need for cash, they
can either become smallholders, laborers, or part of the swelling
number of urban poor.
The effect on food security caused by oil palm plantations
could be even more serious in regard to jatropha, which is to be
planted in the eastern regions of Indonesia (West Nusa Tenggara,
East Nusa Tenggara, Sulawesi, and Papua).81 Jatropha has been
promoted as a good solution to the impact of biofuel production on food security as it is a non-food crop that can be grown
on “marginal lands” not normally suitable for foodcrops.82 The
eastern regions of Indonesia are often considered marginal as
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they are deemed to have limited food production ability and
are prone to drought. In these regions there is an abundance of
land not permanently cultivated, which is considered ideal for
biofuel plantation development. However, if so-called marginal
land is converted into biofuel plantations, the land can no longer
be used as common property resources, which have traditionally
supplied food, fodder, fuelwood, building materials, and other
locally important resources.
The introduction of large-scale jatropha plantations will
also increase the need for cash as workers and farmers have less
time to feed themselves directly from productive land or other
natural resources. Jatropha is quite labor intensive with calculations indicating one hectare of jatropha will require 108 working days per year (from land preparation to post-harvest), with
each worker being annually paid Rp.1.7 million ($187). 83 For
farmers themselves, the price they receive for jatropha seeds is
low, at less than one dollar per kilo, and in some cases less than
six cents.84 This is a very small
amount of money and there is
little time remaining for workers to either tend to their own
land for food production or to
carry out other income generating activities to procure food.
An important aspect of the
right to food is the ability to
procure adequate food without
compromising the satisfaction of
other basic needs.85 Like many
countries, Indonesia is experiencing steep increases in food
prices, particularly staple foods. The price of palm-oil-based
cooking oil experienced the steepest rise; from Rp.9,000 per kilo
in August 2007,86 to Rp.14,000 per kilo by March 2008.87 This
price is prohibitively expensive for many Indonesians given that
forty-two percent of Indonesians (nearly 100 million people)
live on less than Rp.9,000 to 18,000 per day.88 One of the causes
of this increase is that Indonesian palm oil producers are more
interested in selling CPO to the international market, drawn by
the possibility of higher prices.89 The shortage of cooking oil
has meant many families are using recycled cooking oil, bought
from vendors at a reduced price.
Indonesia is not immune to the recent world food crisis.
Many Indonesians do not have regular access to, or means for
the procurement of, sufficient, nutritionally adequate, and culturally acceptable food for an active, healthy life.90 In pursuing the
plantation and production of biofuel, Indonesia needs to address
the possible consequences that not managing biofuel sustainably may have on food security. Failure to do so may seriously
weaken the availability of food in quantity and quality sufficient
to satisfy the dietary needs of individuals and the accessibility
of such food.
The question then is whether Indonesia is likely to address
the possible consequences of not managing biofuel sustainably. One challenge is that Indonesia has simply not publicly

acknowledged the social and environmental problems associated with unsustainable biofuel production. For example, in
September 2008, the Indonesian Minister for Agricultre lobbied
the EU over concerns that the EU was planning a policy that
would limit imports of palm oil for biofuel from Indonesia. The
Minister claimed “the EU was influenced by negative campaigns
from non-governmental organizations (“NGOs”). We feel it’s
not about environmental issues, it’s about trade.”91 He emphasised the Indonesian government’s belief that biofuel is a solution to poverty through employment creation by stating that the
palm oil sector currently employs more than 5 million people.
He added that “we should choose between human interests or
those of the monkeys.”92 However, sustainable biofuel production does not require such a choice.
At the international level, there is an increasing awareness of the dangers inherent in unregulated palm oil and biofuel production. Voluntary guidelines relating to certain crops
used for biofuel production
have been developed, such as as
the Roundtable on Sustainable
Palm Oil (“RSPO”) Principles
and Criteria for Sustainable
Palm Oil Production.93 These
Principles were finalized in
November 2007, although they
will be reviewed again within
five years. According to these
Principles, “sustainable palm
oil production is comprised of
legal, economically viable, environmentally appropriate and
socially beneficial management and operations.”94 On the positive side, these Principles represent a potentially useful tool for
civil society groups to evaluate companies’ social and environmental practices and to hold them accountable. The grievance
panel of the RSPO has already been used by communities in
West Kalimantan as part of a suite of measures to challenge the
environmentally and socially unsustainable practices of the Wilmar Group operating in the region.95 Wilmar International (and
the International Finance Corporation) has since withdrawn its
claims of sustainable palm oil production, and Wilmar claims to
have set up procedures to ensure that the RSPO Principles will
be adhered to.96
However, there are also challenges in relation to the Principles. The Principles are voluntary and may only be truly
enforced through market forces where there is higher consumer
awareness about sustainability. There is also the question of who
will ultimately bear the time and financial burden of proving
that the palm oil produced is sustainable: will it be small plantation holder producers, who in many cases produce oil palm
fruit for the companies that control their lands and debts? An
additional problem with the Principles was outlined by Unilever,
the world’s largest consumer of palm oil, when it admitted to
Greenpeace that it is not possible to trace the origin of palm oil
once it is on the international market.97

In 2008 Indonesia became
“the country which
pursues the world’s
highest annual rate of
deforestation.”
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Jatropha seeds and fruit

Finally, it is important to consider whether domestic legal
systems that regulate biofuel production facilitate compliance
with the Principles. If the legal systems do not, and in fact are
contrary to the Principles, it will be impossible for companies
that have already established plantations in compliance with
domestic law to produce sustainable biofuel.
Irrespective of the efficacy of such Principles, the formulation and implementation of national strategies for the production of biofuel requires full compliance with principles of good
governance: adequate and representative legislative capacity
which can link the human rights principles to the concrete situations and needs of the country concerned, people’s participation,
accountability, transparency, rule of law, and an independent
judiciary, well versed with human rights.

Conclusion
In this article, we have presented the general environmental
and food security issues relating to biofuel production and its
use for transportation and have explored the real impact on the
ground through a case study of biofuel plantation and production
in Indonesia.
Two key lessons stand out from the environmental harm
described above and from the soaring food prices, which are having a devastating impact on vulnerable people. The first is that
food availability is becoming an increasingly serious problem
and has to be met by increased production. Future intensification
of agricultural production or expansion to formerly uncultivated
land should focus on food production, not on fuel production,
and particularly not on liquid fuel production. The second lesson
should be based on the awareness that prices will remain high
for a long time, even though somewhat reduced from the present
level. Taking into account that hundreds of millions of people in
developing countries will not be able to buy their necessary food
on the market at such high prices, alternatives must be found.
This can take two directions, both of which must be pursued.
The first step is to ensure adequate land and protect the assets
of small farmers and peasants so that they may produce the necessary food for themselves, their families, and the local market
with low input costs. The possibilities for small-scale and more
organic farmers should be significantly expanded and given
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support, nationally and internationally. The second step, which
supplements the first, is to establish a functioning safety net for
those who cannot gain access to the necessary assets. Safety nets
must be established through national and international cooperation. They should not be restricted to the minimum food or
cash required to survive, but should facilitate empowerment of
the recipient by helping them move from dependency to selfreliance, whether through agricultural activity or other means.
The safety net should not be merely an emergency device but a
tool for sustainable development.

Recommendation: The Need for International
Guidelines
To avoid the harmful environmental and human consequences and maximize the possible benefits from biofuels,
international guidelines must be urgently developed for biofuels
production. The exact form of the guidelines is a matter to be
explored through international negotiations. This is of increasing urgency as a result of the food crisis. Existing guidelines on
crops that can be used to produce biofuel and their associated
strengths and weaknesses should serve as models. All guidelines
should complement, not contradict, each other and should not
impose an unnecessary burden on those who produce biofuel in
a socially and environmentally satisfactory way.
In regard to the content of international guidelines for biofuel production, the following concerns should be taken into
account:
• Avoid production of biofuel in ways which lead to increased
greenhouse gas emissions, when direct and indirect impact
is taken into account, or which divert water from existing
users and prevents previously existing access to water for
drinking and sanitation, which degrade the soil or pollute
water or the local air conditions (e.g. by burning).
• Avoid introducing non-native species which carry risks of
invasion before appropriate safeguards are adopted—full
application of precautionary principle is required.
• Abstain from measures which evict previous users of the
land without negotiation and acceptable alternatives for
the previous users, whether they had recognized tenure
or not. Abstain from production of biofuel in ways which
undermine previously existing opportunities for women to
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produce food or have access to woodfuel, unless other alternatives are made available prior to the initiation of the biofuel project.
• Establish legally binding certification schemes and a reliable monitoring system to ensure that the international certification is effective and enforced.
• Give priority to projects based on small-scale farming, possibly through cooperative arrangements, with a combination of biofuel and food production for local consumption,

and projects that ensure stable and healthy working conditions, which ensure adequate dignity and independence of
the worker.
• Choose feedstock that has the potential, in its production,
transport, distribution, and use, to reduce GHG emissions
compared to the use of fossil fuel, and which avoids diverting water from established and necessary uses, and avoids
soil degradation or pollution.
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The Real Price of Atlantic Salmon
by Courtney Henson*

T

he price of salmon has drastically decreased in the United
States in the past decade, largely because of increased
salmon aquaculture in countries like Chile. However, this
price reduction was not achieved with sustainable methods. The
real costs have been absorbed by the environment and workers
in Chile’s salmon industry.
Salmon aquaculture has developed commercially in countries with natural salmon populations since the 1970s.1 Aquaculture is the farming of fish under controlled conditions in natural
water bodies or in closed systems. Fundación Chile, a nonprofit
organization associated with the government whose goal is to
foster Chilean business and industrial growth, introduced salmon
aquaculture to Chile in the 1980s. The industry has boomed and
Chile has become the world’s second largest salmon-producing country.2 Chilean salmon and trout exports have increased
about 500% in the past decade.3 The expansion of commercial
salmon aquaculture has resulted in the cost of salmon to consumers being one-fourth the cost in the 1980s.4 Salmon has
shifted from being an expensive delicacy to a common substitute for meat and poultry.5 The drastic price reduction is a result
of simple supply economics: aquaculture and improved technology caused increased salmon production in more geographical
areas, like Chile, which did not historically supply wild-caught
salmon. Lower prices lead consumers to consume more salmon
and has increased demand, particularly for value-added products like fillets, smoked salmon, and prepared meals.6 This shift
has been particularly pronounced in the United States, the largest importer of salmon.7 Chile supplies sixty-five percent of the
salmon consumed in the United States.8
Salmon aquaculture in Chile has been credited as bringing
development to several regions in Southern Chile. In Southern
Chile’s Region X, with the majority of aquaculture sites, poverty
has decreased by nearly half within a decade. 9 Extreme poverty
in the same period dropped from thirteen to seven percent, and
even further gains have been made since 2000.10 SalmonChile,
an industry organization, estimates fifty-five thousand workers
are directly or indirectly employed by the salmon industry.11
In addition, Chile’s export-oriented economy has diversified
its exports from copper and fruit; salmon is now Chile’s third
largest export.12 Foreign direct investment has also increased,
especially from Norway and Japan.13 Development of roads,
banking services, and universities have also extended into the
southern regions because of the salmon industry.14
Cheaper prices in the supermarket and rapid development
are not without costs, however. Impacts to the environment
are more severe in Chile, because there is less regulation than
in Norway, its primary competitor.15 There are several major
environmental impacts from the salmon aquaculture industry. The salmon themselves produce waste in addition to the
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antibiotics and other chemicals in their food. Escaped salmon
present another environmental hazard. Salmon that escape their
farm pens, which can amount to millions of salmon, are especially harmful in Chile because they are not a native species.
They upset the ecological balance of the Pacific waters they are
penned in because they are carnivorous and have few predators
in their adopted habitat.
Like Chilean environmental concerns, Chile’s labor practices in the salmon industry do not match their peers due to
inadequate regulation. The industry’s close relationship with
the government and the emphasis on exporting salmon has
resulted in anti-union practices, substandard working conditions,
and very low wages for workers.16 For example, Norwegian
salmon industry workers make 378% more than their Chilean
counterparts.17
Economic development in southern Chile is highly dependent on the salmon industry, which thus far has not demonstrated
long-term sustainability. The industry faces an additional threat
in the form of infectious salmon anemia (“ISA”), a disease that
has plagued the salmon farming industry all over the world. ISA
does not affect humans, but it is fatal to salmon and extremely
contagious, especially to farmed salmon which are kept in close
quarters. ISA finally spread to Chile in 2007, when much of the
salmon stock in the country had to be destroyed. In the wake of
the disease outbreak some importers, such as Safeway, refused
to import Chilean salmon because the quality of the stock had
declined.18 The effect of ISA has lead to the loss of jobs in
Region X as companies—especially the giant in the industry,
Marine Harvest—relocate or close.19
The ISA outbreak has dramatically exacerbated the negative impacts of poor environmental regulation and labor practices on the salmon aquaculture industry in Region X, where
ninety percent of salmon production is located. Many of the
companies in Chile have moved their operations further south to
Regions XI and XII, or have closed, laying off over four thousand workers in Region X.20 The disease outbreak has illustrated
the unsustainability of the salmon farms’ practices. To prevent
further outbreaks, companies have to improve their husbandry
practices, and the government has to ensure greater regulation,
such as protecting union efforts, mandating the space between
aquaculture sites, and monitoring the chemicals administered to
the fish. Regulatory agencies need to catch up to the growth of
the salmon industry in Chile in order for the industry to become
sustainable.21
Endnotes: The Real Price of Atlantic Salmon continued on page 67
* Courtney Henson is a JD candidate, May 2010, at American University Washington College of Law.

12

Two Global Crises Bring Opportunity to
International Tobacco Control
by Chris A. Bostic, M.S.F.S., J.D.*

I

Introduction

n many low-income countries, particularly those hardest hit
by rising food prices, resources such as valuable land and
human labor are diverted into the production of a cash crop
that society would be better off without, tobacco leaf. Ironically, many of these farmers are rendered poorer than their foodproducing neighbors in the process, owing to the oligopolistic
nature of the tobacco leaf processing industry, including predatory credit and other practices.1 As the world takes greater action
to combat the devastating health effects of tobacco consumption,
nations that largely depend on tobacco leaf for export earnings
are anxiously looking for alternatives.2 The nexus between this
problem and the world food crisis is obvious. What is lacking is a
coordinated, holistic approach. This paper will provide an overview of global tobacco leaf cultivation and efforts to promote
a transition to other livelihoods for farmers, as well as suggest
actions that may lead to greater cooperation toward solutions.
The health costs of tobacco consumption are well known,
although few appreciate the magnitude. The World Health Organization (“WHO”) estimates that tobacco killed 100 million
people over the course of the 20th century.3 It predicts that one
billion will die this century.4 Unlike last century’s casualties,
the majority of these deaths will be in lower income countries.5
Addiction to tobacco causes more than just deaths. Tobacco-related diseases cost families and governments untold billions in
health care costs, lost wages, and lost productivity.6 Poor families that spend money on cigarettes must make up the difference
somewhere else in the budget by reducing spending on food,
housing, health care, or education.
In response to the coming catastrophe, the WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco Control (“FCTC”) came into
force in 2005.7 The treaty is focused on halting and reversing
the alarming trends in tobacco consumption and its related death
and disease.8 The FCTC includes several provisions focused on
the developing world, including Article 17, which calls for cooperation in finding alternative livelihoods for persons involved
in tobacco leaf cultivation.9 Article 17 has been a back-burner
issue for the governing body of the treaty, but recently many
have called for increased efforts to take advantage of opportunities in other vocations.10 The world food crisis has changed the
equation for farmers and governments wishing to move away
from tobacco cultivation.

The FCTC and Article 17
Negotiations for the Framework Convention on Tobacco
Control began in 1999 under the leadership of then-WHO Director Gro Brundtland.11 It was ground-breaking in two ways. First,
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it is the only treaty ever negotiated under the auspices of the
World Health Organization.12 Second, it is the world’s first public health treaty.13 In contrast to many environmental treaties,
which have been seen as a threat to the profit margins of private
industries, the goals of the FCTC and those of the multinational
tobacco industry are diametrically opposed; complete success
for the treaty necessarily means the bankruptcy of the tobacco
industry. Public health advocates often point to the tobacco
industry as the “vector” of diseases caused by tobacco consumption, explicitly comparing them to mosquitoes or parasites.14
As a framework convention, the FCTC is meant as a starting
point for further negotiations. Many of its articles are broad and
few include definite obligations on parties. Still, six intergovernmental negotiating body sessions, along with innumerable
national and regional meetings, were required to hammer out the
final language, which was unanimously adopted by the World
Health Assembly in May 2003.15 To date, the FCTC includes
168 national Parties, representing 83.5% of global population.16
The only two mega countries—those with over 100 million
persons—not Party to the FCTC are Indonesia and the United
States.
The issue of tobacco cultivation is not a traditional concern
of the public health community. Owing to the relatively small
percentage tobacco leaf contributes to the total value of retail
tobacco products, raising the price of leaf is not vital to efforts
to curb tobacco consumption. There was, therefore, little reason
from a public health perspective to include Article 17, which
addresses farmers’ livelihoods rather than direct public health
implications of tobacco use. Like all treaties, however, the FCTC
is a political instrument. A number of WHO member states that
depend to a great degree on export earnings from tobacco leaf
were reluctant to support a treaty process that aimed, ultimately,
to destroy this market by eliminating consumption. Article 17
was the compromise that brought these countries on board by
providing for alternative economic activities. It is short enough
to quote in its entirety.
Article 17: Provision of support for economically viable alternative activities
Parties shall, in cooperation with each other and with
competent international and regional intergovernmental
* Chris A. Bostic is Legal Counsel to the Framework Convention Alliance, an
umbrella organization of over 350 organizations from more than 100 countries
working on the development, ratification, and implementation of the Framework
Convention on Tobacco Control. He is also a Clinical Instructor at the University
of Maryland School of Law, where his students focus on supporting the FCTC. He
is a 2002 graduate of the American University Washington College of Law.
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organizations, promote, as appropriate, economically
viable alternatives for tobacco workers, growers and, as
the case may be, individual sellers.17
The framers of the FCTC also gave a nod to environmental
concerns, particularly as they relate to tobacco cultivation:
Article 18: Protection of the environment and the health
of persons
In carrying out their obligations under this Convention,
the Parties agree to have due regard to the protection of
the environment and the health of persons in relation to
the environment in respect of tobacco cultivation and
manufacture within their respective territories.18
The first Conference of the Parties (“COP”) (the governing body of the FCTC) created an ad hoc study group (“Study
Group”) to address Articles 17 and 18.19 The Study Group,
made up of interested FCTC States, has met twice and reported
back to the COP.20 While they are far from developing concrete
solutions, the group has made a number of general recommendations, which will be further discussed below.

Overview of Global Tobacco Leaf
Cultivation
As the absolute number of smokers in Europe and North
America has leveled off and even fallen over the last four
decades,21 the tobacco industry has increasingly looked to the
developing world as a largely
untapped market. 22 As tobacco
sales have exploded in developing
countries, increased manufacturing and commercial leaf cultivation have followed.23 In spite of
public health efforts to combat
consumption, the global demand
for tobacco leaf is expected to
continue to rise for decades.24 The
United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization expects total
production to reach 7.1 million metric tons in 2010, a twenty
percent increase over 1998.25 Cultivation in developed countries
continues a slow decline that began in the early 1980s; increased
production is occurring entirely in developing countries, particularly China.26
Tobacco can be grown in a variety of climates and soil
types, and is grown in over 100 countries.27 For most nations,
it is a minor crop, accounting for less than one percent of total
exports.28 Two-thirds of the world total is grown in just four
countries: China, Brazil, India, and the United States.29 South
American leaf production is dominated by Brazil, the world’s
number one exporter, which earned more than U.S. $1 billion in
2003, the last year for which full figures are available.30 Brazil’s
total production is dwarfed, however, by China, which produced
more than 2.4 million metric tons in 2004, compared to Brazil’s
928,000 metric tons.31
Africa has seen steady growth in tobacco cultivation since
1970, increasing by an average of 3.7% from 1970-2000.32

Malawi and Zimbabwe dominate continental production, producing about half of Africa’s total.33 The two countries are major
leaf exporters. Although most of the crop in China and India is
destined for domestic consumption, Malawi and Zimbabwe34
earn sixteen percent and sixty-three percent, respectively, of their
total export revenue from tobacco leaf. They are seventh and
third, respectively, in the world in total export value.35 For obvious reasons, both countries were keenly interested in including
language in the FCTC regarding the fate of tobacco farmers.
Farmers in poor countries turn to tobacco for a variety of
reasons. It has a relatively high yield per unit of land, and is
therefore attractive in areas where individual farms are very
small. The market for leaf is perceived as stable, anticipating
high returns over the long term. Cured tobacco is far less perishable than food, a major reason why countries with poor infrastructure and far from developed world markets tend to produce
tobacco. Finally, support and loans (of both money and inputs)
are often available from the tobacco industry, assistance that is
not traditionally available for other crops.36
The benefits of tobacco cultivation are often illusory, however. In many instances, farmers who switch to tobacco cultivation find themselves poorer as a result,37 in monetary, health,
educational as well as other terms, for several reasons. First,
the initial investment is higher for tobacco than for many other
crops. While economies of scale allow large-scale growers to
make money, peasant farmers are rarely able to realize
enough profits to make the
investment worthwhile.38
A second barrier to profitability is the inherent power
imbalance between tobacco
farmers and transnational
tobacco leaf buying companies.39 A typical scenario
plays out as follows: farmers
enter into contracts with the
companies whereby they receive up-front loans, seed, fertilizers,
pesticides, advice, assistance, and a guaranteed buyer. Farmers must promise to sell the entire crop to the company, at a
price determined by the buyer. Sometimes payment for a partial
crop will be withheld until the entire crop is delivered. Since
the farmer has no control over the price paid for a crop, and no
option to choose another buyer, in many cases the earnings do
not equal what is owed under the contract. The farmer is able to
put off the debt by signing a similar contract for the following
year. Since these are legal contracts, and the farmer’s only collateral is usually the farm itself, the leaf buyers can now use the
domestic legal system to force the farmer to continue growing
tobacco. This is known as “debt bondage.”40
The third drawback to tobacco cultivation is its relatively
high reliance on labor. In order to make ends meet, farmers often
require the full-time work of the entire family, including children. Precluded from attaining an education, the children will be
unable to break out of the cycle of poverty.41

Farmers who switch
to tobacco cultivation find
themselves poorer
as a result.
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In addition to concerns about poverty cycles, tobacco cultivation brings on a host of health concerns that are unrelated
to smoking or other forms of consumption. Field workers often
suffer an ailment known as green tobacco sickness, which occurs
when nicotine is absorbed through workers’ skin during leaf
handling. Symptoms include nausea and other gastro-intestinal
maladies, weakness, headaches, dizziness, difficulty breathing,
and increases in blood pressure and heart rates.42 Tobacco is also
highly dependent on fertilizers and pesticides, including a number of organophosphate insecticides that have been shown to be
highly toxic to humans.43
In addition to the human
costs, there is an environmental
cost to tobacco cultivation. First,
runoff from heavy use of chemical fertilizers and pesticides pollutes waterways and drinking
water.44 Second, one of the reasons fertilizers are so necessary
is that the tobacco plant leaches
nutrients from the soil at a rate
higher than most other plants,
reducing the fertility of the soil
for years to come. 45 Finally,
tobacco cultivation is a major contributor to deforestation when
wood is used as fuel to cure tobacco leaves. A researcher in 1999
estimated that 200,000 hectares of forests are cut down per year
as a result of tobacco farming, and that this accounts for nearly
five percent of all deforestation in tobacco-growing developing
countries.46 As tobacco cultivation has expanded in the first ten
years of the new millennium, this figure has surely gone up.
Finally, one must consider the opportunity costs of growing tobacco instead of food crops. In addition to the millions
of hectares devoted to tobacco, an estimated eleven to twelve
million farmers are largely dependent on the crop, with perhaps an additional twenty million somewhat dependent.47 One
researcher has estimated that if the land and resources devoted
to tobacco were switched to food crops, an additional 10-20 million people could be fed.48 This figure may seem pale in comparison to the world’s hungry, but one must consider that few
farmers are profiting from tobacco and that leaf is the first step in
a product stream that causes massive harm to society as a whole.
Such obvious “win-win” trade-offs are rare.

(3) reporting on initiatives that are being taken at national
level in accordance with Article 17; and
(4) recommending cost-effective diversification
initiatives.49
In addition, the COP mandated that the study group work
closely with international organizations in related fields, such
as the UN Food and Agriculture Organization (“FAO”) and
the World Bank.50 The study group is comprised of interested
Parties. As an ad hoc group, membership is not fixed, and a
greater number of Parties attended the second session than the
first. Nongovernmental organizations with relevant expertise
have also been invited to both
official meetings.
The study group is not
well-funded and has undertaken
little original research, instead
focusing on meta-analyses of
other research in order to draw
conclusions and make recommendations. Issue areas examined include economics, labor,
health, social and environmental impacts, alternative crops,
non-crop alternative livelihoods, national policy frameworks,
and tobacco industry corporate practices.51
The study group is tasked with reporting on its progress to
each meeting of the Conference of the Parties, and produced
a document in preparation for the third COP, held in Durban,
South Africa in November 2008. In that document the group
comes to a number of specific conclusions, recommendations,
and observations:
48. The pursuit of alternative livelihoods to tobacco
growing must be addressed from a development
perspective, as it involves health, social, environmental and economic aspects beyond substitution of one economic activity for another. Despite
advances in terms of national experiences, further
work remains to be done.
49. Standardized, regularly collected data are needed
on employment, health and environmental and
social issues, and independent studies should be
conducted, especially in less developed countries,
that provide credible evidence.
50. Intersectoral approaches are needed to address alternative livelihoods, and public policies are required
to ensure, for example, research and development,
technical assistance and market access.
51. At all levels, undue influence of the industry
must be avoided in policy decisions by careful
monitoring.
52. The group agreed that a holistic framework is
required that addresses all aspects of the livelihood of tobacco growers. Such a framework was
discussed at the meeting, and it was agreed that a

Tobacco plant leaches
nutrients from the
soil at a rate higher
than most other plants,
reducing fertility.

The FCTC Study Group
At its first meeting after the FCTC came into force, the
Conference of the Parties established an ad hoc study group to
address Parties’ issues arising under Articles 17 and 18. The
study group has four objectives:
(1) summarizing the uptake of existing economically viable alternatives for tobacco workers, growers, and, as
the case may be, individual sellers;
(2) recommending to the Conference of the Parties mechanisms to assess the impact over time of the tobacco
companies practices;
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similar approach should be used to evaluate experiences with alternative livelihoods and to provide
a basis for implementing Articles 17 and 18 of the
Framework Convention.
53. To this end, the group identified the following objectives, which the Conference of the Parties might consider when expanding the group’s
mandate: (1) adjust the suggested framework to
address alternative livelihoods to tobacco growing;
(2) standardize the terminology, instruments and
variables in line with the standards and practices of
the specialized international agencies; (3) identify
mechanisms and areas of cooperation with international organizations with expertise in the matter;
and (4) elaborate policy options and recommendations for implementation of Articles 17 and 18 of
the Framework Convention.
54. The group agreed that a successful shift from
tobacco growing to economically sustainable alternatives requires public policies that give priority
to profitability, technical and financial assistance,
capacity-building and market and social support,
especially during the transition from one economic
activity to another, and that ensure the involvement
of farmers in decision-making.
55. An international database of information, research,
experiences, best practices and regulations should
be established, covering the status of tobacco
growing, employment and the role of the tobacco
industry. A baseline database should be established
initially.
56. While progress has been made in finding economically sustainable alternatives to tobacco growing, further studies are needed, particularly on the
health, social and environmental impacts of tobacco
growing in developing countries and countries
with economies in transition. Further monitoring is
needed, and information should be made available
to farmers and to the public.
57. States and international organizations should take
a multisectoral approach in addressing the issue
of alternative livelihoods, incorporating them into
poverty reduction strategies and programmes. The
World Food Programme and relevant development
agencies should consider alternative livelihoods
for tobacco crops as an opportunity. The involvement of farmers in all stages of decision-making
should be encouraged.
58. Better understanding is needed of the role of the
tobacco industry in tobacco production and its
influence on the identification of sustainable alternatives. In accordance with Article 5.3 of the Convention, governments should protect their policies
for alternative livelihoods for tobacco farmers
from the vested interests of the tobacco industry,
Fall 2008

affiliates and front groups, as defined in the Framework Convention.
59. The group considered that the Convention Secretariat should support Parties in raising and accessing funds for implementation of Articles 17 and 18
of the Framework Convention.52
The global food crisis, and its nexus with the goals of FCTC
Article 17, is specifically mentioned in the study group’s report,
but only in passing.53 The group’s main contribution to a shift
away from tobacco cultivation is in the gathering of evidence
and data. It is simply not mandated or designed to react quickly
to developments in international economics. By asking for specific expansions in its mandate—particularly in expanding cooperation with other international actors—the group is giving the
COP the opportunity to accelerate the process. It remains to be
seen whether the COP, which has so far seen Article 17 as a side
issue, will rise to the challenge.

Funding Streams and Practical
Obstacles
The study group’s final recommendation, while simple, is
arguably the most important. Many of the other recommendations for action will require funding, including further research,
expanding infrastructure, technical assistance, monitoring, and
market support. Over the life of the FCTC, Parties have been reticent to assign a meaningful percentage of the budget to alternative livelihoods work. This reflects a common, and quite correct,
attitude among tobacco control professionals that demand-based
interventions are the priority. Even on the supply side, it is
tobacco smuggling that receives the lion’s share of attention.
There is also a perception among many that tobacco farmers, as a part of the tobacco industry, are part of the problem and
should be left out of any solution. FCTC Article 5.3 specifically
calls for such a policy: “In setting and implementing their public
health policies with respect to tobacco control, Parties shall act
to protect these policies from commercial and other vested interests of the tobacco industry in accordance with national law.”54
The perception that farmers should be included as members
of the tobacco industry contradicts the FCTC itself, however,
which defines the tobacco industry as “tobacco manufacturers,
wholesale distributors and importers of tobacco products.”55
Finally, the needs of tobacco farmers receive short shrift
due to the compartmentalization of problems. The phenomenon
is not limited to tobacco control or public health, but is universal and very natural. Tobacco control focuses on a problem that
simply doesn’t include the plight of farmers. The focus of public
health when it comes to tobacco was summarized very clearly in
the chapeau of the FCTC:
The objective of this Convention and its protocols is
to protect present and future generations from the devastating health, social, environmental and economic
consequences of tobacco consumption and exposure to
tobacco smoke by providing a framework for tobacco
control measures to be implemented by the Parties at
the national, regional and international levels in order
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to reduce continually and substantially the prevalence
of tobacco use and exposure to tobacco smoke.56
Without a doubt, most public health professionals working
in the tobacco control field, on a personal level, are also sympathetic to the plight of tobacco farmers. They simply do not
wish to see time and resources diverted from the core issues of
tobacco control.
This discrimination against core WHO funding for Article
17 issues is mirrored by private funding sources. In January of
2007, billionaire and New York City Mayor Michael Bloomberg
announced a major funding initiative to aid global tobacco control efforts.57 With additional financial support from the Bill and
Melinda Gates Foundation, this now amounts to hundreds of
millions of dollars a year, a massive increase over the sparse
funds allocated by WHO and donor countries in the past.58 Public health professionals in low and middle income countries who
wish to be considered for a grant under the initiative are directed
to an explanatory web page, which includes the following information: “What kind of projects will NOT be funded? The grants
program is NOT designed to fund education programs (schoolbased or otherwise) nor is it designed to fund agricultural or
crop-substitution programs.”59
However, there are reasons to differentiate between farmers and the rest of the tobacco industry. First, the FCTC explicitly carves farmers and farm workers out for special treatment.60
The FCTC is a legally-binding instrument. When considering
any one aspect, Parties must take into account all of its obligations. This does not necessarily mean that farmers must receive
attention and funding equal to more mainstream tobacco control
strategies, but it would be antithetical to the spirit of the main
document to treat them as partners in one aspect but lump them
in with tobacco manufacturers in another.
Second, farmers are in some respects natural allies of the
tobacco control movement, since they are often victims of the
tobacco industry, albeit in a different form than consumers and
those exposed to secondhand smoke. Large tobacco farmer
unions, which are controlled by international leaf buyer companies, have attempted to influence the ad hoc study group’s
work. However, a number of smaller unions and cooperatives
have joined forces with public health groups to support the study
group.
There are few in the public health community who would
argue to shift existing tobacco control resources in order to pay
for programs to aid farmers to move away from tobacco. It is
therefore unlikely that either public or private entities will decide
upon such a diversion. Clearly, if progress is to be made on this
issue, either new money must be found, or an existing funding
stream for a related issue must be diverted.
Strong evidence already exists that funding crop diversity,
substitution, and alternative livelihoods would not be wasted.61
In the United States, the state of Maryland has successfully
reduced tobacco cultivation by eighty-six percent in a decade
through a voluntary buyout program.62 Tobacco is a traditional
crop in Maryland and, for most of its roughly four hundred year
history, has been its leading commercial agricultural product.
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Funding for the buyout came via the Master Settlement Agreement, a landmark legal settlement between most U.S. states and
the tobacco industry, compensating governments for public
health expenditures. The State’s plan included three steps:
1. The tobacco buyout—Farmers voluntarily entered into a
contract with the State to cease tobacco farming permanently while continuing to use the land for agriculture
for ten years. In exchange, farmers received compensation for ten years based on earlier tobacco yields.
2. Infrastructure/agricultural development—The State
funded development of alternative industries, such as
vegetables, flowers, etc.
3. Agricultural land preservation—The State offered further incentives for farmers to place former tobacco lands
in agricultural preservation.63
To be sure, not many developing countries will have the
financial means to adopt the Maryland strategy wholesale. But
other experiments are underway and showing signs of success.
According to studies presented at the second meeting of the
FCTC ad hoc study group on alternative livelihoods:
•	In Mexico, a reconversion project run by the Government
aims to seize the opportunity opened by current international
food prices to promote cultivation of vegetables, fruits and
grains.
• In Kenya, bamboo was found to grow well under agroclimatic conditions similar to those for tobacco; this crop
was selected on the basis of potential demand, its multiple
uses, and the low investment and labor costs required.
• In India, the net returns from cropping systems were found
to be higher than from tobacco monoculture.
• In Bangladesh, viable crop combinations were identified on
the basis of food requirements, cash earnings, and improving soil health, as well as increasing livestock-keeping.
• In Pakistan, the State is involved in research on economically viable alternative crop cycles, particularly in the case
of hybrid spring maize and hybrid sunflowers.64
Brazil is also experimenting with a model promoting alternative livelihoods beyond crop substitution that focuses on five
types of capital: natural, human, physical or infrastructure, financial, and social.65 Much research remains to be done, and there
will be no one solution that fits every country, or even every
region in a single country.

Conclusion
From one perspective, the need to promote a global transition away from tobacco leaf cultivation is not urgent. The WHO
and the World Bank expect a dramatic increase in the number of
smokers worldwide from approximately 1.1 billion today to 1.6
billion in 2025.66 Demand for tobacco leaf will therefore actually go up, not down, for the foreseeable future, offering a potential livelihood for farmers for decades.
The purpose of Article 17, however, is to help farmers transition away from tobacco cultivation before the market forces them
out. There is presently a unique opportunity to take advantage of
increased global demand and prices for food. Several changes are
Sustainable Development Law & Policy

required to fully realize this opportunity. First, the compartmentalization of problems must be solved, meaning greater cooperation among disparate but interested parties. The ad hoc study
group has been admirable in reaching out to other groups, such
as FAO, the UN Ad Hoc Interagency Task Force on Tobacco
Control, the International Labour Union, the World Bank, and
others. What is needed is an umbrella group, comprised of
experts from each group, focused on bringing various resources
together to face the issue. Perhaps this could be a UN task force
on alternative livelihoods for tobacco farmers. Such a group
could coordinate research and allocate funds for pilot projects.
Second, funding streams must be found. The most obvious
place to start is with tobacco industry profits. In 2005, revenues
for Altria alone were nearly $98 billion.67 Article 6 of the FCTC
calls for Parties to implement excise taxes on tobacco products
in order to raise the price and therefore reduce demand.68 A side
benefit, of course, is greater government revenue. A relatively
small earmark would provide large sums to help farmers through
infrastructure development, crop experimentation, and debt
relief, among others.

Another source is development funding, both public bilateral and private. As we have seen, transitioning farmers away
from tobacco cultivation cuts across a number of issues, including food, environment, labor, and social justice. Presently, each
funding mechanism seems to view the problem as outside its
mandate. Private foundations should consider an overarching group, similar to the UN group called for above, to address
how to best use existing funds to target tobacco farmers. Donor
nations must reevaluate priorities.
As populations rise and environmental degradation reduces
the amount of arable land on the planet, humanity can ill-afford
to spend land and labor on growing a crop that causes a social
ill. The need for new alternatives is obvious and the opportunity
and funds exist. All that is needed is the will of the international
community. The FCTC ad hoc study group on alternative livelihoods has produced an excellent set of recommendations for the
Conference of the Parties. However, the message needs to be
heard beyond the mandate of a single treaty mechanism.
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Sustainable Soils: Reducing, Mitigating, and Adapting to
Climate Change with Organic Agriculture
by Meredith Niles*

O

Introduction

n April 2, 2007, the U.S. Supreme Court handed down
its decision in Massachusetts v. EPA, its first case dealing with the issue of global warming.1 Yet, even before
the ruling, the effects of climate change were already being felt
and documented throughout the world. In late 2007, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate
Change (“IPCC”) released its
Fourth Assessment Report,
which famously noted that
warming of the global climate
system is now “unequivocal.”2
As policymakers throughout
the world continue to feel the
impacts of climate change and
are compelled to action, oversight measures aimed at reducing greenhouse gas (“GHG”)
emissions and their impacts
can no longer ignore the effect
of industrial agriculture on climate change. Similarly, policymakers should recognize the role
organic agriculture can play in stabilizing and lessening the
impacts of climate change, and provide adequate funding for
transition programs and initiatives utilizing organic production
methods.
The IPCC’s Fourth Assessment Report, and several subsequent reports, including a recent synthesis and assessment report
by the U.S. Climate Change Science Program (“CCSP”), all
conclude that climate change is already occurring and will likely
accelerate in the future.3 New research suggests that our food
system will be singularly affected by climate change. Agricultural yields in the United States are set to notably decrease for
crops ranging from corn to rice to sorghum.4 Longer growing
seasons will increase crop water requirements,5 while rainfall
events will become more sporadic and the intensity of rainfall
events is expected to increase, resulting in more significant flood
conditions.6 Weed growth is projected to blossom as weeds
respond positively to higher carbon dioxide (“CO2”) levels, and
glyphosate, the most frequently used herbicide in the United
States, will lose its efficacy.7 Warmer temperatures will also
likely increase the insect and pest populations throughout the
United States, and a recent study has demonstrated that soybeans
grown at elevated CO2 levels had more than fifty percent more
insect damage than soybeans grown in normal conditions.8

Such significant damage to our food system would have
widespread implications throughout the world. As the evidence
of climate change continues to mount, oversight paradigms like
regional cap-and-trade programs have focused mostly on the
industrial and transportation sectors as targets of GHG emissions mitigation. To date, the agricultural sector has been largely
overlooked as both a source of
GHG emissions and a potential
tool for mitigation. Estimates of
agricultural GHG emissions, as
a percentage of total emissions,
range from 13.5% to nearly 33%
of all global emissions.9 Furthermore, the U.N. Food and Agriculture Organization (“FAO”)
estimates that animal production
alone accounts for eighteen percent of global GHG emissions.10
In comparison, transportation
emissions account for a little
over thirteen percent of total
global GHG emissions.11 Clearly, there is a need for a shift in
climate change policy to address the agricultural sector.
As policymakers and individuals grapple with ways to
reduce carbon footprints, it is essential that agriculture be recognized as a sector that needs to decrease its GHG emissions.
Such reductions are essential, as they are in other sectors; however, agriculture has a unique role to play in climate change
discussions because of its potential to mitigate GHG emissions
through carbon sequestration, as well as lessen and prevent climate change impacts on agricultural, land, and water systems.
This article will discuss recent and mounting evidence which
suggests that organic agriculture, more than any other production system, has the greatest potential for combating climate
change by reducing overall GHG emissions, sequestering more

The agricultural
sector has been largely
overlooked as both a
source of GHG emissions
and a potential tool
for mitigation.
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carbon, and promoting land management that lessens or eliminates the potential climate change impacts on land and agricultural systems.
Reducing GHG emissions in agriculture and adapting to
climate change will depend on organic production systems for
three reasons:
1) The overall emission reductions possible using organic
production methods;
2) The increased ability of organic production systems to
sequester carbon; and
3) The demonstrated ability of organic production to better adapt to potential climate change related events,
including drought, floods, pest increase, and loss of
biodiversity.

Reducing Emissions through Organic
Production Methods
Agriculture in the United States has changed significantly
in the past several decades. Farming has shifted largely toward
the adoption of industrial practices that rely heavily on synthetic
chemical pesticides and fertilizers, equipment and machinery
reliant on fossil fuels, and monoculture. Most large farms now
grow only one crop, typically corn or soybeans. The industrialization of our food system has had a heavy impact on the
environment and played a major role in increasing global GHG
emissions—especially with the rapid adoption of synthetic fertilizers and pesticides.12
Each year, the U.S. food system uses nearly 40 billion
pounds of synthetic fertilizers13 and more than one billion
pounds of synthetic pesticides.14 The GHG emissions associated
with the production, packaging, transport, and application of
these chemicals contribute to climate change and air pollution.
The production of synthetic fertilizers and pesticides contributes more than 480 million tons of GHG emissions to the atmosphere each year.15 The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
(“EPA”) estimates that, once on our soils, synthetic fertilizers
generate over 304 million pounds of GHG emissions.16 Frequent
over-application of synthetic fertilizers results in “run-off” when
fertilizers are carried off of fields during weather events and irrigation.17 Build-up of synthetic fertilizers has caused hypoxia, or
“dead zones” lacking sufficient oxygen, in water bodies throughout the world where animals, plants, and plankton are dying in
vast quantities.18
Shifting to organic production systems will cause an immediate drop in GHG emissions as organic production systems produce fewer GHG emissions than conventional industrial farming
systems. FAO concluded that, “[w]ith lower energy inputs,
organic systems contribute less to GHG emissions and have a
greater potential to sequester carbon in biomass than conventional systems.”19 Because organic production systems are prohibited from using synthetic fertilizers and pesticides, they often
rely on less intensive methods for fertilization including animal
manure, cover crops, and integrated pest management strategies.20 Research performed at the Rodale Institute, in conjunction with Cornell University, demonstrated that a conventional
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corn production system required significantly more energy per
hectare than organic systems.21 The reduced reliance on fossil
fuel energy in the organic system reduced energy inputs about
thirty percent, mostly because the organic systems relied on
animal and legume nitrogen nutrients rather than synthetic fertilizers and pesticides.22 In addition, nitrate leaching from fertilizers is significantly higher for intensive conventional systems
as compared to organic systems,23 and organic compost has the
ability to reduce nitrogen and phosphorus leaching five fold
when compared to synthetic fertilizers.24 Switching to organic
production will thus reduce not only initial GHG emissions from
the production of fertilizers, but will also prevent fertilizers from
leaching into waterways and exacerbating emissions in hypoxic
systems.
Many of the synthetic fertilizers and pesticides used in the
United States are for feed crops for animal production. It is
estimated that about half of the grain and oilseeds grown in the
United States are fed to livestock,25 and conventional grain-fed
beef requires twice as many energy inputs as grass-fed beef.26
Animals that are “grass-fed,” or produced using organic methods,
produce significantly fewer GHG emissions than conventionally
raised animals. Organic systems typically require fewer synthetic inputs and less energy to operate than conventional industrial facilities.27 In addition, because pastured systems require
fewer feed crops than confined systems, significant reductions
in nitrous oxide would result from a shift to grass-fed animal
production.28 Overall, the global warming potential of organic
animal production is about one third as much as intensive animal
farming.29 USDA-certified, grass-fed animals “cannot be fed
grain or grain byproducts and must have continuous access to
pasture during the growing season.”30 While some animals (like
chickens or pigs) do not eat grass and may rely on feed crops, if
raised organically the animals are fed 100% organic feed grown
without synthetic pesticides and fertilizers.31 Thus, organic meat
and dairy products result in significantly fewer GHG emissions
than conventional meat and dairy.32
Animal production contributes nearly one fifth of all global
GHG emissions,33 and in addition to the impact of synthetic
fertilizers and pesticides used on feed crops, manure management, and enteric fermentation are also significant sources of
GHG emissions.34 In 2007, EPA reported that livestock manure
management is responsible for over 55 million metric tons of
GHG emissions,35 mostly in the form of methane and nitrous
oxide, which are approximately 21 times and 310 times more
potent as GHGs than CO2, respectively.36 Improper manure
storage in large-scale, conventional animal production increase
GHG emissions because waste is often pooled in large lagoons
and holding ponds, rather than being directly incorporated into
soils.37 During manure storage and decomposition, gaseous byproducts including hydrogen sulfide, CO2, ammonia, and methane are produced and released into the atmosphere.38 Research
has documented that manure stores on conventional farms emitted about twenty-five percent more methane gas than organic
farms, demonstrating the significant impact that organic animal
production can have in reducing GHG emissions.39
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Carbon Sequestration in
Organic Agriculture
Addressing climate change issues involves not only reducing GHG emissions, but also incorporating mitigation techniques that can sequester excessive GHG emissions. More than
any other sector, agriculture is uniquely positioned to sequester
vast amounts of carbon and thus reduce the impacts of climate
change. Microbes and other soil organisms play a vital role in
maintaining the health of agricultural soils as they decompose
organic matter, cycle nutrients, and convert atmospheric nitrogen into organic forms.40 EPA estimates that composting one
ton of organic materials results in a net storage of nearly 600
pounds of CO2.41 While all types
of agriculture have the ability to
sequester carbon, organic agriculture can sequester significantly
more carbon than conventional
systems, and even conventional
no-till systems,42 because organic
agriculture prohibits synthetic fertilizer and pesticide use, incorporates leguminous cover crops, and
prioritizes increasing soil organic
matter.43 Moreover, several studies have shown that organic soils
can sequester more carbon than
conventional soils and that synthetic fertilizer can have a negative impact on carbon sequestration.44
In comparisons of field trials of organic and conventional
farming plots, researchers found that while soil carbon levels were initially the same, after more than two decades the
organic systems had significantly higher soil carbon levels. The
organic systems—one using legume cover crops and the other
using manure—retained more carbon in the soil, “resulting
in an annual soil carbon increase of 981 and 574 kg per hectare . . . , compared with only 293 kg per hectare in the conventional system.”45 Similar long-term research at the United
States Department of Agriculture (“USDA”) demonstrated that
organic agriculture increased overall soil health more than conventional no-till methods and resulted in increased yields over
conventional production.46 In addition, carbon sequestration is
not exclusive to crop systems and can also provide substantial
opportunities for farmers in animal production.47

temperatures, reduced water availability, and altered
frequency of extreme events and severe storms.48
One of the greatest challenges of climate change will be finding ways to adapt to its myriad potential impacts. Securing and
maintaining a food system that can continue to produce, despite
unexpected weather and climate events, is crucial for the future.
Organic agriculture, which is more resilient to climate change
impacts, will be a necessary component to this challenge.
Among the greatest threats of climate change will be the
impact on biodiversity and the potential global loss of life. Biodiversity contributes to ecosystem functioning and maintenance;
as biodiversity decreases it will be extremely difficult to retrieve
and recover.49 Endangered and
extinct species are already documented throughout the world,
but climate change is causing more subtle losses in species and diversity.50 Many of
the species more prevalent in
organic farming were known
to have declining diversity and
numbers as a result of previous
agriculture intensification. 51
The biodiversity benefits associated with organic farms likely
derive from the management
practices absent from or rarely utilized in most conventional
systems.52 Specifically, organic farms have considerably more
spiders,53 birds,54 butterflies,55 and other species,56 in both number and species count. Maintaining biodiversity on farms will be
crucial to sustaining food production and ecosystem functions
and organic production can certainly perform this task.
Climate change also has the potential to threaten agriculture through changing water and weather patterns increasing
both drought and run-off.57 Soil organic matter and soil carbon
content are important for water absorption and retention and can
be greatly affected by changes in these elements.58 Increasing
organic matter in soils leads to a direct increase in the ability of
soils to retain water59 and will be an important tool for combating drought and potential flood conditions from increasing snow
melt and runoff.60 Organic soils have higher levels of soil carbon and research has shown that in drought conditions, organic
systems produced corn yields twenty-eight to thirty-four percent
higher than conventional systems.61 As weather patterns and precipitation continue to change, organic agriculture will be better
able to adapt and continue to produce in uncertain conditions.

Organic agriculture, more
than any other production
system, has the greatest
potential for combating
climate change.

Utilizing Organic Agriculture to Adapt to
Climate Change Impacts
Climate change will impact many aspects of our lives, but
the effects on agriculture may be the most noteworthy. CCSP
noted:
Ecosystems and their service (land and water resources,
agriculture, biodiversity) experience a wide range of
stresses, including pests and pathogens, invasive species, air pollution, extreme events and natural disturbances such as wildfires and flood. Climate change
can cause or exacerbate direct stress through high
21

Providing the Framework for Transitioning
to Climate Resilient Agriculture
Climate change is real, and its current and foreseeable future
impacts can no longer be overlooked. As policymakers in the
United States examine ways to reduce GHG emissions, mitigate
climate change, and adapt for its effects, it is apparent that our
food and agriculture system cannot be ignored. Conventional
agriculture cannot continue on the same path because it causes a
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significant portion of our global and domestic GHG emissions.
Without a paradigm shift in farming, excessive and unnecessary
GHG emissions will continue and our food system will become
ever more susceptible to collapse as a result of climate change.
The policy and legal approaches to addressing climate
change through agriculture must involve a transition to a more
organic way of farming. In 2007, the U.S. government allocated more than $3.7 billion in direct subsidies for corn, soy,
and wheat.62 Less than one percent of corn, soy, and wheat are
grown organically in the United States, meaning almost all of
these subsidies were given for industrial or conventional production.63 Moreover, as described by Environmental Working
Group:
Direct payment subsidies are provided without regard
to the economic need of the recipients or the financial
condition of the farm economy. Established in 1996,
direct payments were originally meant to wean farmers
off traditional subsidies that are triggered during periods of low prices for corn, wheat, soybeans, cotton, rice
and other crops.64
Yet, prices for these commodities are currently at record
highs, with the cost of corn per bushel rising nearly sixty percent
between 2006 and 2007.65
Such subsidies contribute to significant increases in annual
GHG emissions and promote increased production and over-application of synthetic fertilizers, loss of biodiversity, and simplification of the soil that leads to reduced soil health, which in turn
reduces carbon sequestration capacity. Meaningful reductions in
GHG emissions from agriculture will require broad-based and
large-scale legislative initiatives that stop rewarding an agriculture system that is worsening the global climate change crisis. Billions of dollars of subsidies for conventional production
could be reallocated to organic transition programs and water
and land conservation initiatives that will ensure that agriculture
in the United States will continue to produce and function.

Increasing Funding for Organic Certification,
Conservation and Conversion
The 2008 Farm Bill allocated a total of $22 million for
the national organic certification cost share program, which is
designed to help decrease the amount of money farmers pay for
organic certification.66 While this allocation did increase the
annual cost-share eligibility from $500 to $750 per operation,67
it pales in comparison to the vast subsidies received by larger
conventional industrial farms. The National Organic Program
received $39 million through 201268 and was authorized up to
$10 million dollars for organic research.69 To foster the transition of farmers to organic production systems and reduce GHG
emissions, future legislation must allocate significantly greater
funds.
Unique opportunities also lie in providing carbon offsets to
farmers who transition to organic agriculture. Given the increasing evidence that organic agriculture is better suited to sequester
carbon, offset programs established within cap-and-trade programs and public-based carbon offset initiatives should consider
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adding offset components for agriculture. Currently, only a few
agriculture-based offset programs are in place within cap-andtrade programs, including a methane digester offset program in
the Northeast Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative.70 While converting methane from manure can reduce emissions, research
estimates that methane digesters could potentially only provide
about 0.0002% of the energy currently consumed in the United
States.71 Moreover, the compression of methane gas requires
significant amounts of energy, which may offset any potential
emissions reductions.72 Transportation of methane gas may also
present difficulties, as most large scale farms will be able to produce more gas than they can use on farm; yet, given the economic investment of digesters, only large farms are usually able
to invest in this technology.73 Creating opportunities for farmers
transitioning to organic production to receive carbon credits will
create incentives for organic production and also help decrease
the costs of transition.
to

Reducing Feed Crops and Transitioning
Pasture-based Organic Animal Production

With roughly fifty percent of grains grown in the United
States being fed to livestock, much of corn, soy, and wheat subsidies are diverted to animal production.74 Livestock and animal
production is an important source of income for billions of people
throughout the world; yet, our current production methods are
not sustainable. Transitioning livestock production to pasturebased organic systems will utilize grasses unsuitable for human
consumption and, through proper management, increase carbon
sequestration.75 Reducing crop production for animal feed is
one of the most efficient methods for mitigating GHG emissions
from agriculture76 and ensuring sustainable food sources in the
face of increasing fossil fuel prices. “[N]o other form of agriculture is less dependent on external, finite resources, such as fossil fuels, and/or external, potentially environmentally disruptive
resources, such as fertilizers or pesticides, than grazing of native
grasslands.”77

Advocating for Organic Conservation
Measures
Transitioning to organic agriculture is not a process that can
happen overnight and will certainly require significant investments of time and money. Yet, in the meantime, many organic
practices can be incorporated into existing conventional farming
methods that will help to reduce GHG emissions. For example,
integrating perennial crops, riparian zones, cover crops, and
grasslands, and increasing crop diversity on farms have a demonstrated ability to not only reduce the climate change impacts
of agriculture, but also increase yields and decrease costs associated with land management and fertilizer.78
Traditionally, the USDA’s Conservation Reserve Program
(“CRP”) has assisted farmers and ranchers to comply with federal, state, and tribal environmental laws, and encourages farmers,
by providing annual rental payments under multi-year contracts,
“to convert erodible cropland or other environmentally sensitive
acreage to vegetative cover” including native grasses, trees, or
22

riparian buffers.79 The CRP has increased carbon sequestration
and promoted the maintenance of important ecosystem functions that help reduce environmental pollution. Since 1985, the
program “has protected 170,000 miles of streams and restored
2 million acres of wetlands and buffer zones.”80 Unfortunately,
with recent steady increases in ethanol production, land-use has
begun to change. Subsidies for ethanol production have caused
land previously held in reserve under the CRP to be taken out of
conservation for corn production.81 In 2006, USDA Chief Economist Dr. Keith Collins testified before the Senate Committee on
Environment & Public Works about ethanol production, noting
that the CRP, “which has 36 million acres set aside from crop
production for environmental reasons, may provide a source of
additional crop acreage. . . . [A] preliminary assessment concluded that 4.3 to 7.2 million acres currently enrolled in the CRP
could be used to grow corn or soybeans . . . .”82
Policies that advocate for the removal of CRP land for
ethanol production will not decrease GHG emissions.83 Instead,
increased ethanol production is releasing carbon stores in grasslands and creating a “carbon debt.”84 If ethanol production
increases to the congressionally suggested 15-36 billion gallons
by 2022, nitrogen fluxes into the Gulf of Mexico could increase
by as much as thirty-four percent.85 Such measures would have
devastating effects on water quality, aquatic ecosystems, and
GHG emissions. Policies encouraging ethanol production, specifically with land-use changes, should be strongly reconsidered
in this context and re-evaluated for their overall effectiveness at
reducing GHG emissions. Instead, CRP funding should continue

and be strengthened to encourage organic conservation methods
to be incorporated into farms throughout the country.

Conclusions
Climate change is a critical environmental issue and has
broad implications for sustainable development and the future
of our economy, health, and food system. The ability to respond
to the momentous task of regulating GHG emissions will have
implications for the overall well-being of our entire country.
Reducing and sequestering GHG emissions and adapting to
climate change impacts demand comprehensive approaches
that fully integrate agriculture, recognizing its contribution
to climate change and unique ability to sequester GHG emissions and reduce climate change impacts. Organic agriculture
offers much hope for the future of environmental sustainability and food production and should be recognized for the many
contributions it can make. Providing and increasing funding for
organic transition, certification, and conservation programs will
allow the United States and other countries throughout the world
to reduce and offset GHG emissions. At the same time, organic
agriculture policy initiatives will ensure environmental protection in our waterways and promote biodiverse ecosystems in the
face of looming global reductions in species. Ensuring the future
of our environment and the vitality of our food systems in the
shadow of climate change depends on organic production systems and our ability to transition to more sustainable agricultural
policies.
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USDA Organic:
Ecopornography or a Label Worth Searching For?
by Blake M. Mensing*

“E

copornography,”1 more commonly known as
greenwashing,2 is a term that applies to any entity
that disseminates disinformation in order to promote
an environmentally friendly public image without actually taking significant action to protect the environment.3 Greenwashing
is pervasive and a nearly unavoidable component of consumers’
evaluations of potential purchases.4 Food producers and packagers are often guilty of greenwashing their products to appeal to
the environmentally conscious consumer by using such terms as
“free range”5 or “all natural.”6 The United States Department of
Agriculture (“USDA”) has set standards for the use of the word
“organic” on food labels. These standards, while significantly
more meaningful than those behind the “free range” label, are by
no means the most stringent in the world.7 Is the USDA organic
label indicative of an environmentally friendly product or is it
greenwashing?
The 1990 Organic Foods Production Act8 provided for the
formation of a National Organic Standards Board (“NOSB”)
within the USDA’s Agricultural Marketing Service.9 The NOSB
serves as an advisor to the Secretary of Agriculture in promulgating the final standards that the USDA National Organic
Program oversees.10 The USDA organic labeling standards are
broken down into four categories. The first category allows
100% organic products to carry the USDA organic logo. 11 In
the second category, the USDA organic logo may appear on the
packaging if, excluding water and salt, the product is ninety-five
percent organic by weight.12 Third, the front panel of a product
made with seventy percent organic content may state that the
product is “made with organic” and it may list a maximum of
three organic ingredients.13 Last, if the product is made with less
than seventy percent organic content, the back or side panel may
list those ingredients that are organic.14
Since October 21, 2002, it has been a federal offense punishable with a maximum civil penalty of $10,000 to place the word
“organic” on any food product that has not been certified by a
USDA accredited certifier or state certification program.15 Making uncertified labeling a federal offense should tend to reduce
the probability of greenwashing. However, it is important to note
that although the organic certification process focuses on the
materials and methods of production,16 some synthetic materials
are nonetheless allowed in foods labeled “USDA organic.”17 For
example, nitrates and nitrites are permitted in organic meats.18
These chemicals give meat the bright red color that, to the average consumer, denotes “freshness.”19 Meat that does not have
nitrates or nitrites added will naturally turn an unappetizing grey
color before it decomposes or spoils.20 Consumers are eating
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chemically dyed meat carrying the USDA organic label. Despite
the strict certification process behind the USDA organic label, 21
a charge with significant gravamen may be leveled at the agency
for allowing synthetics in foods labeled “organic.”22
Synthetic additives permitted under an organic label are not
the only area of weakness in the USDA labeling standard. The
USDA may validly be charged with greenwashing for the standards behind the “free range” label, which on its face seems to
indicate safe and humane treatment of animals raised for consumption. However, under USDA standards, an animal that is
“free range” must be given merely the opportunity to go outside for an undetermined period of time.23 There is no actual
guarantee under the “free range” label standard that the animal
exited its enclosure.24 A willingness on the part of the USDA to
lend credence to “free range” labels raises suspicions about the
organic label as well.
If the USDA organic label is bordering on greenwash, then
what standard is worth searching for? One possible answer is
the Demeter Biodynamic certification, which imposes more
stringent requirements than the USDA organic certification standard.25 Debio, Norway’s national organic certification body,
includes the Demeter standard in its organic certifications.26 The
Demeter standard has long enjoyed popularity in Europe, Australia, and New Zealand,27 and is currently used in wineries and
vineyards in the United States.28 It focuses on treating a farm as
a living organism, with frequently-composted soil as its heart.29
Because the Demeter standard goes above and beyond what the
USDA requires for its “organic” label, using the standard would
help assuage the fears of American consumers facing a heavilygreenwashed marketplace.30 The current USDA standard has
been watered down to the point of greenwashing because synthetics such as nitrites are permitted in “organic” food. For the
organic label to be meaningful, the standards behind it must be
closer to the Demeter standard and further from today’s “USDA
Organic” standard.
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The Growing Supply of Ecolabeled
Seafood: An Economic Perspective
by Nicolai V. Kuminoff, Darrell J. Bosch, Dan Kauffman, Jaren C. Pope, & Kurt Stephenson*

C

Introduction

onsumers respond to names and labels on food products. In the seafood industry, this has led to the renaming of species that sound like they would taste bad. For
example, “slimehead” (Hoplostethus atlanticus) was renamed as
“orange roughy” in order to increase its marketability in restaurants and supermarkets.1 Unfortunately the marketing strategy
worked too well. After first becoming widely available in the
United States in the 1980s, this New Zealand and Australian
fish became so popular that it was overfished and the population crashed.2 Today, orange roughy is on the Monterey Bay
Aquarium’s “Seafood Watch” list of fish to avoid.3 The Seafood
Watch list is part of a growing effort by independent organizations and government agencies to inform consumers about the
health of fisheries and the sustainability of their harvesting practices. The seafood industry has begun to use this information to
develop ecolabels for fish caught from fisheries that are managed sustainably.
Ecolabeling refers to placing a seal of approval on a product
to recognize that it has been certified as meeting specific criteria for the environmental impacts of its production process.
The largest independent certification program for fisheries is the
Marine Stewardship Council (“MSC”).4 Wild fisheries that satisfy the Council’s criteria for sustainability may display its seal
on their products.5 This ecolabel is intended to induce consumers
to pay a premium for sustainable seafood or to consume MSC
certified products rather than unlabeled seafood. If consumers
are willing to pay a premium for ecolabeled seafood, they will
provide an economic incentive for fisheries to shift toward more
sustainable production practices.
Seafood bearing the MSC label is currently sold in thirtynine countries and can be found in major supermarkets including
Wal-Mart and Whole Foods.6 Since the number of fisheries currently seeking MSC certification is more than twice as large as
the number currently certified, the supply of ecolabeled seafood
will continue to grow in the near future.7 This article describes
the growing market for ecolabeled seafood and provides an
economic perspective on emerging legal and policy issues. We
begin with an overview of the different ecolabeling schemes,
with emphasis on the Marine Stewardship Council. We then
summarize the state of knowledge on the demand for ecolabeled
seafood and discuss three issues: conflicting labeling claims,
the impact of ecolabeling on the demand for fish which are harvested sustainably but not sold under an ecolabel, and the effect
of ecolabeling on the health of aquatic ecosystems.
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Seafood Ecolabeling and the Certification
of Sustainable Fisheries
Perhaps the first non-governmental effort to bring fisheries
management to the attention of consumers was the Earth Island’s
Institute campaign for “dolphin safe” tuna. The campaign took
off in 1988, when an Earth Island employee videotaped dolphins
drowning in tuna nets.8 This campaign was instrumental in passing federal legislation and getting major U.S. tuna packers to
change their harvest practices and put “dolphin safe” labels on
their cans.
In 1996 the World Wildlife Fund and Unilever, a multinational corporation, jointly developed an independent organization to certify sustainable fisheries—the Marine Stewardship
Council.9 Subsequently, other independent certifying organizations have been formed, such as the Monterey Bay Aquarium’s
Seafood Watch program.10 Meanwhile, industry groups such as
the Alaska Seafood Marketing Institute have developed their
own sustainability criteria.11 International growth in seafood
ecolabeling has also led the Food and Agriculture Organization
of the United Nations to issue broad guidelines for ecolabeling
of marine products.12 Domestically, the U.S. National Oceanic
and Atmospheric Administration’s (“NOAA”) Fish Watch program tracks whether specific fisheries meet the ten conservation
and management standards defined by the Magnuson-Stevens
Fishery Conservation and Management Act.13 For the interested
seafood consumer, there is clearly a wealth of information about
the sustainability of fisheries.
Today, the Marine Stewardship Council is still the largest
independent third-party certification program and its sustainability seal is the most widely recognized seafood ecolabel.14 The
label is intended to provide consumers with information about
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the sustainability of the seafood they purchase in order to help
them make informed decisions in the marketplace.15
To receive MSC certification, a fishery must demonstrate
that it complies with three broad principles for sustainable
fishing:16
MSC Principle 1: A fishery must be conducted in a
manner that does not lead to over-fishing or depletion
of the exploited populations and, for those populations
that are depleted, the fishery must be conducted in a
manner that demonstrably leads to their recovery.
MSC Principle 2: Fishing operations should allow for
the maintenance of the structure, productivity, function
and diversity of the ecosystem (including habitat and
associated dependent and ecologically related species)
on which the fishery depends.
MSC Principle 3: The fishery is subject to an effective
management system that respects local, national and
international laws and standards and incorporates institutional and operational frameworks that require use of
the resource to be responsible and sustainable.17
These general principles underlie twenty-three specific criteria that each fishery must satisfy in order to license the MSC
ecolabel.18 For example, one of the criteria that must be satisfied under MSC Principle three is that mechanisms must be in
place to limit or close the fishery when designated catch limits
are reached.19 Likewise, fisheries must demonstrate that they do
not use poisons or explosives.20
A fishery seeking MSC certification can hire an independent
certifier who has been accredited by MSC to determine whether
their harvesting practices meet MSC standards.21 Certification
lasts for five years and a fishery is also subject to annual audits.22
After a fishery has received certification, manufacturers and processors who want to use the MSC logo must pay an additional
licensing fee to do so. 23
Since 1997, the Marine Stewardship Council’s ecolabel has
been licensed by nearly fifty different seafood brands and over
200 specific products, which are sold in restaurants and national
supermarket chains in the United States.24 This is not limited to
small organic groceries and local health food stores. National retail
chains have become interested in the MSC label. Whole Foods,
the nation’s largest retailer of organic foods, started supporting
the MSC label in 1999.25 In February 2006, Wal-Mart announced
that it would purchase all of its wild-caught fresh and frozen seafood from MSC certified fisheries within three to five years.26
One limitation of the Marine Stewardship Council’s certification program is that its standards only apply to wild capture
fisheries. MSC does not currently certify aquaculture and has no
plans to do so in the future.27 Other independent organizations
do monitor aquaculture. The Monterey Bay Aquarium’s Seafood Watch Program, begun in 1999, developed a “stoplight”
system for reporting the sustainability of both wild caught and
aquaculture fisheries. Its regional “pocket guides” use color coding to tell consumers whether a particular fish is a best choice
(green), a good alternative (yellow), or a fish to avoid (red).28
Compared to MSC, Seafood Watch is more comprehensive in its
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coverage. Fisheries do not pay to be evaluated. Seafood Watch
conducts independent audits of major fisheries that serve different regions of the country.29 From an industry perspective,
however, Seafood Watch’s pocket guides are more difficult to
integrate into product labeling than the MSC label because the
guides are updated biannually whereas MSC certification lasts
for five years which facilitates longer term planning.
Have the Marine Stewardship Council, Seafood Watch, and
other ecolabeling programs been effective in promoting marine
conservation and sustainable fishing practices? At the time of
writing, thirty-five fisheries are certified by MSC and another
seventy-eight are undergoing the assessment process for potential future certification.30 These fisheries, which are located
around the world, have perceived the potential economic gains
from ecolabeling to be sufficiently large to induce them to pay
independent certifiers to verify that their fishing practices meet
MSC standards. Whether their short run investment in certification will translate into higher profits in the long run will depend
on the extent to which ecolabels increase the demand for sustainable seafood.

The Demand for Ecolabeled Seafood
Market data on the sales of ecolabeled seafood are only
beginning to become available. Without access to sales data,
seafood economists have traditionally relied on statistical analysis of consumer surveys to assess the potential demand for ecolabeled products. In one of the first studies of the demand for
ecolabeled seafood, economists at the University of Rhode Island
conducted a mail survey of 1,640 potential seafood consumers in
the lower forty-eight states during the fall of 1998. Participating
households were asked to make a hypothetical choice between
two regular seafood products (cod and shrimp) and ecolabeled
versions of the same products that would cost up to five dollars
more per pound.31 The survey results indicated that consumers
would be willing to pay a premium for ecolabeled seafood, but
that the size of the premium would differ across seafood products and consumer groups. Consumers with larger budgets and
those who were members of environmental organizations were
more likely to be willing to pay a premium for ecolabeled products.32 These results were reinforced by subsequent surveys of
consumers in the United Kingdom.33
While consumers say they are willing to pay more for ecolabeled seafood, it is less clear whether the increasing availability
of ecolabeled products will have a large impact on their purchasing decisions. Recent evidence suggests that while consumers
would be willing to pay more for ecolabeled versions of their
favorite fish products, this “ecolabel effect” is too small to convince average consumers to switch from their favorite fish (without an ecolabel) to a less preferred fish (with an ecolabel).34
As more ecolabeled seafood products have entered the
market, there have been some preliminary efforts to measure
the effects on demand. For instance, preliminary evidence from
supermarket scanner data suggests that the introduction of the
dolphin-safe tuna label increased the market share of canned
tuna by one percent between 1990 and 1995.35 However, this
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analysis focused on sales of all canned tuna relative to lunchmeat, red meat, and other seafood products and, therefore,
did not isolate the shift of consumption away from unlabeled
tuna and toward products bearing the dolphin-safe label. More
recently, after the New Zealand hoki fishery received its MSC
certification in 2001, the Unilever corporation increased its hoki
purchases by an estimated $3 million.36 Hoki prices rose in the
year after certification although the portion of the rise attributable to ecolabeling is difficult to estimate precisely.37
Overall, there is still very little evidence on the market
demand for ecolabeled seafood. Survey results indicate that
consumers would be willing to pay a premium for their favorite
ecolabeled fish in restaurants and supermarkets, and case studies
of specific fisheries indicate that ecolabels can increase returns
to the industry.38 Yet the magnitude of the “ecolabel effect” on
demand appears to be small. In order for consumers’ purchasing decisions to influence the sustainability of fisheries, the
price effect would have to pass through the marketing chain to
provide a sufficiently large incentive for fishermen to change
their harvesting practices.39 It is also important to remember
that the existing evidence on market demand is almost entirely
based on anecdotes and survey questions that ask consumers
to speculate on their hypothetical future purchasing decisions.
There is almost no market-based evidence on how consumers
have actually reacted to the recent introduction of fresh and frozen seafood products that have been certified by MSC or other
organizations.

Emerging Issues in Seafood Ecolabeling
The impact of ecolabeling on the demand for seafood is
one of many questions raised by the recent growth in the supply
of “sustainable” seafood. Other interesting issues for industry
experts, researchers, and policymakers to consider include labeling conflicts, the impact on the demand for seafood products
that lack ecolabels but meet standards for sustainability, and the
impact of ecolabeling on environmental quality.

Labeling Conflicts
Labeling conflicts can occur when different ecolabeling
schemes use the same terminology with different interpretations,
or when they present conflicting information. For example, consider two of Alaska’s fisheries: coho salmon and king crab. The
Marine Stewardship Council, Seafood Watch, NOAA’s Fish
Watch program, and the Alaska Seafood Marketing Institute
all seem to agree that the coho salmon fishery is sustainable.
Coho salmon has MSC certification, Seafood Watch gives it the
“green light,” NOAA’s Fish Watch program notes that Alaska’s
stocks are healthy, and the Alaska Seafood Marketing Institute
(“ASMI”) advertises that coho salmon is one of many sustainable fisheries in the state of Alaska, which is “one of the most
bountiful fishing regions on the planet, and has been recognized
as a world model for sustainability.”40
There is less agreement on Alaska king crab. While ASMI
includes king crab among its list of sustainable fisheries, the
crab fishery does not have MSC certification. 41 NOAA and
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Seafood Watch both report that Alaska’s red king crab population is healthy, but note that the pots used to catch crab can disturb aquatic habitat and result in bycatch of females, juveniles,
and non-targeted species.42 These concerns motivated Seafood
Watch to give Alaska king crab its “yellow light.”43
The differences in the way NOAA, MSC, Seafood Watch,
and ASMI characterize the sustainability of Alaska’s king crab
fishery exemplify a broader issue in ecolabeling and green marketing. Rapid growth in green marketing claims, conflicting
reports, and vague language can leave consumers misinformed
or confused. This is especially true when products are advertised
using adjectives like “sustainable,” “renewable,” “eco-friendly,”
and “green,” which are inherently vague or at least open to interpretation. In response to the growth in environmental marketing, the Federal Trade Commission recently began reviewing its
Guides for the Use of Environmental Marketing Claims, more
commonly known as the “Green Guides.” This process may
affect seafood ecolabeling practices because one of the issues
being reviewed is the allowable use of the word “sustainable”
among other environmental buzzwords that are frequently used
in product labeling and advertising.44

Unlabeled Sustainability: The Case of Chesapeake
Bay Oyster Aquaculture
A second issue is that the best known ecolabeling schemes
do not necessarily identify the fisheries with the strongest potential for sustainability. Oyster aquaculture in the Chesapeake Bay
provides an example. In the 1950s, the Chesapeake Bay was by far
the nation’s largest oyster fishery. Since then, disease and habitat
degradation have caused annual landings for the native Bay oyster (Crassostrea virginica) to decrease from 30 million pounds
to 0.3 million pounds, cutting U.S. oyster production in half.45
Small oyster harvests pose a concern for commercial growers
and people who care about water quality in the Bay. The oyster
fishery provides a source of income for growers and an economic base for some Chesapeake Bay communities. In addition,
oysters provide ecological services, particularly water filtration.
By filtering phytoplankton (and seston in general) oysters help
to improve water clarity.46 The nitrogen and phosphorus embodied in the filtered material can be removed from ambient waters
through natural biomass sequestration as well as through natural chemical transformation of oyster feces and pseudofeces.47
These processes in turn aid the growth of submerged aquatic
vegetation and help to protect essential habitat for other aquatic
species.48 The Chesapeake Bay states have noted the importance
of restoring oyster populations by signing the Chesapeake Bay
2000 Agreement, which aims for a tenfold increase in native
oysters in the Chesapeake Bay by 2010, among other goals.49
Commercial oyster aquaculture, which involves submersing
oysters in cages or floats, provides water quality services without
further depleting the wild oyster stock. This is a proven way to
overcome the disease, predation, and habitat degradation problems that have plagued oyster restoration in the Chesapeake Bay
region.50 If aquaculture is proven to be a financially viable means
of producing oysters, it may relieve pressure on wild stocks.
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Given the fishery’s extraordinary credentials for sustainability, developing an ecolabel for aquacultural oysters would
appear to have strong potential to promote conservation and
reward growers for the water quality services they provide.
Ironically, the MSC ecolabel is not available to the Chesapeake
Bay’s aquaculture oyster fishery because it is a form of aquaculture. NOAA’s Fish Watch program does not currently include
aquaculture oysters among the species it tracks, and the Chesapeake Bay growers do not currently engage in green marketing.51
While Seafood Watch gives aquaculture oysters a “green light”
and recognizes their water quality services, the Seafood Watch
pocket guides are only distributed in a limited number of restaurants and groceries.52 Thus, consumers may be largely unaware
that unlabeled aquaculture oysters from the Chesapeake Bay
meet Seafood Watch’s definition for sustainability and provide
additional water quality services.

The Impact of Ecolabeling on
Environmental Quality
Ecolabeling is a decentralized tool for obtaining the goals
of environmental policy. Will this tool lead to improved environmental quality? Recent research in economic theory has
suggested that the development of markets for “green” goods
presents both advantages and disadvantages with respect to environmental quality, and the net effect may be product specific.53
The possibility that the introduction of green goods could have
a detrimental effect on environmental quality is counterintuitive,
but can be illustrated by an example.
One of the key questions is whether the dimension of sustainability that is highlighted by an ecolabel is a substitute or a
complement for the seafood product itself. For example, aquaculture oysters remove some nitrogen and phosphorous from
the Chesapeake Bay through their normal filtration of water and
consumption of phytoplankton. Many consumers may enjoy eating oysters and may also want to improve water quality in the
Chesapeake Bay. But these same consumers may be reluctant
to eat “green” oysters that are labeled in a way that highlights
the fact that they remove nutrients from the Bay. Is there a special health risk associated with eating aquaculture oysters? Will
they taste bad? Of course not. Wild oysters provide the same
water filtration services as aquaculture oysters, and all saleable
oysters must be harvested in waters that are approved for shellfish consumption. The point is that it may be difficult to convey
this to consumers as part of an ecolabeling strategy that centers on water filtering services rather than simply one promoting
sustainable harvests. If oyster lovers are turned off by the idea

that aquaculture oysters are advertised as filter feeders (the “kidneys” of the Chesapeake Bay), they may seek out oysters from
wild populations that are harvested in a less sustainable manner.
A second issue is that the introduction of ecolabeled seafood
products (and “green” goods in general) has the potential to drive
out donations to environmental organizations. If consumers feel
that they are making their contribution to the health of aquatic
ecosystems by paying a premium for ecolabeled seafood, they
may be reluctant to make charitable contributions to environmental organizations such as the Chesapeake Bay Foundation.54
In this case, whether the introduction of a market for ecolabeled
seafood will ultimately improve the health of an aquatic ecosystem will depend partly on whether environmental organizations
are more or less effective in improving environmental quality
than fisheries which meet the criteria for sustainability that are
reflected by the presence of an ecolabel.

Conclusion
The challenges in developing sustainable fisheries are well
known. In the past, governments have sought to overcome these
challenges through policies which limit fishing effort, catch
rates, and harvests for wild fisheries. Ecolabeling offers a more
decentralized approach to environmental policy by seeking to
illuminate the connection between the choices we make in the
marketplace and their environmental consequences. While the
ecolabeling of seafood is still relatively new, a variety of government, industry, and independent third-party organizations
have developed schemes during the past decade to measure the
sustainability of fisheries.
Evidence based on the number of fisheries that have
obtained or are currently seeking ecolabeled status suggests that
the market for ecolabeled seafood will continue to grow. The
number of wild fisheries seeking MSC certification is more than
double the number of fisheries currently certified. This growth
raises a number of important questions. Is there a significant
long-run demand for ecolabeled seafood, or are fisheries overly
optimistic? How can conflicting ecolabeling claims be resolved?
Will the introduction of ecolabels decrease the demand for sustainable seafood that is not ecolabeled? Will ecolabeling actually improve the health of aquatic ecosystems? What are the
best strategies for conveying ecolabel information to consumers to maximize the market advantage of environmentally sound
fisheries? These are important topics for economic research and
legal analysis.
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The Food Crisis: A New-Found Momentum to Redefine
African Agricultural Policies
by Meti Zegeye*

T

he unprecedented magnitude of the current global food
crisis took the world by surprise. Its hardest-hit victim,
Sub-Saharan Africa (“SSA”), is in the midst of its worst
food crisis in recent history.1 Immediate responses such as foodaid and cash-handout programs, although necessary to address
the urgent humanitarian dimensions of the food crisis, are not
long-term solutions.2 Attaining a sustainable solution to SSA’s
reoccurring food crises requires that African governments
engage the international community in candid discourses tackling the crisis’ main
cause, namely the
inherent structural fallacies of these countries’ agricultural
policies.3 The recent
food riots and civil
unrest that occurred in
many of these countries should incentivize
such policy discourse,
as SSA’s fragile peace
is closely linked with
governments’ willingness and ability to
offer and sustain longterm solutions to food
security.4
Most land in SSA
countries is agrarian, with varied agroecological zones that are not conducive to uniform, large-scale
farming techniques.5 SSA farmers predominantly engage in rainfed agriculture which makes them highly vulnerable to climate
variations in an area which already suffers from low soil fertility
and low rainfall.6 Frequent weed and pest infestations, as well as
inadequate farming and water management techniques, further
hinder farming productivity.7 Despite these shortcomings, agriculture remains the most important economic sector in most SSA
countries.8 Agricultural output represents about forty percent of
exports, thirty percent of GDP, and about thirty percent of foreign exchange earnings in the region.9 The sector also employs
more than seventy percent the workforce.10
Ironically, while other agrarian regions, such as parts of
Asia, invested in green revolution, SSA adopted Bretton Woods
championed developmental policies, which discounted and
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neglected agriculture’s role in these countries.11 Therefore, since
independence, these countries have adopted various agricultural
policies, which span from a focus on industrialization, to agro
industries, integrated rural development, export crop-led agriculture, and finally to smallholders’ staple food crops.12 These varied
and often contradictory policies have hindered agriculture development in most of SSA countries. For instance, the neo-liberal
development paradigm of the 1980s promoted drastic reduction
in international assistance for agriculture.13 While agriculture
received eighteen
percent of overseas
development assistance in 1980, its
share dwindled to
about four percent
in 2007.14 Similarly,
SSA governments
felt compelled to
reduce their agriculture expenditure. 15
Although recently on
the rise, these countries allocated less
than four percent of
their expenditures to
agriculture for the
past twenty years.16
African governments’ withdrawal
Photo courtesy of Megan Chapman
from the sector has
crippled farmers’ productivity. SSA farming is predominantly
a household enterprise, and is mostly undertaken by poor smallholder farmers.17 These farmers represent a very large portion
of the world’s most marginalized people.18 Given their extreme
marginalization, SSA farmers have historically depended on
government services and subsidies for access to credit and farming techniques, such as fertilizers and irrigation.19 Without government intervention, these farmers could not afford the high
transaction costs associated with agriculture and experienced
extensive market failures.20
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Consequently, over the last twenty years, crop production
per capita has decreased by 0.2% per year, while food demand
has continued to increase.21 Confronted with such stringent realities, these farmers have expanded the arable farming land, at the
expense of forests, soil fertility, and water.22 Their efforts have
been unsuccessful as is evidenced by the prevalence of drought
and famine throughout the continent. In SSA, agricultural productivity growth, as opposed to expansion in arable farming
land, is the means to achieve food security.23 Furthermore, agriculture must become the engine of growth in these countries,
especially given the fact that three quarters of the poor in SSA
depend on agriculture for their livelihood.24
African governments must use this opportunity to revamp
their agricultural policies. SSA countries should continue to
increase their budgetary allocation for agricultural development
to about fifteen to twenty percent of their revenues. They should
also develop new agricultural policies, which take into account
their particular agro-ecological characteristics.25 These policies
should create the kind of incentives and market opportunities
necessary to reduce the marginality of smallholder farmers.26
Particularly, the new policies must improve soil and water management, and must invest in drought resisting crops.27 Finally,
African countries should invest in research and development and
come up with home grown viable farming.
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The Global Food Crisis:
Urgent Need and Emerging Solutions
by Terence P. Stewart, Stephen J. Norton, Jumana G. Madanat, and Hanna E. Stewart*

T

Introduction

he global food crisis has affected hundreds of millions
of people worldwide, causing a surge of sociopolitical
unrest in many countries as families struggle to find ways
to survive soaring food and fuel prices.1 In the United States,
many families find it harder to feed their children on a daily basis
and more families are turning to local food banks.2 In developing countries, the World Bank estimates that at least 100 million
could fall back into poverty, swallowed by what Josette Sheeran,
the director of the World Food Program (“WFP”), dubbed the
“silent tsunami” of soaring food prices.3
At the UN General Assembly meeting on September 23,
2008, UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon “told the UN’s 192
member states that in a single year, staple foods that feed half of
the world more than doubled in price,” 4 highlighting the severity
of the global food crisis. A report by the United Nations Food
and Agriculture Organization (“FAO”) produced in conjunction
with a summit on the food crisis in Rome last June stated that the
prices of all major commodities have reached their highest levels in nearly fifty years (prices in real terms were at a thirty-year
high).5 The FAO price index rose, on average, eight percent in
2006 in comparison to 2005, but then twenty-four percent from
2006 to 2007.6
Governments and multilateral bodies have met to discuss
possible solutions, for both the short and long-term. They have
debated issues such as the possible effects of climate change on
food production and the problems caused by increasing biofuel
production.7 Governments and international organizations must
play the lead role in designing policy in this area and encourage multilateral solutions to this problem. Short-term monetary
donations are needed for emergencies, but multilateral institutions will have to work together to achieve a sustainable solution that develops economies and promotes wise environmental
stewardship around the world. Already, organizations such as
FAO, WFP, the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund
(“IMF”), and the UN Children’s Fund (“UNICEF”) have begun
a multifaceted approach to addressing this problem, targeting
“high risk” countries first. Of course, these efforts are just the
first steps of an effort that could go on for years.
This paper will survey briefly some of the causes of the
global food crisis, identified by economists and policy experts,
and will discuss multilateral responses to date.
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Source: FAO, World Food Situation: Food Prices Indices (2008), available at
http://www.fao.org/worldfoodsituation/FoodPricesIndex/en/.
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Many policy experts believe that another factor contributing
to higher food prices is the production of biofuels. The worldwide
approaches to energy security and food security have been in
conflict. The increasing production of alternatives to fossil fuels
has depleted supplies in commodities such as corn and sugar,

Phosphate rock

leading to unsustainable prices. Moreover, government support
for the biofuels industry in the form of consumption mandates,
tax credits, import barriers, investment subsidies, and other policies can be substantial in some cases. This support accelerates
the shift in usage for some commodities from food and feed to
fuel, thereby driving up prices for food. Ethanol production tripled from 2000-2007, with the United States and Brazil accounting for a major part of this increase in production.20 Europe has
also been a significant contributor to increase in ethanol production as the European Commission has set a goal of having at
least 5% of all road transport fuels come from renewable sources
by 2015, with at least 1% of that share derived from secondgeneration biofuels, electricity, or hydrogen.21
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Source: World Bank Commodity Price Data (Pink Sheets) September 2008.
(Potassium chloride (muriate of potash), standard grade, spot, f.o.b. Vancouver
TSP (triple superphosphate), up to September 2006 bulk, spot, f.o.b. US Gulf;
from October 2006 onwards Tunisian, granular, f.o.b.).
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The increasing price at the gas pump that has affected millions of drivers has also affected the farming industry and contributed to the increase in food prices. According to the FAO,
these higher fuel prices have been coupled with increasing fertilizer costs and have driven up the cost of producing and transporting major agricultural products all over the world.17 Some
farmers and ranchers who pay these high fuel and fertilizer costs
are forced to pass on the increased costs to consumers.18 Furthermore, this year’s record oil prices are driving up food prices
by increasing costs of production and transportation which also
increases the prices consumers pay.19
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Figure 2: Increasing Prices of Fertilizer 2006-2008
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Weather, either in single catastrophic events or subtle shifts
possibly related to climate change, has impacted food production
causing structural changes to the agricultural system.11 According to the FAO, cereal production among major exporting countries has been declining since 2005,12 and much of this decline
can be attributed to droughts and other weather disasters in grain
producing countries. For example, Burma’s cyclone destroyed
its supply of rice,13 a commodity with prices that have risen by
as much as 130% or more since 2007.14 As climate change is
altering or threatening to disrupt growing patterns around the
world in the coming decades, experts warn prices could continue to go up. For example, the Intergovernmental Panel on
Climate Change, in a 2007 report, warned that melting glaciers
in the Himalayas could have serious ramifications for farmers in
China and India during the dry season in those countries.15 On
the other hand, climate change could allow for the cultivation
of crops in areas now inhospitable for agriculture.16 The challenge is how quickly the world’s growing population can adapt
to these changes in areas for cultivation.

2007
Annual Average

1987

Numerous factors have contributed to increasing food costs
from 2005-2008 and created the “perfect storm” that led to the
global food crisis.8 This “perfect storm” has been catastrophic to
millions of people and has threatened the world’s political stability.9 Perhaps more disturbing, the confluence of factors from
climate change to increased production of biofuels to changing
consumer demand could mean a fundamental change is occurring
in the dynamics of food production, distribution, and consumption. The FAO and the Organization for Economic Cooperation
and Development (“OECD”) warned in a May 2008 study that
the changes occurring could take ten years to address and to
reestablish market equilibrium needed to make food affordable
to millions of people.10 Some of the factors that led to the crisis
are discussed below.
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Figure 3: Ethanol production 1975–2007 (billion liters)
Source: Global Subsidies Initiative 2007, Joachim von Braun, International
Food Policy Research Institute, Seminar at IFAD Rome, February 19, 2008.
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Increasing Demand
Increased economic development and international trade
have led to the growth of the middle class worldwide, which
in turn has increased demand for costly meat and dairy products by people who have changed their diets to match their
incomes. While the FAO report22 cautions against overestimating the role changing diets are
playing on food price spikes,
Joachim von Braun, the Director General of the International
Food Policy Research Institute
(“IFPRI”), estimates that changing demand could account for
half of the recent price hikes.23
China exemplifies this phenomenon as its per capita meat
consumption grew by 140%
between 1990 and 2006.24 This
increased demand also puts a
strain on grain supplies because
it takes seven pounds of grain to
produce one pound of meat, further burdening the commodities
already experiencing production
decreases due to weather-related
disasters and other factors.25

earlier this year, the implications for the trading system and for
net food-importing countries are significant.

Decline in Agricultural Research
The steep and prolonged reduction in agricultural research
in developing countries and major agricultural research institutions has also been cited as a contributing factor to the food crisis. Nicholas Minot of the IFPRI
explained at a June 5, 2008
briefing before the U.S. House
Hunger Caucus that national
agricultural research institutes
in developing countries have
experienced declining budgets
since around 1990, and international agricultural research
centers have suffered budget
cuts as well.28 This decline has
hindered the ability of countries to respond quickly to
short-term and long-term solutions to the food crisis. Without current research, countries
have been unable to respond to
new pests, climate change, and
other impacts on agriculture in a
timely fashion.

Higher fuel prices have
been coupled with
increasing fertilizer
costs and have driven
up the cost of producing
and transporting major
agricultural products all
over the world.

Trade Policy

Financial Markets

Trade policy is also a key factor to consider as it can determine access to food. Proponents of trade argue that it is more
urgent than ever to complete the World Trade Organization
(“WTO”) Doha Development Agenda.26 They argue that market forces would better ensure the right level of production and
distribution. However, even before the food crisis emerged, free
market advocates argued that subsidies distort trade, reward
farmers in developed countries, and punish those in developing
countries. The food crisis has intensified calls for cutting subsidies. But, before subsidies are sharply reduced or eliminated,
it is important to keep in mind that this could cause the cost of
production to rise, and many importing countries would not be
able to afford the food they need. Imports of subsidized products
are often their chief source of food.
As the food crisis unfolded, some twenty-six countries began
to prohibit the export of certain products in order to ensure that
their own populations were able to eat.27 This drove up prices
even more and prompted calls for the export controls to be lifted.
Some countries, such as Ukraine, did lift their bans.
Of course, it is important to keep in mind that under global
trading rules established in the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade (“GATT”) after World War II, nations retain the right to
restrict exports in certain situations. Specifically, GATT Article
XI:2(a) permits “[e]xport prohibitions or restrictions temporarily applied to prevent or relieve critical shortages of foodstuffs
or other products essential to the exporting” country. When such
rights are used simultaneously by many countries, as was done

According to the FAO report, investments of non-commercial interests, such as financial funds, in futures trading on
commodity markets have also played a role in determining the
decisions of farmers, traders, and processors of agricultural commodities.29 Essentially, the activities of major futures investors
appear to have a causal relationship with spot or cash markets.30
As this trend increases, it may mean large institutional investors
could control futures of wheat and other commodities causing
new spikes in demand, and therefore even higher prices.
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Crisis Mitigation
As noted earlier, the scope and likely duration of the food
crisis has commanded the attention of elected officials, multilateral institutions, non-governmental organizations, and private sector companies around the world. In the months after
the media began to focus on the crisis in the spring of 2008,
there have been high-level meetings, an increase in monetary
donations to relief operations, and steps by over thirty countries
ranging from easing import restrictions to distributing seeds in
an effort to mitigate the short- and medium-term effects of the
crisis and to design long-term strategies for preventing a recurrence of this catastrophe.
In April 2008, the Chief Executives Board of the United
Nations pulled together its major departments as well as representatives from other multilateral institutions to create a HighLevel Task Force (“HLTF”), and began work on a framework
for action to mitigate and eventually solve the food crisis. United
Sustainable Development Law & Policy

Nations participants included the FAO, the UN Conference on
Trade and Development (“UNCTAD”), and the UN Development Program (“UNDP”). Other multilateral organizations represented in the task force included the WTO, the World Bank,
and the IMF.31
At the FAO annual summit in Rome in June 2008, world
leaders and experts from a wide array of fields considered possible reasons for the price spikes and how to address the ensuing
hunger and political instability. Among the medium- and longterm solutions embraced by participants were policies to help
restore the viability of subsistence farming in cases where the
market-based trading system cannot deliver food to where it is
needed. The summit’s formal declaration also called for more
concerted action to respond to challenges presented by climate
change, and a focus on maintaining biodiversity through wise
stewardship of fisheries and forests. Participants also called for
increased investment in science and technology for food production, as well as reductions in trade barriers and market-distorting
policies.32
On the issue of biofuels, the Rome declaration acknowledged the competing international goals and urged in-depth
studies on ways to ensure that
production and use of biofuels
is sustainable. These recommendations tracked closely with a
ten-point proposal World Bank
President Robert Zoellick put
forward on the eve of the Rome
summit. Specifically, he called
for lifting of export bans and cutting tariffs on ethanol imported
into U.S. and European Union
markets to encourage the output of more efficient sugarcane
biofuels, which do not compete
directly with food production and expand opportunities for
poorer countries.33
Meanwhile, WTO Director General Pascal Lamy also urged
a successful conclusion to the WTO Doha Round and stressed
the importance of improving the trade capacity of developing
countries. He noted that of twenty-two countries listed as most
vulnerable to food insecurity, many were also among the least
integrated economies in terms of their assimilation into global
agriculture markets. These countries lack the adequate roads,
ports, and administrative infrastructure needed to import and
export goods; countries often import food from a country on
another continent instead of a country next door.34
Later on in the summer, the members of the G8 major economic powers met in their annual meeting and spent a significant portion of time discussing the dire effects of the global food
crisis worldwide. They emerged with pledges for cash assistance
and commitments to work to find long-term solutions to the
crisis.35
Sustained attention at the highest levels of government
and international organizations will be needed as the food

crisis continues, and there have been encouraging steps in recent
months to suggest that international leaders are taking the matter
seriously.
For example, the World Bank has moved forward on its $1.2
billion rapid financing program—the Global Food Resource Program (“GFRP”). As of October, the GFRP had dispersed $193
million in twenty at-risk countries. One project worth $7 million
was awaiting approval and an additional $651 million had been
earmarked for projects in eleven countries. The money is to be
used for feeding the most vulnerable groups (such as children
and pregnant women), obtaining food imports, and purchasing
seeds for the upcoming planting season.36
In July 2008, the FAO approved a series of projects in
forty-eight countries with a total value of $21 million to help
farmers and needy people in those countries. The chief goal of
these efforts is to ensure the success of the next planting season.
Over the longer term, the expectation is to demonstrate how better access to seeds and fertilizers can increase food production
where it is needed most.37
In addition to these actions by multinational institutions,
in May 2008 three dozen countries, in every part of the world,
unilaterally adopted policies
to try to feed their populations
for the short-term and develop
approaches for food security
needs for the future. For example, Guyana began distributing seeds for free while Ghana
eliminated all export duties on
rice, wheat, yellow corn, and
vegetable oil.38 India removed
an export ban on non-basmati
rice and other products for shipment to Bhutan, while China
made diesel fuel more readily
available for farm vehicles during the cereal harvest season.39
In addition, Ukraine lifted export quotas on grains and cancelled
restrictions on grain imports it had put in place when the crisis
first manifested itself.40 These examples show that individual
countries are beginning to shift their policies in response to the
global food crisis. Governments realized that restricting or banning exports of key food staples to ensure domestic supplies and
reduced prices would only bring short-term relief. However,
these practices would eventually cause long-term harm by creating disincentives for domestic production and constraining
global supply, which would raise costs to consumers around the
world. These changes in agricultural and trade policies manifested by numerous countries this year show that individual
governments are not solely relying on the work of multilateral
institutions to temporarily solve the food crisis—they are also
taking the initiative to protect their future food security.
The focus by governments and international organizations
has also served to underscore the need for creative and diligent
work by the private sector, whether corporations or charitable
organizations. There are complex political, economic, and social

Countries lack the
adequate roads, ports,
and administrative
infrastructure needed to
import and export goods.
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relationships at stake for policy makers to consider. At a development conference in September 2008, Zoellick renewed calls
to lift export bans and restrictions on humanitarian food aid as
these “harm the most vulnerable.” He acknowledged that it is
not always easy for countries that are concerned about having
enough to feed their population and suggested possible solutions
including, “sharing the management of physical reserves, creating regional information systems for early detection of supply
shocks, and establishing networks of virtual grain reserves.” 41
The food crisis has also created new challenges and opportunities for the public and private sector to address broader goals
for sustainable development. For example, the UN HLTF issued
a paper urging public/private actions that would engage and
aide smallholder farmers in rural areas of developing nations. It
promotes ensuring farmers’ access to seeds and fertilizers,
opportunities to reduce post harvest losses, and rehabilitation of
infrastructure.42
The meeting of the UN General Assembly in September
2008 provided a forum for showcasing some of the private sector initiatives and highlighting the need for even more action.
For example, the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation, the Howard
G. Buffett Foundation, and the government of Belgium unveiled
a $76 million initiative called Purchase for Progress (“P4P”),
which is designed to help hundreds of thousands of small farmers
access reliable markets so that they can sell their surplus crops
at competitive prices. P4P will bolster fragile local economies,
particularly in Sub-Saharan Africa and Central America.43
The General Assembly also saw the convening of chief
executives representing leading corporations from all continents
for the first UN Private Sector Forum on Food Sustainability and
the Millennium Development Goals (“MDGs”). At the opening meeting UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon told business
leaders, “We need to bring knowledge, resources and innovation
together in a way that links sustainability with opportunities for
growth.” 44
To be sure, there are many private sector initiatives directed
toward the eradication of hunger. For example, during the General Assembly meeting, the WFP welcomed a private sector
commitment under the auspices of the Clinton Global Initiative
(“CGI”) to support improved food and nutrition for millions of
schoolchildren in the world’s least developed countries. The leading corporate supporter of this initiative, YUM! Brands, offered
an $80 million cash pledge to WFP and other hunger-related
organizations.45 Earlier in the year, Kemin Industries announced

it will help the WFP improve the quality and nutritional impact
of the food it distributes to the hungry poor throughout the world
by providing its technical expertise in the field of food quality
maintenance and quality assurance systems.46 This example
shows how a company can connect its unique capabilities to specific needs—it is an example that should be duplicated.

Conclusion
The causes of the food crisis are numerous, complicated,
and interconnected, so designing mechanisms for addressing the
current emergency and preventing a future catastrophe will take
time, resources, and political will.
While the price of some commodities has come down
slightly, the factors that have contributed to this crisis remain.
According to the FAO, by 2030 world agricultural production
will have to increase by fifty percent to feed an additional 1.6
billion people and world food production will need to double
to feed 9 billion people by 2050. Concerted public and private
investment is crucial for boosting agricultural production and
spurring sustainable development.47
Nations and multilateral institutions have begun to sort out
how issues from trade to biofuels to investment in agricultural
research can be part of a long-term solution. Of course, it is a
daunting challenge to create solutions that suit political, economic, social, and environmental considerations all at once.
Creative philanthropy by the private sector will also be
integral to sustainable and environmentally sound development.
Businesses, large and small, with a wide variety of tools, know
how, and financial resources might be in the best position to
tackle discrete challenges in isolated corners of the world.
For individuals and companies, there are many ways to contribute to the alleviation of hunger and starvation in the short
run and prevent future catastrophes. This will require people to
remain aware of the issue. Every day a myriad of tragedies, crises,
and important “normal” events compete for our attention—the
plight of disabled veterans and homeless people, global financial
panics, elections, wars, and weather-related calamities, such as
tsunamis. Many of these issues explode onto the front page. But
others, like the silent tsunami of the food crisis, wreak havoc
every day in places where people are voiceless and powerless.
In a world ever more interconnected, we must remain vigilant
in our attention to the silent tsunami because it affects all of us.
Nothing is so fundamental to human existence as a sustainable
supply of affordable food.

Endnotes: The Global Food Crisis
1

See U.N. World Food Programme, WFP Crisis Page: High Food Prices,
http://wfp.org/english/ ?ModuleID=137&Key=2853 [hereinafter WFP Crisis
Page] (last visited Oct. 31, 2008) (explaining that high food prices have put
up to 130 million people deeper into poverty and have caused social unrest in
countries around the world).

2 Kent Garber, The Food Crisis Hits the U.S., U.S. News & World Report,
May 1, 2008, http://www.usnews.com/articles/news/national/2008/05/01/
the-food-cost-crisis-hits-the-us.html (last visited Oct. 31, 2008).

Endnotes: The Global Food Crisis
continued on page 71
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Adding Biofuel to the Fire: A Sustainability Perspective
on

Energy Policy in the 2008 Food, Conservation, and Energy Act

by Jeni Lamb, Andrew Rogers & L. Leon Geyer*
Introduction:
Positioning Biofuel Production in the Latter
Half of the Twentieth Century

T

here is little doubt that the world is in the midst of a food
and fuel crisis. Among developed nations, the United
States finds itself in the particularly precarious position
of maintaining both a strong domestic economy and a positive
reputation abroad. Domestically, 39.8% of total energy consumption comes from petroleum,1 22.8% from coal,2 23.6% from natural gas,3 8.4% from nuclear power,4 and 6.8% from renewable
energy (including conventional
hydroelectric power, wood,
alcohol, geothermal, solar, and
wind).5 The frightening reality is
that 98.4%6 of the world’s oil is
largely located in nations characterized by political instability
and/or tense relations with the
United States, such as Venezuela, Iran, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, and
Nigeria.7 Some have characterized this geopolitical situation
as allowing the above mentioned
nations’ political leaders to ensconce themselves from democratic reforms and “insulate themselves from international and
domestic pressures.”8 Many also allege that the United States’
interest in oil has led to unnecessary engagement in foreign conflict. The current energy crisis has come with equally troublesome record-increases in the cost of agricultural products and
foodstuffs. Rising food and fuel prices are driving record enrollment in food nutrition assistance programs in the United States9
and threatening to return some 100 million individuals to poverty abroad.10 This situation has left Americans searching for a
means of securing energy independence and restoring affordability to the global and national food supply.
In this context, the rapid expansion of renewable biofuels
has been simultaneously viewed as a culprit and solution. Biofuel production has been consistently indicted as a major contributor to increasing food prices in multiple dimensions. This
includes the direct competition of food crops being diverted for
production of biofuels, as well as the more indirect competition
for land and resources to grow fuel versus food crops.11 Alternatively, some stress that biofuels are not to blame for rising global
food prices, adding that biofuels have had a greater impact in
keeping transportation costs as low as they are.12 As a substitute
for gasoline, it is argued that biofuels have played a critical role

in adding stability to energy prices and assuring that they do not
climb higher than their recent record levels.13
Before delving extensively into the role of biofuels in the
modern food and fuel crisis, it is important to remember that
the modern experience of “agflation”14 and energy dependence
is not unlike other points in U.S. history. As Federal Reserve
Chairman Ben Bernanke recently recalled, in the mid-seventies
“oil price shocks” were also accompanied by “rapidly rising
prices of agricultural products.”15 Then, just as now, the United
States turned to domestic avenues for diversifying the energy
economy. For example, in 1978,
Congress passed its first version
of the ethanol blenders’ credit
as an incentive to begin blending their gasoline with home
grown ethanol. 16 Powerful
corn advocates were among the
first to push for a corn ethanol
industry, and this initial support
secured their dominance in the
U.S. biofuel industry.17 Interestingly enough, exactly thirty
years later, another convergence
of food and fuel crises along with the dominance of the corn ethanol industry and its controversial environmental impacts, has
placed the United States at a critical juncture in regards to future
importance and sustainability of biofuels policy.
With the leg up in the seventies, corn ethanol was best situated to take advantage of a number of recent market and political trends. The widespread state bans on the gasoline additive
MBTE created a significant opportunity for ethanol to be combined with gasoline in order to obtain a desired consistency and
quality at the pump.18 More recently, record high and rapidly
increasing oil prices have made corn-based ethanol competitive with gasoline.19 In recognition of the rapidly increasing
importance of biofuels, an energy title was added to the Farm
Security and Rural Investment Act20 (the previous farm bill) for
the first time in 2002. The passage and implementation of the
first Renewable Fuels Standard (“RFS”) in 200521 provided the
first mandated level of ethanol production as an opportunity for

Expansion of renewable
biofuels has been
simultaneously viewed as
a culprit and solution.
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the United States to “grow its way” out of a dependence upon
foreign oil.22 Between 2005 and November of 2007, production nearly doubled from four billion gallons to 7.6 billion gallons.23 Moreover, it is estimated that another 4.9 billion gallons
of production capacity is under construction.24 This increase has
not occurred without significant secondary impacts in agriculture and the greater environment. Increased ethanol production
has substantially raised livestock
feed prices, 25 eroding profit
margins for poultry, swine, and
cattle producers. Also, expanded
production has brought increased
inquiry into ethanol’s actual ability to deliver on its promise as a
climate mitigating strategy. Current research is focusing on the
secondary costs associated with
biofuel expansion.26 These costs
include carbon deficits created
by drawing new lands into production for biofuels in developing nations, the impacts of drawing down major aquifers for the
planting of corn,27 and, most importantly as of late, the cost of
diverting land from the production of food crops to the production of fuel.28
With production for 2008 expected to well out-pace the
mandate of the 2005 Renewable Fuels Standard29 and growing concern over corn ethanol’s impact on environmental and
food policy, the 2007 Energy Independence and Security Act
(“EISA”) both revised and expanded the standard in light of
the modern food and fuel controversy.30 Beginning in 2009, the
EISA will require increasing portions of the renewable fuels
mandate to be derived from “advanced biofuels,” or biofuels
derived from sources other than corn.31 While the EISA outlines
a skeletal framework for the future of domestic biofuel production, the recently passed 2008 Food, Conservation, and Energy
Act (“2008 Farm Bill”)32 requires fleshing out the policy incentives to facilitate such a transition.
Through the lens of the most recent farm bill, this paper
investigates the content and implications of a dramatically altered
renewable fuel policy in the context of the modern food and fuel
crisis. After establishing this basic understanding, we argue that
the renewable biofuels industry is at an important juncture as
the transition is made from corn ethanol towards advanced biofuels. We offer a preliminary assessment of the sustainability
of biofuels as a component of the U.S. energy policy transition
from “monosource” petroleum dependence to a “multisource”
production scheme.

production. It also carries the responsibility for creating the programs that will make the goals set by the EISA attainable over
the five-year horizon.
The 2008 Farm Bill marks a major transition in renewable
biofuels policy by moving away from the dominant corn-based
industry.33 The Farm Bill’s programs are directed towards the
development of “advanced biofuels.” The “advanced biouels”
terminology was adapted by
the Congress in the 2007 EISA,
but loosely aligns with what
the scientific community has
termed “second generation”
biofuels.34 The primary emphasis is placed on cellulosic ethanol, which is derived from
cellulose, hemicelluloses, or
lignin,35 and includes fuels that
are produced primarily from a
variety of crops, crop residues,
forest sources, waste streams,
and other cellulosic sources.36
However, the term “advanced biofuels,” as utilized by the Congress in the 2007 EISA37 and in the 2008 Farm Bill, covers a
much broader range of technologies than solely cellulosic ethanol. These include commercially scaled technologies such as
biodiesel and sugar ethanol. In reality, the modified definition of
advanced biofuels can include any non-corn source.38 Programs
with specific reference to “advanced biofuels” terminology
include the authorization and appropriation of mandatory funds
for a loan guarantee program and an energy payments program.39
General programs incorporating advanced biofuels promotion
establish a controversial sugar-to-ethanol program and reauthorize federal programs to give preference to bio-based products.
The 2008 Farm Bill’s Energy Title addresses the concept of
“advanced biofuels.” In § 9003, a $320 million loan guarantee
program offers up to a ninety percent guarantee on loans up to
$250 million for the construction of advanced biofuel infrastructure and demonstration scale projects.40 The other major program
addressing advanced biofuels, outlined in § 9005,41 builds off
of the Commodity Credit Corporation bio-energy program, created by executive order of President Clinton in 1999.42 The program previously provided incentives and payments for biofuels
producers.43 Although the bioenergy program was extremely
popular, no funding was appropriated in fiscal year 2007.44 Now
the second largest provision of the title in terms of mandatory
money at $300 million, the Farm Bill has revived the program
with a focus on moving away from corn-based ethanol.45 The
program “directs the USDA to make payments to support and
ensure an expanding production of advanced biofuels.”46 In
addition to these funding incentives, § 9002 commissions a biofuel infrastructure study that directs the Secretary of Agriculture
to look into infrastructure needs associated with the expanding
production and use of advanced biofuels.47 The Department of
Energy and the Transportation and the Environmental Protection Agency will also assist in the study.48

The United States stands
at a critical juncture
in the implementation
and acceptance of
biofuels policy.

2008 Farm Bill Energy Provisions
The 2008 Farm Bill occupies the unique position of generating active policies for energy production incentives and
reactionary policies which must account for higher food costs
and negative environmental impacts associated with biofuel
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More targeted programs that begin to address the needs of
cellulosic ethanol are also present in the energy provisions of Tax
Title XV, § 15321. However, none of the programs likely to see
the level of funding promised in the general advanced biofuels
provisions.49 The first targeted program is the Biomass Crops
Assistance Program (“BCAP”).50 According to the Statement of
the Managers, the “primary focus of the BCAP will be promoting the cultivation of perennial and annual bioenergy crops that
show exceptional promise for producing highly energy-efficient
bioenergy or biofuels, that preserve natural resources, and that
are not primarily grown for food or animal feed.”51 This program is granted no mandatory funding under the Energy Title,
but the Congressional Budget Office (“CBO”) scores the program to cost some $70 million.52
Cellulosic ethanol production is also being supported
through additional funding for research and development initiatives.53 Tax Title XV creates a $1.01 per gallon tax credit for
producers of cellulosic ethanol.54
The CBO scores the program
at a cost of $403 million over
the ten-year budget window,55
which is likely the single largest
flow of funds to the commercialization of cellulosic ethanol.56
Working from the opposite
side of active advanced bio
fuels programming is the effort
to reduce the incentive for corn
ethanol production. Section
15331 of the Trade and Tax
Title reduces the Volumetric
Ethanol Excise Tax Credit (“VEETC”) for ethanol blended into
gasoline from fifty-one cents per gallon to forty-five cents per
gallon starting in 2009.57 More popularly known as the ethanol
blenders’ credit,58 the tax credit is an incentive for blenders to
purchase ethanol and has been a powerful tool for expanding the
ethanol market since it was established in the 1978 Energy Tax
Act.59 The 2008 Farm Bill reduces the ethanol blenders’ credit
in reference to projections that ethanol production will soon outpace the 2005 RFS mandate.60
The sugar loan program appears in the Commodities Title
and confronts increased competition from trade liberalization.61
The U.S. sugar loan policy consistently maintained sugar prices at
levels two to four times higher than world markets through managed trade.62 These circumstances, which allowed the USDA to
operate the sugar policy at “no cost,” are quickly eroding.63 An
increasing number of free trade agreements coming online and,
most significantly, the phase-out of tariff quotas in the North
American Free Trade Agreement,64 will make it harder for the
USDA to recoup all losses from sugar forfeitures. In light of the
celebrated success of the Brazilian sugar ethanol program, the
USDA began considering the possibilities of sugar-to-ethanol
production. In 2006, the USDA released an economic analysis
concluding that with high oil prices, it would be cost effective
for the United States to produce sugar ethanol.65 With the added

push of the U.S. market opening up to sugar inputs from Mexico,
the sugar-to-ethanol program was added to both the House and
Senate versions of the Farm Bill.66 The final product is the establishment of the Farmer Feedstock Flexibility Program.67 Building on the Commodities Title three quarters of a cent per pound
raise of the loan rate for sugar, this Title IX program requires the
USDA to buy up surplus sugar for sale to ethanol producers.68
Additional sugar-related programs include the extension of the
sugar ethanol tariff until 2011.69

Evaluating the Future of Biofuels
We argue that the successful transition of U.S. biofuel production from corn to a broader-based system will require the convergence of a number of factors. First, the modern debate over
the causes of the food and fuel crisis has significantly damaged
the public perception of biofuels. While ethanol is most often
recognized as a one element of a “perfect storm” of a number of
factors influencing prices of food
and fuel, it has been consistently
indicted as a primary contributor in analyses from politically
powerful organizations,70 with
estimates ranging between ten
and thirty percent regarding its
role in driving record prices.71
The role of biofuels in driving agricultural prices needs to
be clearly addressed through
reforms that reduce the competition between uses of food crops
and production lands.
Second, the corn ethanol industry has the advantage of
already having advanced along a substantial commercial learning curve.72 Thus, policies must also address means to “level
the playing field” by increasing the competitiveness of advanced
biofuels along the production chain and reducing supports that
encourage the dominance of corn in the industry. Recognizing that the United States stands at a critical juncture in the
implementation and acceptance of biofuels policy, this section
assesses the progress of the 2008 Farm Bill towards meeting
these goals.73
While the “advanced biofuels” terminology of the farm
bill allows for a transition away from the corn based system,
it fails to hold United States policy accountable to a food and
fuel hypothesis. This is because sugar ethanol, biodiesel, and
cellulosic ethanol present different obstacles to sustainability.74
In particular, sugar and biodiesel face a similar problem as corn
in requiring the diversion of a food crop to fuel production.75
Furthermore, a scarcity of land resources available to be brought
into production limits the potential of either biodiesel or sugar
ethanol to expand to occupy a dominant position in the market
relative to corn.76
By contrast, cellulosic ethanol avoids many of the pitfalls
associated with commercially available technologies. It can be
produced from almost any plant source, including plant waste

Cellulosic ethanol
avoids many of the
pitfalls associated with
commercially available
technologies.
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and dedicated energy crops that may not be as competitive for
land and resources with food crops. By assessing the current
level of existing activities, some studies estimate that the United
States has the capacity to produce enough raw materials for
cellulosic ethanol production to offset sixty percent of domestic oil consumption.77 Cellulosic ethanol further promises to be
more energy efficient in life cycle costing measures, and is more
regionally diverse in its applicability when compared to corn
ethanol.78 However, because the technology has not been commercialized, there is no way to truly know what its actual potential is. Farmers do not want to grow dedicated energy crops that
have never been grown on a commercial scale,79 investors do
not want to invest in cellulosic ethanol production plants until a
crop is in the ground, and banks do not want to offer reasonable
loan rates until the technology is proven.80 Clearly the obstacles
to cellulosic production are very distinct from the sugar or biodiesel industries. However, with cellulosic ethanol placed under
the same umbrella as the previously mentioned problems with
commercially available technologies, it is very possible that the
infant industry’s particular needs will be neglected as policy
makers grasp for a short-term solution.
Despite its far less commercialized position, cellulosic ethanol is not given near the prioritization, in terms of overall funding
or triangulation, as programs dedicated to other advanced biofuels. While the Bill earmarks substantial funding for research,
the most actively praised program by farmers81—the BCAP program—receives no mandatory money.82 Yet this is the program
most likely to begin solving the problem of “who goes first”83 in
terms of growing cellulosic ethanol production on a commercial
scale. Cellulosic ethanol, clearly distinct from corn-based ethanol, sugar ethanol, and advanced biofuels, needs to be discussed
as an alternative to those fuels. The current inclusion of cellulosic ethanol with advanced biofuels has great potential to be
misleading in the context of the food and fuel debate.
In terms of leveling the commercial playing field, the 2008
Farm Bill does offer incentives to expand the commercialization of advanced biofuels. Existing ethanol plants or new plants
looking to produce sugar ethanol can apply for a loan guarantee
through the loan guarantee program. Those plants can expect a
steady stream of supply as trade in sugar opens and the USDA
has to both accept and sell more sugar forfeitures to ethanol processors.84 Moreover, while small producers can take advantage
of producer credits, distributors can take advantage of the now
reduced, but still significant, ethanol blenders’ credit.85 All the
while, the domestic production system is protected from direct
competition against the more efficiently produced sugarcane
ethanol from Brazil.86
Regardless of these advancements, recent research suggests that the 2008 Farm Bill’s ethanol blenders’ credit reduction will not decrease the competitiveness of corn ethanol in the
biofuels market. While the six cent reduction in the tax credit
is certainly significant as the greatest reduction in the blenders’
credit in nearly twenty years,87 recent studies conclude that the
reduction will have very little impact in the short run. Research
from Iowa State University suggests that even the entire repeal
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of the blenders’ credit would not result in a major transition
away from corn ethanol as ethanol plants will continue to operate in the short-run as long as production covers their variable
cost.88 If the price of gasoline remains high, there will be sufficient demand for corn ethanol even with higher costs of inputs
and reductions in credit.89

Expanding the Horizon:
Sustainability Impacts of Biofuels in the
Conservation, Nutrition, and Trade Titles
and Food Aid Provision
There is more to the sustainability of advanced biofuels
than can be demonstrated through the specific energy provisions
alone. Placed in the broader context of the 2008 Farm Bill, biofuels policy conflicts with the principles of environmental stewardship through land pressures in the Conservation Title,90 and
with social equity through disproportionate distribution of the
burden of higher food costs compensated for in the Nutrition and
Trade Titles and Food Aid Provision.91 Despite the fact that the
energy and tax portions (discussed above) are the primary actors
in shaping the active policies regarding the future of domestic
biofuels, the funding priority overwhelmingly targets programs
that must react to the secondary effects created by continued and
increased ethanol production.92 Specifically, the Conservation
Title takes a new direction based on increasing land availability,
land values, and the drive to bring more acres under production
due to greater aggregate demand for food and fuel production.93
The Nutrition and Food Aid provisions work even further down
the line, ultimately accounting for the increased end cost of food
that has been linked to ethanol.94 Figure 1 provides a rough picture of the distribution of funding in the 2008 Farm Bill based on
the scores offered by the Congressional Budget Office.95
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Conservation
In the range of opinions on the role of ethanol in food to fuel
policy, there is broad recognition of the fact that biofuel crop
production creates significant pressure to bring more lands into
production.96 In the Farm Bill, this trend collides directly with the
Conservation Title. Established in 1985 under the Conservation
Sustainable Development Law & Policy

Reserve Program,97 the funding for the Conservation Title now
feeds into a number of programs which promote environmental
sustainability for both “retired” and working lands.98
Concern in the 2008 Farm Bill focused on the original
Conservation Reserve Program (“CRP”). CRP is a land retirement program that offers farmers a paid option to enter into a
ten year contract to reduce environmental and income risk by
removing highly erodible and marginal lands from production
while encouraging environmental stewardship; CRP is popular
with farmers, environmentalists, and the hunting community.99 Despite its popularity, vast increases in crop prices have
offered farmers a powerful incentive to not reenroll their lands
in the program and to return many of these marginal lands to
production.100 These concerns elicited several proposals from
academia, and even the Secretary of Agriculture, with the objective of making more effective use of the land.101 In response to
these proposals, the CRP will gradually reduce its enrollable
acreage from the current 36 million acre cap to a 32 million acre
cap in 2010.102 Because of reduction in CRP acreage, funding
increases in the Farm Bill will now go to programs focused on
the regeneration and environmental sustainability of working
lands.103 This includes substantial increases for the Environmental Quality Incentives Program (“EQUIP”)104 and the Conservation Security Program (“CSP”).105 Managers announced in
a May press conference that a funding agreement focusing on
EQUIP and CSP would assure the sustainability of agriculture
in light of increased land demand from biofuel producers and
increases in crop production.106

Nutrition, Trade, and Food Aid
Whatever the exact role of ethanol in the food and fuel crisis, its effects bear primarily on the poor—both in the United
States and abroad. The poor spend the greatest proportion of
their income on food and transportation.107 The U.S. scenario,
where the average American still spends less than ten percent108
of his income on food, is a rosy one in the global context where
the poor spend approximately seventy-five percent of their
incomes on food.109 The administration of the food stamp program, renamed the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program
in the 2008 Farm Bill, and the delivery of international food aid
are the government’s primary mechanisms for ensuring that hard
economic times and high commodity prices do not translate to
hunger at home and abroad.
In 1996, steep cuts made to the food stamp program meant
a drastic decline in the purchasing power of food stamps.110 The
2008 Farm Bill sought to correct this by linking the asset deduction of the eligibility formula to inflation. Moreover, the minimum benefit had not been indexed in over thirty years, meaning
that food stamp participants could only purchase one third of
the amount purchased in 1979.111 The 2008 Farm Bill raises
the minimum benefit by almost one-third and then indexes the
minimum benefit to future inflation in hopes of preventing this
problem in the future.112 In terms of more macro interventions,
the Nutrition Title doubles assistance to food banks for a total of
$1.256 billion.113
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Indeed, to some extent the funding dedicated to nutrition
and food aid objectives in the Farm Bill can be seen as a transfer payment for the relative inefficiency of the U.S. government
to ensure an affordable food supply. Although seventy percent
of the Farm Bill spending ($10.3 billion) goes towards nutrition
programs,114 rising agricultural prices have eroded the strides
made by the Farm Bill. Reflecting these concerns, the House
Agriculture Committee held hearings this summer to review the
extent of “hunger in America” and international development
assistance in agriculture.115

Conclusion
Given the dualistic position of biofuels as both a potential
mechanism for reducing energy dependence and a source of food
and environmental stress, it is vitally important that the policy
and scientific community “get it right” in order for biofuels to
remain an important aspect of the domestic energy portfolio. In
the recent example of the rise and decline of public favor for
King Corn,116 “history tells us that public opinion will latch onto
the first standard issued, and if the number is inaccurate, the
public may . . . withdraw their support [from] renewable biofuels
because of concerns about environmental impact.”117
In terms of offering a sustainable solution, cellulosic ethanol may present the greatest biomass opportunity for a mutually
agreeable solution to the reduction of dependence on petroleum
in our current energy crisis. The Senate Committee report recognizes this premise stating, “for bioenergy, the most important
need is to support and accelerate the development and commercialization of technologies for producing biofuels and biobased
products from cellulosic biomass feedstocks.”118 Yet, despite lip
service to the importance of cellulosic ethanol, the 2008 Farm
Bill obfuscates its definition through inclusion in the general
category of advanced biofuels. It also fails to provide adequate
incentives along the production chain for either commercialized
cellulosic production to come to fruition or for adequate removal
of support for corn ethanol production to promote the opening of
an opportunity in the market.
This failure to deliver a systematic approach to bring a more
sustainable biofuels production becomes all the more devastating when viewed in light of the downstream effects on the
environment and the poor, most threatened by the rising cost of
food. Such impacts come at great economic and moral expense.
In the Nutrition and Trade Titles and the Food Aid Provision,
rising food costs create a double bind in which more people are
made food insecure while it costs substantially more to provide
a safety net. As showcased in the section on Conservation, land
pressures have forced the issue of increased conservation spending as more marginal lands are brought into production. Yet the
moral implications of our failed biofuels policy are truly the
most profound, illustrating that we have yet to find an engine
to our modern way of life that does not thrive at the expense of
our natural environment, food affordability, food availability, or
common humanity.
Endnotes: Adding Biofuel to the Fire
continued on page 72
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The WTO, Agriculture, and Developing
Countries: The Need for Trade Reforms
by Melissa Blue Sky*

T

he most recent collapse of World Trade Organization
(“WTO”) negotiations occurred in July 2008 because
countries were unable to reach an agreement on how to
protect farmers in developing countries from the negative effects
of greater trade liberalization.1 Although an attempt was made
to restart talks in September 2008, little progress was made, and
if talks are to continue, it will not likely be until 2009.2 The current round of negotiations, titled the Doha Development Agenda
(“DDA”), began in 2001 and included an emphasis on the needs
of developing countries.3 However, subsequent negotiations
have raised many questions about the commitment of developed
countries to the DDA goals and highlighted the increasingly
central role of agriculture in the WTO.
The Uruguay Round of negotiations, which continued from
1986 until 1994, created both the WTO and the Agreement on
Agriculture (“AoA”). Prior to the Uruguay Round, it was commonly believed that the international trade regime did not include
agriculture. This can be traced to a 1955 waiver on agricultural
import restrictions granted to the United States, which resulted
in global disregard of trade rules.4
The AoA firmly returned agriculture to the WTO trade
regime with specific binding commitments regarding market
access, domestic support, and export competition.5 Yet it does
not take into consideration non-market aspects of agriculture
and food markets, such as the relatively inelastic supply and
demand in agriculture, the lack of political and economic power
of farmers, and the fact that corporations rather than countries or
farmers are the actors who engage in agricultural trade.6
The agricultural trade rules of the WTO have required liberalization of developed country access to developing countries’
markets, but developed countries have not reciprocated by opening their markets to agricultural products from developing countries. Tariffs levied by developed countries on products from
developing countries increase the final product price, making it
more difficult for developing countries to sell their agricultural
products.7 Nor have developed countries sufficiently decreased
their trade-distorting agricultural subsidies, which provide additional income to agricultural producers and allow them to sell
their products for a lower price.8 As a result of these types of
policies, developing country farmers are forced to compete
with subsidized, larger foreign producers who may cause local
producers to go out of business, increasing urban emigration,
vulnerability of food-importing nations to swings in global commodity markets, and food insecurity.9

Commodity prices, which were quite low until relatively
recently, coupled with the AoA’s unfair trade rules, have significantly affected the ninety-six percent of the world’s farmers
who live in developing countries and approximately 2.5 billion
people who are dependent on agriculture as their main source of
income.10
Farmers in developing countries are negatively impacted
when prices for their crops decline, which can result from trade
liberalization.11 Conversely, consumers in developing countries
generally benefit from lower food prices, because a large percentage of their income is spent on food.12 However, in many
developing countries, households are both producers and consumers of agricultural products and lower prices simultaneously
lead to negative and positive effects.13 In subsistence farming
households, the benefits of reduced food prices for consumption
may not outweigh the losses of decreased profits from sale of
their crops.14
Increased food prices have the greatest negative effects on
people who spend a substantial portion of their incomes on food.
When prices in staple food crops go up these people are forced
to reduce either their food consumption or their purchases of
other essentials. The recent food crisis has increased the number of people living in poverty by an estimated 100 million and
led to widespread food riots.15 The number of people suffering
from malnutrition increased by 119 million in 2007 and 2008,
bringing the worldwide total to nearly one billion.16 Although
increased food prices should lead to increased incomes for
farmers in developing countries, for the most part this has not
occurred because of increases in input prices, limited access to
markets, and the fact that the minority of household producers
are net sellers.17
At the July 2008 WTO negotiations, parties reached an
impasse because developing countries refused to move forward
with an agreement that would deepen the inequities exacerbated
by agricultural trade. Developing countries want to protect their
farmers and their populations from poverty and hunger. The
agricultural sector within developing countries is important for
ensuring food security and for employment. In India, for example, two-thirds of the population is supported by agriculture.18
At the July negotiations, Susan C. Schwab, the U.S. Trade
Representative, stated that the developing countries wanted an
agreement that would take the global trading system back thirty
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years.19 While this may be true in some respects, it ignores the
fact that developing countries are not now industrialized to the
degree that the United States was thirty years ago. Developed
countries, like the United States, have demonstrated a continued unwillingness to recognize the role that protection played in
their own economic development and to extend similar protections to developing countries.
Developing countries’ concerns regarding unfair rules of
trade in agriculture must be incorporated into any future WTO
negotiations in order to contribute to rather than detract from
progress on long-term development goals. Developed countries
should reduce the subsidies given to domestic agricultural producers, as well as the tariffs on agricultural imports from developing countries. It is also essential that countries recognize that
trade may lead to food insecurity in developing countries and
take measures to support both subsistence farmers and consumers there.20
Since the Doha Round began, developed countries have proposed some reductions in their subsidies and to allow some of
the poorest developing countries to maintain tariffs on a limited
number of products.21 However, the developing country proposals do not go far enough to fulfill the objectives outlined by the
Doha Ministerial Declaration, such as taking into account the
development needs of non-industrialized nations, including food
security and rural development.22 Developing countries should
continue to work together to build agreements and power blocks
to ensure that any future trade agreement embodies the original
intent of the Doha Development Agenda.
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Rising Global Food Prices:
The Need for Re-regulating Commodity Futures
by Megan S. Chapman*

T

he sharp rise in the price of basic foodstuffs in the last
year has impacted consumers around the globe, but the
ill effects are disproportionately felt in developing countries. The UN Food and Agriculture Organization (“FAO”)
reports seventy-five million more people living below the hunger line in 2007, raising the number of undernourished to 923
million worldwide; these numbers are likely to increase even
more sharply in 2008.1 Food prices for staples such as flour,
corn, and rice have risen fifty-two percent on average from 2007
to 2008.2 In developing countries, where families may spend as
much as fifty to seventy percent of their daily budget on food,
these price increases translate into poorer nutrition and loss of
purchase power; in other words, these families must make devastating trade-offs: paying for food instead of essential utilities,
education, or basic health care.3 Food prices have triggered protests in thirty-six countries, twelve of them violent.4
Economists and food policy experts cite a variety of factors
that have most likely contributed to the price rise of commodities. Demand-side fundamentals include the increased demand
for commodities due to new investment in biofuels, which now
for example use one third of U.S. corn production,5 and the
changing diet of the world’s growing middle class, requiring
more land- and water-intensive production of meat, dairy, fruits,
and vegetables.6 Supply-side fundamentals include weather and
natural disasters affecting crop yields, such as Cyclone Nargis in
Burma, droughts in Java, stem rust disease affecting wheat crops
in East Africa;7 food and water shortages effecting agricultural
production; and generally lagging agricultural productivity
that fails to keep up with worldwide population and economic
growth.8
Many experts agree, however, that the fundamentals alone
to do not explain the dramatic rise in commodity prices. Outside of the fundamentals, there are old culprits: inefficient trade
policies, such as tariffs, subsidies, and export restrictions, some
of which have been raised or reinstated as countries attempt to
protect their domestic food supplies. And there is a relatively
new culprit: the direct and indirect impacts of speculative investment in commodity futures. Within this market, as the International Food Policy Research Institute (“IFPRI”) reports, “rising
expectations, speculation, hoarding, and hysteria are among the
additional factors that have played a role in the increasing level
and volatility of food prices.”9
Investment in the commodity futures market has increased
from roughly $13 billion in 2003 to $250 billion this year.10

Much of the increase has come through the introduction of
new investors, index funds, and other noncommercial traders
who seek profits through speculation, using largely unregulated over-the-counter swaps.11 Commodity futures were originally designed to protect farmers and commercial investors,
for example grain elevators, with some physical interest in the
underlying commodity market.12 Until the 1990s, the distinction
between these commercial hedgers and non-commercial speculators was clear—and both were regulated. In the United States,
the Commodity Futures Trade Commission (“CFTC”) regulates
the activities of the commercial hedgers, for example, by imposing position limits and capital stock requirements.13 Beginning
in 1991, recognizing that non-commercial swaps dealers were
playing an important role in providing liquidity in the market,
the CFTC granted them exemptions from these limits. With
deregulatory legislation of the late 1990s, additional regulatory
loopholes were deliberately left for commodity swaps, which
allowed for more speculation by commercial hedgers and the
entrance of more noncommercial speculators into the market.14
Speculation in commodities futures involves both benefit
(liquidity) and risk (price destabilization). There is little doubt
that speculation is tied to rising food prices, whether as a cause,
a symptom, or both.15 The causal effects are both direct, as a
flood of investment further drives up already rising prices, and
indirect, since the price of oil, a non-food commodity, invariably
affects the prices of other commodities through transportation
and fertilizer inputs.16
By spring 2008, international organizations, think tanks,
and politicians began to call for regulatory reform in the commodity futures market. The IFPRI called for “a resilience package” of policy measures, the first of which was to “calm markets
with the use of market-oriented regulation of speculations” in
May.17 On July 10, 2008, Senators Joe Lieberman, Susan Collins, and Maria Cantwell introduced in the Senate the Commodity Speculation Reform Act (“S. 3248”).18 The bill was referred
to the Senate Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forestry,
where it has languished ever since.19
Meanwhile, political pressure and charges that the Commission was neglecting its regulatory duties spurred a response
from the CFTC. In September 2008 it published the preliminary
results of a broad survey of all U.S. swap dealers and index
funds. In the introduction to the preliminary report the CFTC
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wrote, “this type of a compelled survey relating to off-exchange
activity is unprecedented, but the growth and evolution in futures
market participation and growing public concern regarding offexchange activity supported the need for this extraordinary
regulatory inquiry.”20 The recommendations mostly called for
further investigation. For example, a review was recommended
as to whether “swap dealers would maintain their exemptions
in exchange for them to report when their clients reach certain
position levels and provide ‘certification’ that none of their speculative clients exceed position limits.”21 One of the four CFTC
commissioners, Bart Chilton, said the recommendations did not
go far enough. As he colorfully put it, “We need a sheriff in the
saddle, to make sure these markets are honest.”22
Regulation is also being addressed internationally. On
October 1, 2008 the CFTC announced that it will co-chair the
International Organization of Securities Commissions’ newlycreated Task Force on Commodity Markets (“TFCM”), alongside the United Kingdom Financial Services Authority, with
the participation of both developed and developing member
countries. The TFCM is charged with “examining the current
supervisory approaches for overseeing commodity markets
worldwide” given the “profound changes” these markets have
recently undergone.23
If not for the latest wave of the financial crisis, including
the near failure of American International Group, the prospect
of legislative change in the United States on these issues may
have died with S. 3248. Instead, in mid-October various committees of the both the House and the Senate have held hearings
on credit-derivatives and credit-default swaps. As these committees debate whether the CFTC, the Security Exchange Commission, or private sector clearinghouses are better suited to regulate
credit swaps,24 the hope is that whatever the legislative outcome
may be, it does not allow the gaping loopholes in commodity
futures regulation to persist.
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Conserving Farmland in California:
For What and For Whom? How Agricultural Conservation Easements
Can Keep Farmland Farmed by Kendra Johnson*

C

Introduction

alifornia farmland is disappearing.1 As farmers age2
and their heirs move to other lines of work, the agricultural land traditionally making up small- and mediumsized farms is being consolidated by large-scale agribusiness
or, increasingly, moving out of production.3 Although smaller
farmers have never been responsible for a majority of California’s agricultural production,
they do offer important social,
economic, and environmental
benefits to their local communities. They also contribute to
local and national food security
by improving crop diversity
and lessening dependence on
imports.
The shift away from productive agricultural use is largely
related to the sprawling development that consumes valuable
farmland: about fifty thousand acres of farmland in California
are paved over annually.4 Land values in California have skyrocketed in recent years and as cities sprawl farther beyond traditional suburbs, formerly rural agricultural land has increased
dramatically in value. As a result, small farm owners find it more
profitable to subdivide, develop, or simply sell their land than
keep it in production—even on land producing some of California’s most profitable crops. Farmland along the expanding urban
fringe is often purchased by wealthy suburbanites who crave
open space and country estates but not necessarily agriculture.5
One relatively recent and innovative solution to preserving
productive agricultural land is the Agricultural Conservation
Easement (“ACE”). Generally, an easement is a legal tool that
gives one person or entity an interest or right in another person’s
property. Frequently easements give the third party the right
to restrict the owner’s use of his or her property in a specific
way. Conservation easements encourage land conservation by
restricting development. Often the party with the interest in the
land is a municipal government or land protection organization
known as a land trust.6 California state law7 provides for conservation easements and federal tax law provides for substantial tax
benefits to donors of conservation easements.8
Agricultural conservation easements, in particular, have
emerged as a popular tool in protecting not only “open space,”
but also top-quality soils in productive farming areas or working

landscapes. This is a significant step, however many ACE programs do not go far enough when they merely set aside valuable
land. Protecting open spaces preserves the inherent value of
nature and ecosystems but stops short of boosting rural economies, maintaining domestic food production as a societal asset,
and protecting our food independence and security. ACEs can
be used to achieve the dual
goals of protecting open space
and ensuring that productive
land is actually farmed. 9
This paper discusses the
challenges of maintaining the
benefits of ACEs in California
where land value has increased
so drastically that even the
encumbered property is worth
more than the potential agricultural productivity of the land. It
then explores three tools used
by other states’ easement programs that, if adopted by California land trusts, could improve the tools available to preserve
California’s working agricultural landscapes.

Smaller farms often
provide ecological, social,
and even economic
benefits to the public that
industrial agriculture
does not provide.
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ACEs in California: The Challenge of Land
Value & Keeping Land in Production
“It’s Not Farmland Without Farmers,” cautions a bumper
sticker put out by American Farmland Trust. Even so, would-be
farmers are dissuaded by competitive global markets, industry
consolidation, and rising land prices. Open space and farmland
conservationists, ‘Locavores’ promoting regional food economies, rural sociologists, Farm Bill reform groups, and agricultural industry representatives are all concerned that young and
incoming farmers are becoming scarce. While the consolidation of big agriculture diminishes the need for new farmers,
those small- and medium-scale farmers intrepid enough to enter
the business need a leg up. These smaller farms often provide
* Kendra Johnson, born and raised on the Sonoma Coast, California, operated an
urban market garden for several years in the San Francisco Bay Area and developed an interest in beginning farmers. She later completed a Master’s in Community Development at UC Davis, writing her thesis on agricultural conservation
easements and farmland access. While in graduate school, she worked out of the
Central Valley regional office for California FarmLink, where she continues to
help farmers with land access and establishing their farm businesses. She is now
also completing a research project for the Yolo Land Trust on easement tools for
use on smaller farms, designed to keep those farms productive and accessible to
farmers.
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ecological, social, and even economic benefits to the public
that industrial agriculture does not provide.10 Lack of access to
affordable farmland is a real barrier to new-entry farmers that
must be addressed to keep farms farmed.
Due to unprecedented residential development pressures,
especially the proliferation over the past twenty-five years of
“rural sprawl,” agricultural land prices throughout much of
California have climbed well out of reach of new farmers.11
Increased demand for rural ranchettes, for example, is having a
grave impact on land prices. For example, recently land values
in the San Joaquin Valley increased from ten thousand dollars
per acre for agricultural land to upwards of two hundred thousand dollars per acre when that land was re-zoned and sold for
development. The result is that ranchettes are “pricing bona fide
commercial farmers out of the market for the most productive
agricultural land.”12
Small farms, defined for our purposes as those agricultural
parcels at or near their zoned minimum parcel size (or usually
ten to eighty acres), present a particularly difficult conservation
challenge. The value of a parcel
of land as a home site consistently overshadows its agricultural production value. Though
these farms may play a valuable
part in an area’s agricultural
economy, ecological resilience,
and rural culture, conservation
easements may not successfully
preserve them as working landscapes. Non-farmers who buy
these properties but do not need
agricultural income may let production lapse. Moreover, nonfarm buyers are often willing to out-bid farmers on such properties, establishing an “after-value” which outstrips agricultural
income potential.
For example, consider a forty acre farm property with a
modest house within an hour and half driving distance of the
San Francisco Bay area valued at one million dollars. A standard
agricultural conservation easement, prohibiting further subdivisions, residential buildings, and location of farm buildings, is
appraised at $300,000, bringing the easement-encumbered property value down to $700,000. Based on local crop production
data and a thorough farm business plan, an organic farmer calculates that she could only afford to buy the farm for five hundred
thousand dollars.

Easement Value:
$300,000

Fair market, unencumbered (“before”)
value: $1 million
Fair market, easement-encumbered
(“after”) value: $700,000

Easement “Gap”:
$200,000

Agricultural + residential use value to
a farmer: $500,000

Figure 1: Easement “Gap”

As you can see, standard agricultural conservation easements often do not yield enough easement value to bring properties into a price range affordable by farmers. The difference
between easement-encumbered estate home value and agricultural use value results in the “gap” shown in this example.
This lack of affordable access and the increased likelihood
that parcels owned by non-farmers will fall out of production are
creating a stir in the farmland
conservation community. Of
twenty-five easement programs
surveyed nationally in 2005,
only five reported that average
prices of easement-protected
parcels were still affordable
for buyers seeking to continue
farming on those parcels. Thirteen said land resale prices in
their areas had clearly become
unaffordable to farmers; and
only nine said a majority of their protected parcels are purchased
by farmers. Only one of these easement programs is in California; the Marin Agricultural Land Trust reported that easementprotected rangeland is only marginally affordable for ranchers
there.13
A more recent series of interviews with thirteen easement
programs in California revealed that fewer than forty percent of
properties under an agricultural easement were under production
by their owners.14 Since most of these properties are still in their
first generation of ownership under the easements, there is concern that the number of owner-operators of preserved farmland
will diminish further after these parcels are sold.15 Some land
trusts are also beginning to see small farms as an important part
of agricultural economies and local communities.16 Since small

Ranchettes are
“pricing bona fide
commercial farmers out
of the market.”
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farms are especially vulnerable to the “easement gap” problem,
these land trusts ask how to make rural housing more affordable
and avoid further farmland conversion to non-farmer ownership
as they strive to protect working landscapes.17

Creative Easement Alternatives:
Encouraging Land-Ownership by Farmers
A number of land trusts and farmland conservation programs in the Northeast have adopted farmland conservation
tools to directly address the related goals of ensuring continued
farming and land-affordability for farmers. Similar to the earliest conservation easements, these tools have lacked precedent
and sometimes been controversial. However, in two decades of
use, a great deal has been learned.
Bringing down the market values of smaller farms in California to affordable prices for farming families requires these
types of legal tools that are not currently part of standard conservation easement transactions in the state. As discussed below,
these may include increased residential building restrictions,
requirements that limit an owner’s right to sell his or her farm, or
affirmative mandates of agricultural use.

Exclusion of Residences and Other Infrastructure
Some easement programs exclude residences and other
infrastructure in order to eliminate the disproportionate value
they add to whole farms. As authorized by its state law, the
Massachusetts Agricultural Preservation Restriction (“APR”)
does this as a matter of course, carving out homesites and even
agricultural buildings from APR-protected parcels.18 Similarly,
Vermont law permits the carve-out of residential and farm buildings and the majority of Vermont Land Trust (“VLT”) conservation easements do so.19 This tool results in bare land easement
valuation remaining unaffected by increasing residential values.
It also eliminates difficult appraisal issues, instead allowing the
land to be transferred for its agricultural value alone. Meanwhile,
it effectively creates small residential parcels surrounded by
agriculture, which can be sold separately from the farmland. In
both states, while the majority of these building areas or “farmsteads” have been purchased by the owners of adjacent farmland,
there is an emerging concern that their exclusion from agricultural easements will encourage consolidation of smaller farms
into fewer, larger farms while the residential parcels become
expensive, thus reducing opportunities for entering farmers to
live where they farm.20 Some land trusts adhere to the principle
that farmsteads are integral as housing for farmer-owners and as
infrastructure for continued farming operations, and would not
choose to separate them.
Practically speaking, the exclusion of several-acre farmsteads from greater acreages of “bare land” would not be possible in California. This is because local zoning ordinances for
minimum parcel sizes, as enabled by state law,21 require that
farmland not be carved up into parcels below that minimum—
often 40, 80, or even 160 acres in agriculturally-zoned areas.
However, the California Farmland Conservation Program and
the federal Farm and Ranch Lands Protection Program do fund
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conservation easements which include design controls commonly limiting building location (or “envelope”), and allowable size (usually to a range of 1,500 to 4,000 square feet).
Sometimes the right to secondary or additional dwellings and
certain nonagricultural infrastructure—equestrian arenas, for
example—is eliminated as well.22 However, farm employee
housing is allowed under California State Code23 and should not
be extinguished by agricultural easements. By restricting “rural
estate” or “trophy home” use, easements can weed out some of
the non-farmers bidding on farm properties. More research is
needed to determine whether such restrictions actually dissuade
a substantial number of non-farmer buyers and how they impact
property values.

Affirmative Obligation to Farm
Standard agricultural easements give up or restrict development rights; few require that the land be actively farmed. A
requirement to farm, usually in the form of an “affirmative covenant,” defines agricultural use and establishes remedies, then
consequences, for failure to comply. The Massachusetts Agricultural Preservation Restriction, administered by the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, may be the only easement program to
currently include the agricultural use requirement, in the form of
an affirmative covenant, in all of its easements.24
Affirmative covenants are additional restrictions on the land
and obligations on the landowner that reach beyond a standard
conservation easement. A covenant requiring the landowner to
farm the property makes it considerably less appealing to any
buyer other than a farmer. Limiting the pool of potential buyers
only to farmers further reduces the value of the encumbered land
while correspondingly increasing the cost of the easement.25
Again, more data is needed to determine the real impact of affirmative language on market value.
While the Massachusetts Code specifically authorizes this
affirmative farming requirement,26 the legal viability of such
language in California is uncertain. The California Code27 does
not explicitly provide for affirmative easement language; instead
it defines easements, in the negative, as limitations. It does, however state the goal of the “preservation of land in its natural, scenic, agricultural, historical, forested, or open-space condition.”28
It is not clear whether affirmative language is enforceable in
California courts. Because of this concern and in order to reduce
the risk that affirmative wording results in termination of the
conservation easement, strong “backup” language should be
incorporated, stating that in case the affirmative clause is ever
found unenforceable, the remainder of the easement is to remain
in effect.29
There is some precedent for affirmative covenants in California ACEs. In some cases, such as in easements held by the
Brentwood Agricultural Land Trust and at least one easement
of the Marin Agricultural Land Trust (“MALT”), the land trust
requires submission and approval of an agricultural management
plan.30 If the owner fails to comply with that plan, the land trust
may require the landowner to lease the land out for farming.
Tougher enforcement mechanisms reserve the right of the land
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trust to collect “damages” or exercise an option to purchase the
farm.31
On Live Power Farm in Covelo, California, for example,
the Equity Trust, a nonprofit organization based in Massachusetts, holds the first known affirmative easement in the state,
and one of the very first in the nation.32 Equity Trust distributed
a sample easement document with affirmative language along
with a related commentary33 for the benefit of land conservation groups interested in doing similar work. MALT and the
Monterey County Agricultural and Historic Land Conservancy
both hold easements with affirmative use language, as does the
Land Trust for Santa Barbara County on an urban farm called
Fairview Gardens. The Tri-Valley Conservancy’s South Livermore Valley easements require agricultural production, but
for only eight years. Sample affirmative agricultural use language, legally reviewed for use in California but not yet exercised, can be found in a California FarmLink model affirmative
easement.34

An OPAV can be exercised at time of sale or assigned to
another farmer. In over fifteen years, an option has not yet been
exercised in Massachusetts, and was exercised only once by the
VLT when a clearly non-farm buyer made a purchase offer on an
easement-encumbered farm. To save paperwork and government
involvement and thereby appeal to a broader group of farm owners, Vermont waives OPAV when a farm is transferred within a
family or to a qualifying farmer as defined by the IRS.39
Vermont appraiser Justus DeVries estimates that there is
roughly a twenty to thirty percent increase in standard easement
value with an OPAV, for a total easement value of up to sixty
to seventy percent of a property’s fair market value.40 In contrast to the Massachusetts APR, the VLT has begun using easements with OPAVs for whole farms, including farm buildings
and residences. This approach is supported by Equity Trust and
is gaining popularity in Vermont, as it protects affordable housing as an integral part of these agricultural areas. Homes and
home sites, however, confound so-called “agricultural value”
and present significant appraisal challenges. Specific appraisal
methodology must be prescribed to arrive at a mutually acceptable property valuation.
In the VLT and Massachusetts APR models, the OPAV
is triggered by a proposal or attempt to sell the property. The
Equity Trust document includes an additional “triggering
event”—the failure to maintain “qualified owner status.” 41 It
becomes, in effect, an enforcement mechanism for the affirmative agricultural language also included in that easement. Each
model addresses the setting of the option/purchase price differently. If the owner has already entered into a purchase and sale
agreement with a third party, the OPAV holder may match that
amount. The Equity Trust model and the Massachusetts standard OPAV present two valuation methods for determining the
purchase price. The first approach is a standard appraisal of “AsRestricted Value” (Equity Trust) or “Fair Market Agricultural
Value” (Massachusetts APR) value as determined by comparable sales and other standard appraisal methods.42 “Agricultural
value” is an adequate description in Massachusetts projects, as

Option to Purchase at Agricultural Value
In response to the concern that protected farms are purchased
by non-farmers at prices higher than farmers can afford, legislation in two states established innovative farmland conservation
programs that now authorize Options to Purchase at Agricultural
Value (“OPAV”) in their agricultural conservation easements.35
An OPAV allows the easement holder to step in any time a farm
property threatens to sell for estate value and, as such, provides
a substantial deterrent to non-farm buyers.36
OPAVs were adopted by the Commonwealth of Massachusetts in 1992 and by the VLT in 2003.37 Whereas the Massachusetts program requires an OPAV, the Vermont program offers
landowners a choice to relinquish the OPAV to the VLT.38 Most
do so for the additional easement value it provides, as well as
assurance that the land will continue to be transferred to other
farmers. Equity Trust includes an OPAV in its model agricultural easement as well. Based on its use in Massachusetts and
Vermont, an OPAV can be a strong deterrent to non-farmer
buyer and an essential component to preserving farmland.
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residences and buildings are not included in these easements.
The second approach offered by these similar documents is to
assess the land and improvements according to the previous
“governing appraisal” and augment with an inflation rate index.
These methods are problematic when home sites are included
because home values have, until recently, increased faster than
the inflation rate. The VLT model OPAV for “Operating Farms”
uses a similar approach to assess agricultural value, but adds the
value of farm structures and improvements, as well as any residence and appurtenant structures/improvements according to the
replacement cost approach to valuation.43
OPAV restricts resale values to a “farm supportable price.”
While an OPAV increases the original easement cost expended
by the land trust, it also gives the organization a measure of
control over future land transactions and deters non-farm buyers. Furthermore, it creates an opportunity for land trusts to
help farmers purchase these farms each time land is transferred.
Drawbacks are that an OPAV may limit the ability of new buyers to obtain financing, and land trusts may not have cash or
financing available to properly exercise the option.
An OPAV has not yet been used in California. In the
absence of authorization by statute, such an option may not be
enforceable by California easement programs: challenges to the
“triggering” of an OPAV, for example, and to appraisal methodologies such as the VLT method described above, might be
expected. Before deciding to use this concept, the legal issues
should be explored and addressed.

Conclusion: Potential for California?
California’s farmland protection policymakers, land trusts,
and supporters have a tough row to hoe in coming years. If farmland conservation efforts do not begin to include access and
affordability strategies, farmers will not experience the benefits
of farmland protection and California’s agriculture will not be
protected. The list of tools described in this article is not exhaustive; there are many other ways to support the use and ownership of farmland by farmers. Non-easement tools for example,
such as land trust ownership with lifetime leases to farmers, collaboration with affordable housing programs or community land

trusts, purchase of farming rights by farmers needing land security but not all the residential value, and other forms of creative
or cooperative ownership, deserve further attention.
California land trusts who wish to further the use in ACEs
of building and parcel restrictions, or be state leaders in the
adoption of affirmative use requirements or OPAVs, will face
a number of financial and legal barriers. At least at first, these
new legal tools will require higher per-acre easement acquisition
costs as well as greater staff resources dedicated to transactions,
monitoring, and stewardship than they do currently. Improved
support and funding for these innovative projects will therefore
be key to their applicability and success in California. The tools
yet untested in California courts (again, affirmative covenants
and OPAVs) may also subject land trusts to increased legal
scrutiny and the risk of expensive court battles. If, on the other
hand, land trust leaders can begin to set precedent for the use of
easement tools benefiting smaller farmers, amendments to State
Civil Code, and other relevant statutes may more easily follow.
If California’s fertile agricultural lands are threatened by
urban and rural ranchette development, its farmers are also
threatened by intense competition for control over farmland. If
the State’s land trusts and policymakers decide to protect not
only farmland but the myriad social, economic, and environmental public benefits offered by our small farmers, they will
find that their eastern counterparts have already set important
examples. Agricultural landscapes are, by definition, working
landscapes and will be best conserved if the livelihoods which
define them are supported as well.
Thanks to Debbie North and the Yolo Land Trust for asking
the right questions and making possible the report upon which
much of this article is based. Thanks to Conservation Partners
for thoughtful review and comments. Thanks to California FarmLink for working on behalf of beginning farmers, and first bringing this question to my attention. Finally, thanks to the many
other land trusts, both California and Northeastern, whose staff
and associates provided information about small farm easement
tools and challenges.

Endnotes: Conserving Farmland in California
1 See Cal. Dep’t of Food & Agric., California Agricultural Resource
Directory 2006 1, 28 (2006), available at http://www.cdfa.ca.gov/files/pdf/
card/AgResDirEntire06.pdf (explaining that there were a reported 144,000
farms in California in 1950; the number plummeted by more than half by 1970,
climbed to a consistent ~85,000 for most of the 1990s. However from 19992005, the number of reported farms in California dropped alarmingly — from
85,000 to 76,500 farms statewide).
2 California FarmLink, A Farmer’s Guide to Securing Land (2008).
3 See Cal. Dep’t of Food & Agric., supra note 1 (explaining that there were
144,000 farms in California in 1950 and only 76,500 in 2005).
4 See Edward J. Thompson, Am. Farmland Trust, Paving Paradise: A New
Perspective on California Farmland Conversion 1, 3 (2007), available at
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http://www.farmland.org/programs/states/ca/Feature%20Stories/documents/
PavingParadise_AmericanFarmlandTrust_Nov07.pdf (last visited Oct. 10, 2008).
5 See generally Greg Kirkpatrick, Case Study 20: Fresno County California,
in Under the Blade: The Conversion of Agricultural Landscapes (Richard
Olson & Thomas Lyson eds., 1999).
6 See Adina Merenlender et al., Land Trusts and Conservation Easements:
Who is Conserving What for Whom?, 18 Conservation Biology 65, 68 (2004)
(quoting The Land Trust Alliance’s definition of a land trust as “any organization that acts directly to conserve land”).
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Three Keys for Rehabilitating and
Stabilizing Haiti
by Chris Logan*

H

aiti faces many challenges due to the current global
food crisis that are exacerbated by the nation’s lack of
an effective government and the devastation wrought
by four hurricanes in one month. In order to rebuild the county’s
infrastructure, combat hunger, and promote good governance,
Haiti must rehabilitate basic infrastructure, expand existing
microfinance institutions (“MFI”), and reestablish functioning
government institutions. This article will discuss three essential
objectives for short- and long-term recovery and advancement
in Haiti.
Today’s global food crisis is affecting hundreds of millions of poor people around the world who live with hunger and
instability on a daily basis. The reasons for the crisis are many.
Global agriculture commodity prices have reached their highest level in thirty years1 and worldwide decreased supply and
increased demand create a situation where the world’s poor must
use more of their incomes to purchase food.2
Haiti is a prime example of an impoverished, fragile country that struggled under the weight of the food crisis even before
natural disaster struck. Seventy-six percent of Haitians live on
less than two dollars per day and fifty-five percent on less than
one dollar per day.3 Daily food insecurity affects forty percent of
Haitian homes.4 In April 2008, the government was ousted following food insecurity riots.5 A functioning government has yet
to be reestablished while Haitians are burdened by rebuilding
after four hurricanes ravaged the country leaving coastal cities
under water and people stranded on their roofs. The hurricanes
wiped away food reserves, flattening crops and farmland, killing livestock, and creating a desperate situation in a country
beholden to foreign aid and relief.6
To improve Haiti’s immediate welfare funding and
resources are necessary to rehabilitate the country’s weak infrastructure so food aid and emergency relief can reach those in
need. As of September 26, 2008, the United Nations (“UN”)
reported that road travel remained disrupted due to collapsed
bridges, damaged dykes, flooded roads, and landslides.7 The
UN Development Programme is leading an interagency effort to
strengthen Haiti’s dyke system and several NGOs are willing to
implement cash-for-work programs to assist with infrastructure
repair.8 The United States Agency for International Development (“USAID”) has 7,000 metric tons (“MT”) of food aid in
Port au Prince and 10,000 MT in regional warehouses ready for
distribution to affected areas, but washed out roads and bridges
hinder its distribution.9
Basic infrastructure rehabilitation will ease immediate suffering in Haiti, but is not enough to mitigate long-term food
Fall 2008

resources inadequacies. One option is increased access to microfinance, which contributes to poverty reduction, especially at the
local level where it bolsters the economy.10 MFIs, such as Haiti’s
Fonkoze, provide a safety net and help establish the economic
foundation for a democratic government.11 Throughout the food
crisis, MFIs have worked with borrowers to provide flexible loan
policies tailored to each client.12 MFIs empower ordinary people
to secure food, housing, and medical care by providing small
business loans, increasing agricultural investment, and coordinating trainings on literacy, women’s health, and environmental
protection.13 Expanding Haitian MFIs through increased funding will allow more people to receive loans, feed their families,
and climb out of poverty.
To begin climbing out of poverty and creating long term
stability, Haiti’s government with international organizations
and the private sector must respond to the needs of its people.
However, its institutions are weak or inactive, so the government cannot “hear or represent citizens’ interests, render justice, achieve consensus, or effectively provide public goods and
services.”14 One promising program is Kombit Ak Tèt Ansanm
[Working Together in Haiti] which facilitates the creation of
immediate, durable jobs through infrastructure development
and maintenance.15 A Haitian government will succeed when its
people have enough food and are empowered to control their
own economic situation.
Coordinated infrastructure rehabilitation and increased
investment in Haitian MFI’s are necessary components for
improving Haiti’s immediate welfare. Long-term stabilization
will come when the Haitian population is free from hunger and
worry, and when a government is in place that responds to needs
of the people.

Endnotes:
1

Sophia Murphy, Inst. for Agric. and Trade Pol’y, The Global Food
Price Crisis (2008), available at http://www.tradeobservatory.org/library.
cfm?RefID=104147 (last visited Nov. 13, 2008).
2 Id. (outlining current decreased supply from factors such as halved world
food stocks, drought affecting exporters of major staple crops, d iminishing
water supplies, climate change affecting rainfall and temperatures, and
production costs alongside increased demand from factors such as an increasing
world population, changing diets, and exponential growth in biofuel use).
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The Case for Green Food Labels
by Emily Alves & Mark Edwards*

P

Introduction

residential debates, headlines, and magazine covers demonstrate a dramatic rise in environmental consciousness,
especially associated with global climate change, carbon
emissions, oil independence, and human health. While global
warming, the need to cap carbon emissions, and oil independence dominate the public arena, the food industry must also be
scrutinized for its energy and carbon emissions. In the United
States, food production consumes nineteen percent of our energy
and contributes thirty-seven percent of our carbon emissions.1
In the absence of a systematic strategy by the U.S. government, many consumers are searching for ways to make a positive environmental impact while, at the same time, improving
their personal and family’s food consumption and lifestyle.
This trend, termed “green consumerism,” leads people to purchase products with limited or positive environmental impacts,
especially foods that have been produced in an environmentally
sensitive manner. Green consumerism has led to a very lucrative industry,2 which is indicative of the appeal of green credentials to consumers. Companies embracing green consumerism
advertise their products’ benefits through eco-labels which are
“label[s] placed on a product to inform consumers that the product is less environmentally harmful than similar products.”3
The green food industry is currently devoid of any meaningful system of making or verifying these claims, which creates
several problems. Many claims may be intentionally or accidentally misleading as to their actual environmental benefits.4 Without any standards set to define what certain environmental terms
mean, the use of this terminology can either render a consumer
clueless or simply confused over the true impact of their purchases. Many label claims address only one environmental issue,
which may or may not be relevant. A label of organic indicates
that a product was probably made from an entirely natural process (although the organic claim can be misleading5), but ignores
other important information contributing to the environmental
impact of a food product such as the amount of energy, water,
and land used in production and the resulting carbon emissions.
This kind of single attribute labeling is not an ideal method for
green consumers who are concerned with the broader state of
the environment, not solitary issues, and would like to utilize
more comprehensive information. A uniform, comprehensive
system of environmental labeling for food production is needed
to inform green consumers
Developing and implementing a comprehensive and comprehensible information labeling system will achieve the dual
purpose of increasing consumer satisfaction and meaningful
environmental progress. While this appears to be a daunting task
considering all the criteria that would need to be evaluated, it
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could be accomplished in a manner that is easy for consumers to
use to make informed, environmentally conscious decisions. A
useful example that eco-labels could emulate is already in place:
nutrition labels on food have been a regular aspect of food packaging for over a decade.6 Nutrition labels have been successful
primarily because they take information about the ingredients
and nutritional value of a food and disseminate it in a consistent,
user-friendly manner that enable consumers to decide which
foods offer the best dietary choice.7 Experience with food labels
should provide the foundation for the development of environmental information labels.
Another method to pursue could be integrating eco-information into the current nutrition labeling system instead of developing an entirely separate enterprise. This path would, perhaps,
be the most comprehensive because nutrition labels and potential environmental labels share a common purpose—to improve
human health. Information relevant to the environmental footprint of a food product—disclosure of pesticides and other
chemicals used on the product, the amount of energy used for
the entire production process, the effects of the manufacturing
process on natural resources such as air and water quality—are
equally relevant to maintenance of human health. Given their
common purpose and audience, combining the two information
systems may be the more efficient, successful system to achieve
both goals of improving the environment and human health.
This article will discuss why food labels should be expanded
to include important environmental information about products
to allow consumers to make educated decisions regarding their
impact on both human and environmental health. The first section of this article examines the history and demand for green
product information. A discussion of the development and lessons from nutrition labels follows, and includes an overview
of potential legal questions that may arise from eco-labeling.
Lastly, the article proposes recommendations for a path forward
on eco-labeling.

Green Consumerism
There is a well-documented demand for green products.8 A
surge in green products produced for a growing demographic of
environmentally conscious consumers began in the 1990s and
continues to this day with a wide variety of green promotions.9
Consumers seek green products for many reasons, motivating
marketers to create vigorous product campaigns promoting eco-

* Emily Alves is a JD candidate, May 2011, at American University Washington College of Law. Mark Edwards is Professor of Food Marketing and Sustainability at the Arizona State University, Morrison School of Management and
Agribusiness.

Sustainable Development Law & Policy

friendliness.10 In response to these diverse motivations and broad
spectrum of products, an enormous range of labels exists currently in stores, from prominent displays of government certified
organic to third-party certification to a company’s own stamp
of environmental approval. This confluence of often competing
claims does little to actually achieve the goals of eco-consumers.11

Independent Labels
Two types of labels have emerged that do not require government regulation. One is awarded by an independent thirdparty certifier that grants products permission to use their logo
indicating their approval of environmental credibility.12 An
example of this is the well-known “Fair Trade” line of products. The appearance of a Fair Trade logo on coffee, tea, or other
product indicates that it was made by a farmer who will not
only receive a fair wage for their work, but also did not use any
genetically modified organisms (“GMO”) or agrochemicals in
the process.13 A second type of green labeling not regulated by
the government is done by companies themselves. A company
may choose to label a food as “natural” with no indication of the
company’s definition of the word.14
There are numerous problems with allowing these practices.
The lack of transparency and sheer volume of claims do not
soundly educate the consumer.15 There is no easy manner for a
consumer to differentiate between credible and less than credible
claims.16 Terms such as “natural,” “environmentally friendly,”
and “green” are vague and non-definitional and do not indicate
what environmental benefit the product offers.17 Without more
specific terminology and explanations, there’s no way for the
consumer to determine what specifically about the product will
help them be eco-friendly,18 be it reducing their carbon footprint
or protecting a certain animal species. These labels frequently
address only one issue and ignore other critical eco-attributes.
For example, a “bird friendly” label does not give any insight
into the carbon footprint of producing the product, and a stamp
of “carbon neutral” does not indicate what, if any, pesticides
were used on the product. Likewise, a “natural” label with no
indication of the word’s definition, gives the consumer essentially no valuable information. This convoluted system does
little to assist consumers seeking to have the greatest impact on
overall environmental health.

State, Federal, and International Statutes
and Guidelines
Governments at all levels have engaged in sorting through
the environmental claims of products, particularly for the food
industry. The federal government has a variety of programs and
labeling schemes to benefit the environmentally conscious consumer. The most well known is the U.S. Department of Agriculture (“USDA”) organic certified labels program, effective since
1990.19 This program came to fruition as a result of the growing
demand for chemical-free foods and the stunting of that market’s
expansion due to a hodgepodge of state regulations.20 Originally
a primarily small-farm technique, large industrial farms came to
dominate the organic market and demanded federal regulation
to enhance their growth.21 Therein lies one of several problems
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with this certification program. Large scale farmers drove the
stakeholder process of creating the food labels, tilting the definitions in their favor.22 For the consumer purchasing organic
products because of their desire to support small, natural farm
practices, the USDA organic label can be misleading.23 Additionally, a lax and underfunded inspection process cannot completely guarantee that all organically labeled products are free
of synthetic fertilizers or agricultural chemicals.24 More recent
federal labeling schemes include labels issued to differentiate
between livestock that had been raised on a purely grass-fed
diet25 and requirements for labels regarding the country of origin
of certain food products.26
The Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) is also engaged in
disseminating production information and issued guidelines in
1992 for proper green advertising of products.27 While not labels
per se, these guidelines do represent “a framework for voluntary compliance with standards for environmental marketing.”28
However, these are merely guidelines and do not have the force
of law behind them, and thus are somewhat meaningless.29
What’s more, the FTC does not have the scientific expertise of
the issues that are present at other agencies such as the Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”), making the well-intentioned
guidelines considerably less effective than they could be.30
The states got an early lead in regulating environmental marketing of products. After a mid-1990s “Green Report”
by ten state Attorneys General about rampant abuses in the
green marketing industry regarding claims of the environmental credentials,31 several states passed statutes with stipulations
defining what standards products must meet in order to advertise their environmentally friendly status. The most publicized
of these was a statute in California that regulated the use of
the terms “ozone friendly,” “biodegradable,” “photodegradable,” “recycled,” and “recyclable.”32 In addition, Indiana and
Rhode Island passed similar definitional statutes regulating
environmental marketing.33 New York, Connecticut, and New
Hampshire have enacted statutes promoting logos to advertise
environmental attributes, and Maine has codified the FTC guidelines.34 What is problematic about this patchwork approach is
that it can be confusing and stifling to manufacturers, who may
decide not to sell their products as expansively to avoid having
to meet such a variety of criteria.35 This denies opportunities to
consumers to choose from a wider array of products.36
Eco-food labels are gaining prominence on the international regulatory scene.37 Perhaps due to the high-profile issue
of reducing carbon emissions, the most publicized labeling
scheme in recent years has been UK-based supermarket Tesco’s
decision to begin listing the carbon footprint on approximately
seventy thousand of its products in-store.38 This will allow consumers the opportunity to reduce these harmful emissions.39
Japan recently announced plans to begin its own carbon labeling scheme in the next few years, and several EU countries are
exploring carbon labeling options as well.40 This trend further
supports the proposition that comprehensive action is needed to
label products at the U.S. federal level, not only for domestic
consumers but also for trade reasons.41
52

The Experience with Nutrition Labels
Assessing the development and execution of nutrition labels
is a useful prototype for implementing a green foods labeling
system because it has, by and large, been successful. An examination is also inevitable if only for the fact that both would have
to co-exist on food packaging.
Although food regulation existed much earlier, the first food
labels were established in 1907 to distinguish between “suitable” food colors.42 Nutrition labeling began gaining notoriety
in the late 1980s out of concern over the American diet and
the idea was codified in the Nutrition Labeling and Education
Act (“NLEA”) of 1990.43 Administered by the Food and Drug
Administration (“FDA”) and the USDA Food Safety Inspection
Service, the Act was intended to provide the American consumer
with reliable and informative data regarding the content of their
food purchases and hopefully encourage healthful nutrition decisions.44 Mandatory labeling became effective in 1992,45 with a
re-examination of the guidelines every five years to ensure that
they reflect the current knowledge and values in the American
diet.46 For example, following an increased awareness of transfats’ detriment to cardiovascular health, the labels were updated
in 2006 to indicate whether a product includes the ingredient.47
Today, nutrition labels are designed to carry the most essential
nutritional value of a food product, listed in order to reflect the
level of importance to a daily diet in an easy-to-read format.48
Studies indicate that consumers view the labels favorably and
often use them to base their decisions over purchases to improve
their diets.49
The flexibility component in updating the labels every five
years to reflect nutritional values would be a useful aspect to
integrate into a potential eco-food label. New research indicating which environmental threats are more precarious than others
is continuously published and changes would be made to reflect
new realities in any potential scheme. Another positive attribute is the comprehensive, consistent dissemination of nutrition
information. As demonstrated above, a severe handicap behind
the current eco-labeling system is that there are no clear standards as to what certain terms mean, which can lead to consumer
confusion over the veracity of the environmental claims.

Potential Legal Obstacles
The major legal challenges to date against either nutrition
or potential environmental labels regard the First Amendment
implications of requiring food producers to display this information on their products. The two most prominent cases concerned
allegations of violations of commercial free speech. In each case,
the courts found that such a violation was not in play.
Nutritional Health Alliance v. Shalala addressed the question of the authority of the FDA to limit the health claims that
may be made on dietary supplements under the NLEA.50 The
plaintiff contended that: (1) the NLEA imposed an impermissible ban on truthful, non-misleading constitutional speech,
and (2) that the preauthorization scheme to label the products
was an unconstitutional prior restraint on commercial speech.51
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Association of National Advertisers v. Lungren involved the
California statute discussed above that required compliance with
state standards when advertising a product in environmentally
friendly ways52 such as declaring the product as ‘biodegradable’
or made of ‘recycled’ material. The plaintiff also alleged violations of commercial speech and non-speech.53 In both cases the
courts relied on a four-step test from Central Hudson Gas &
Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commission to determine if the
speech qualified as commercial, and could therefore be subject
to regulation. 54 The test for determination considers the following factors:
1) Whether the speech is misleading or does not “concern
lawful activity,” in which case no further inquiry is
needed and the speech may be restricted;
2) Whether the government’s asserted interest in regulating
the speech is substantial;
3) Whether the restraint directly advances the government’s
interest; and
4) Whether the legislation is no more extensive than necessary to serve the government’s interest.55
In both cases, the courts found that the speech in question
qualified as commercial and was subject to regulation under this
test.56 If Shalala and Lungren serve as indicators, it is likely
that eco-food labels will be subject to the Central Hudson test
described above. Given the similar First Amendment violations
alleged in both cases, it is plausible that free speech implications
may arise in the implementation of environmental food labeling.
Food producers may argue that restricting their current unbridled use of environmental terms denies them free speech, and,
simultaneously, that requiring them to provide certain information is unjustified regulation. Therefore, those tasked with drafting potential regulations must take care to remain within the
confines of the Hudson test. While eco-labeling is clearly a vital
government interest in line with Hudson’s second and third criteria, the parties involved will have to find a balance to ensure
that the policies are carried out in a reasonable manner to be
consistent with the last criterion.
First Amendment implications are not the only legal issues
that will arise in the drafting process. Another potential legal
concern could be over the roles of different agencies in implementing this system. Since green labels involve issues falling
under at least two different agencies jurisdictions—for instance,
the EPA monitors environmental issues while FDA regulates
food—green food labeling would probably necessitate a jointly
regulated process where the specific roles and jurisdiction of
each agency may be called into question. Other legal issues that
will probably arise and could face legal challenge include the
metrics used for reporting, thresholds for agricultural chemical
content, and even reporting formats.

Recommendations
The following recommendations may serve as a foundation
for implementing a labeling system that would indicate the environmental content of a food product and its production process.
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New or Expanded Label?
It must be decided whether to simply expand nutrition labels
to include environmental information or to have a separate label.
Several factors favor expanding the existing nutrition label.
Because nutrition labels are easy to read and valuable,57 including the environmental information of a food would instantly
reach that same level of credibility and wide audience. The
necessity of involving the FDA in this regulation invokes a need
for efficacy in regulating both labels. It would be easier for the
FDA to continue evaluating only one, comprehensive label.
The overlap in aspirations behind green food labels and
nutrition labels make integration of the two a natural fit. Both
sets of data strive to inform consumers about the best food available for their health. In fact, it could be argued that in neglecting to list environmental considerations on the current nutrition
labels, the information provided is severely lacking a vital component to the consumer’s health and well-being. Knowing how
one’s food is produced and its potential contents resulting from
production allow consumers to make important health-related
purchasing decisions. Therefore, including the environmental
impact and make-up of a food on nutrition labels would simultaneously assist the consumer in improving their health, wellbeing, and the environment.
However, adding another label would increase the FDA’s
workload and perhaps compromise the integrity of both sets of
information as a result. Furthermore, a second label may be overwhelming for packaging, particularly for compact food packets,
and potentially either confuse consumers or risk neglecting vital
information.

program. There ought to be a proper balance struck between
EPA’s expertise over the environmental impacts of various foods
with FDA’s jurisdiction of food regulation. Consideration must
also be given to USDA’s oversight of agriculture. The FCC may
also have a stake in the process and may be able to offer valuable
insight from the guidelines protecting against erroneous environmental marketing. While it is important to ensure that the labels
aren’t bogged down in administrative quagmire, the program’s
credibility depends on having all appropriate experts involved.

Eco-Dimensions
Specific criteria would need to be laid out concerning the
terms used in measuring a food product’s environmental impact.
A major drawback of any environmental labeling currently on
the market is a lack of definitional meaning behind its terminology. The public does not have a concrete idea as to what a term
really means in regards to a product’s environmental impact.
Therefore, there would need to be explicit definitions laid out,
followed by a vigorous public education campaign to ensure that
the public is using the information properly. To illustrate what
such a scheme may look like, an example set of ten eco-dimensions are shown in Table 1.
Table 1: Green Tag 10 Ecological Footprint Food Label
Parameter

Description

Score
(▼ ◆ ▲)

Water footprint

Water use for production

▼

Earth footprint

Cropland used for cultivation

◆

Ecological
footprint

Risk of erosion & fertilizer, pesticide, and
herbicide run-off

▲

Public-Private Partnership

Carbon footnote

Carbon emitted during production

▲

An efficient way to carry out this potentially complex dataprocessing is to engage in a public-private partnership, with the
government setting up a private entity to administer the environmental information necessary to be placed on the labels. Such
models have been implemented in other countries to great success. The Carbon Trust is a private corporation created by the British government to assist UK businesses in lowering their carbon
footprint.58 The organization worked with the Tesco supermarket
chain to develop its food carbon labeling system.59 The Canadian
government has licensed a company called Terrachoice to award
eco-labels.60 While the government has primary responsibility
for the overall program, Terrachoice is tasked with its day-today operation.61 A similar relationship would be very useful in
the United States as a good counterbalancing mechanism. Without a private partner to assume daily responsibilities, the government runs the risk of including too many competing interests in
the program’s development and not executing it as effectively
as necessary. A private company, however, needs some degree
of government oversight to ensure that the needs of the public
health and environmental conservation remain its primary goals.

Imported energy

Imported energy used during production

▼

Biodiversity

Impact on biodiversity

▼

Sustainable

Consumption of non-renewable inputs

◆

Air pollution

Greenhouse gases emitted during production

◆

Chemical input

Chemicals, toxins, of heavy metals used for
production

▼

Waste

Landfill waste created by packaging

▼

Agency Coordination
The EPA, FDA, and possibly USDA should be the agencies
charged with the primary responsibilities in any eco-labeling
Fall 2008

Key: ▼ = low; ◆ = medium; ▲ = high (low being smallest ecological footprint).

A new labeling system such as this would provide consumers with valuable information on the sustainability of each food
product. Reporting the water footprint alone would be astonishing to many consumers who have no idea that it takes approximately 147 liters (thirty-seven gallons) of water to produce just
one cup of coffee.62
To build on the example above, the Green Tag 10 Ecological Footprint label could be scored with a simple low, medium
and high in relation to its impact on that particular category. A
more sophisticated version might score on a ten point scale for
each factor and provide a grand total out of 100. For example,
under such a system, red meat might score 100, poultry 70, bread
40, vegetables 20, and algae 10. Consumers could then use these
scores to make decisions based on credible information regarding the product’s true environmental impact.
54

Conclusion
Expanding food labeling to include eco-consumption dimensions will provide consumers with critical information enabling
them to make better choices for their personal health and vitality, their families, and our collective environment. Moving forward on eco-labeling is important to consumers and supports the
national interests of reducing consumer addiction to oil, carbon
emissions, and pollution by highlighting product footprints on
the label. Eco-labeling supports sustainable eating and lifestyles
that green consumers want and need. Most importantly, ecolabeling will serve to educate consumers about personal and
family well-being issues to enhance health, avoid obesity and
diabetes, and reduce health care costs. How a food is produced
and what resources were required to put it on the store shelf is
directly related to these issues, and having easy, comprehensible
access to this information through labels will allow the consumer
to make sound decisions. All of these are vital interests that the
federal government should seek to address by implementing a
comprehensive, national eco-label system without delay.
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Preparing for the
Unknown:
The Threat of Agroterrorism
by Matthew Padilla*

B

eneath multi-hued trees lie expanses of arable land,
where various crops are grown in order to feed our
hungry society. In the United States many farms are so
large that they resemble an industrial operation, with concentrations of crops and animals that increase the risk of large scale
infection or disease. These characteristics make our agricultural
landscape a unique target for bioterrorism.1
In October 2008, the Agroterrorism Assault on Chester
County (“ATAC 08”) coordinated efforts between federal and
local officials in Pennsylvania to test “the region’s response to
an intentional dissemination of a foreign animal disease into the
region’s livestock population.”2 The exercise put agro-terrorism
on the forefront of the security agenda and brought to light the
problem of tracing and combating diseases which could be introduced into the food system.
A well-planned attack against agriculture would be detrimental to the United States because of its potential to disrupt a
fundamental portion of the nation’s economic system.3 Farming
and related economic sectors account for sixteen percent of the
United States’ workforce.4 The farm sector, while contributing
less than one percent of total Gross Domestic Product (“GDP”),
indirectly has a much greater impact on the national economy as
it contributes, via related economic sectors, to eleven percent of
GDP.5 And although only one percent of GDP comes directly
from farming, 100% of the U.S. population is nourished and
clothed by farming-related industries originating in the United
States and abroad.
Some scholars cite General Sherman’s attack on the American south’s agricultural system during the Civil War as an
example of how greatly an attack on foodstuffs may impact a
population.6 There are countless examples of attacks on agriculture throughout history, from Rome’s salting of Carthage, to
Japan’s World War II Unit 731 in Manchuria, which conducted
numerous biological tests, including many on human subjects.7
The United States’ use of Agent Orange during the Vietnam
War, while not directed at farmland, did damage “some crops.”8
The Soviet Union is also alleged to have used glanders, a disease
which causes death in horses and mules, during their 1980s war
in Afghanistan.9 Furthermore, multiple nations have programs
that could be used to disrupt agriculture.10
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The likelihood of a full-scale attack by another nation
against the United States is small. The possibility of a terrorist
attack on the United States, using asymmetric tactics targeting
agriculture, is greater and could have a substantial and detrimental psychological impact on the country.11 Recent food scares,
which were not terrorist-related, were caused by jalapeños and
tomatoes (infected with salmonella) in summer 2008. The FDA
was forced into an expensive investigation to determine the origin of the infected tomatoes and jalapeños. The scare caused
many restaurants and grocers to stop selling the produce, and
affected both suspect and non-suspect farms alike, while sickening and frightening consumers.12
Several contemporary examples of agroterrorism have been
documented overseas. The Arab Revolutionary Council used
mercury to poison oranges in Israel in 1978, causing orange
exports to decline significantly.13 In 1997 Israeli settlers used
pesticides to spray Palestinian grapevines, causing the loss of
seventeen thousand metric tons of produce.14 In 1952, a Kenyan
insurgent group, the Mau Mau, used the African milk bush to
poison and kill thirty-three head of cattle. 15
Terrorist attacks are not limited to foreign and non-state
actors. For example, the Rajneeshee Cult poisoned Oregon salad
bars in 1984 with salmonella.16 In addition, the largest terrorist
attacks conducted in the United States prior to 9/11 were perpetrated by fringe right-wing domestic groups.17 In fact, the Ku
Klux Klan has reportedly resorted to agroterror in the past, in
an effort to intimidate minority farmers.18 An area of concern
today is the possibility of increased right-wing violence through
agroterror. The Southern Poverty Law Center has reported
increased rhetoric from right-wing racist groups who believe
that an Obama presidency would be good for them because it
could “drive millions to their cause.”19
Amplified racist sentiments, coupled with violence, may
present a daunting challenge for law enforcement authorities
because of the potential for a non-organized amateur terrorist
attack. Mere “curiosity and fascination” may lead resurgent
members of right wing groups to acquire nuclear, chemical,
or biological weapons for multiple uses including agroterrorism.20 Furthermore, extremists of all varieties—whether or not
they are affiliated with an organized group—pose a significant
problem, and according to the FBI, have represented “the most
difficult international terrorist challenge to the law enforcement
and intelligence communities.”21 An amateur terrorist could use
simple technologies to spread fear among the masses, attacking
relatively unprotected areas like agricultural products.22
If farm products are to be protected, both federal and local
governments will have to continue exercises such as ATAC 08.
There is no way to ensure that food will be completely protected.
However, preparing localities and strengthening pertinent legislation will help authorities deal with such an exigency, and
could help prevent a panic among the populace.23 Agriculture
Secretary Ed Schafer, realizing the problem, has stated that the
“USDA has to think of how we are vulnerable to terrorists and
strengthen protective measures against terrorism.”24 In addition,
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diversifying the food supply, by strengthening local farms, can
help offset the vulnerability and impact of an attack on a large
farm. Acknowledgement of the vulnerability is a good step, and
measures such as the ATAC 08 exercise is a sound second step,
but it will take vigilant action at all levels to ensure that the food
supply remains safe.

Endnotes:
1

Jim Monke, Agroterrorism: Threats and Preparedness 1-2 (Congressional
Research Service Report for Congress No. RL32521, 2004), available at
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/terror/RL32521.pdf (last visited Nov. 1, 2008)
(listing the characteristics that make agriculture a unique subset of bioterrorism,
such as the geographical distribution of agriculture and livestock that is
“frequently concentrated in confined locations”).
2 Penn Veterinary Medicine, Penn Vet Hosts FBI Agroterrorism Exercise at
New Bolton Center (Oct. 17, 2008), http://www.vet.upenn.edu/PennVet/News/
PennVetintheNews/tabid/286/Default.aspx (follow hyperlink to title of article)
(last visited Nov. 13, 2008).
3

Monke, supra note 1, at 5-6.

4

Id.

5

Id.

6

See Barry S. Zellen, Preventing Armageddon II: Confronting the Specter of
Agriterror, Strategic Insights, Dec. 2004, at 1-2, available at http://www.ccc.
nps.navy.mil/si/2004/dec/zellenDec04.pdf (last visited Oct. 22, 2008).
7

See Richard A. Falkenrath, Robert D. Newman, & Bradley A. Thayer,
America’s Achilles’ Heel 76 (Teresa J. Lawson ed., MIT Press 2001) (1998)
[hereinafter Falkenrath, et. al.] (outlining the history of Japanese biological
programs from 1932-45; “Unit 732 studied diseases including anthrax, glanders, and plague by infecting prisoners.” Furthermore, Japan conducted small
scale operations by preparing and distributing “chocolates filled with anthrax
spores to youngsters. On another occasion 3,000 Chinese prisoners of war were
given a “holiday treat” of dumplings injected with typhoid or paratyphoid…”);
see also Monke, supra note 1, at 12 (stating in a “Brief History of Agricultural
Bioweapons” that “[d]uring the Vietnam War, the U.S. used agent orange to
destroy foliage, affecting some crops”).
8

See Monke, supra note 1, at 12.

9

Id. at 11.

10

See Joseph P. Dudley & Michael H. Woodford, Bioweapons, Biodiversity,
and Ecocide: Potential Effects of Biological Weapons on Biological Diversity,
BioScience, July, 1 2002, at 585.
11

See generally Jason Pate & Gavin Cameron, Covert Biological Weapons
Attacks Against Agricultural Targets: Assessing the Impact against U.S.
Agriculture, at 5-7 ( BCSIA Discussion Paper 2001-9, John F. Kennedy School
of Government, Harvard University) (stating that there are a variety of costs
that may arise from agroterrorism; economic, political, direct and indirect, and
“[s]ome of these costs apply to any act of terrorism: the loss of confidence and
credibility stemming from a government’s inability to protect the country”).
12

Karen Grigsby Bates, Salmonella Scare Hurts California Tomato Growers,
National Public Radio, July 9, 2008, available at http://www.npr.org/
templates/story/story.php?storyId=92371196 (last visited Nov. 4, 2008).
13

Monke, supra note 1, at 12.

14

Id. at 12.

15

Id. at 12.

16

Id. at 12 (discussing the Cult’s attempt to influence an election).

Endnotes: Preparing for the Unknown
continued on page 76

56

Commentary
Genetically Modified Organisms and Global Hunger: A Real Solution?
by Simon Nicholson*

O

Introduction

ver recent months, sharply rising global food prices
have increased chronic hunger, exacerbated poverty,
and sparked political unrest around the world.1 In the
midst of this crisis a controversial agricultural technology has
been receiving renewed attention: the genetic modification of
food crops.2 This renewed attention comes after a period of
muted consolidation by the food biotechnology industry. The
spread of genetically modified (“GM”) foods has advanced
steadily in recent years, but in the face of widespread public protest and other forms of political contestation in many countries,
this has been taking place with
little fanfare.3
Now, GM foods are once
again in the headlines. Proponents
of the technology have seized on
the global food price crisis as evidence that we need wider acceptance of food biotechnology. In
the process, we are seeing the
recycling of arguments that were
first rolled out with the commercial debut of GM foods in the mid
1990s.4 We are being told now,
as we were told then, that unless
we wholeheartedly embrace the
biotechnological manipulation of the global supply, there is no
way that we will be able to feed an expanding human population
without overstressing an increasingly fragile environment.5 The
argument, in other words, is that GM foods must be at the heart
of the sustainable food systems of the future.6
What are we to make of this renewed call for the more widespread development and deployment of GM foods? In this article,
I will make the case that GM foods in their current guise actually offer very little to help us overcome the current food crisis,
and even less to help us with long-term hunger and poverty. In
fact, by affording greater and greater power to fewer and fewer
seed and chemical conglomerates, GM foods threaten to worsen
our long-term food prospects. This is because GM foods further
entrench the very political dynamics that are currently producing
global hunger and a range of other food-related challenges. Our
food systems must undergo revolutionary change if we are to
eradicate hunger and ensure sustainability. Unfortunately, GM
foods fail to offer this revolutionary change, but instead lead us
further down our present, deeply problematic path.

Making Sense
of the GM Foods Debate
There is no question that since the introduction of commercial GM food products in 1994, the food biotechnology industry has seen extraordinary growth.7 The reach of GM crops has
expanded rapidly to the extent that they now blanket more than
57 million hectares (140 million acres) of farmland in the United
States alone,8 with the result that between seventy and seventyfive percent of all processed foods now in U.S. supermarkets
contain genetically engineered ingredients.9 In 2007, worldwide plantings of GM foods covered as much as 114 million
hectares (280 million acres),
and GM crops were grown by
an estimated 12 million farmers
across twenty-three countries.10
Regarding the area planted
with GM crops and the number of farmers who are now
using them, many claim that
GM foods have been the most
rapidly spread and adopted
agricultural technology in all of
human history.11
Nevertheless, the technology’s spread has not been a
smooth one. The concerns and
actions of a diverse and committed worldwide network of opponents have greatly impacted the biotechnology industry’s expansion plans.12 Certainly, there is little question that GM foods are
one of the most contentious and contested technologies to have
been developed in recent times.13 They have sparked protest in
every place they have been introduced, and have proved a lightning rod for those with wider concerns about corporate control
of the food supply and the harms associated with the practices of
industrial agriculture.14
The debate over GM foods has been wide-ranging, built
around several recurring themes and arguments. On one side of
the debate, supporters claim that genetically modified plants produce, or have the potential to produce, higher crop yields while
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reducing the use of agricultural chemicals, making for more efficient and more environmentally-friendly farming.15 In addition,
proponents claim the technology will both provide more food
for the world’s hungry and increase on-farm profits by reducing
the work that farmers need to perform.16 With future generations of transgenic technologies, we are told we can expect foods
with higher concentrations of micronutrients, crops that thrive
in drought-stricken or saline-saturated soils, resistance to a wider
range of damaging pests and
diseases, plants that act as incubators and delivery systems for
vaccines and other pharmaceutical products, and much more.17
Yet such claims and promises have done little to convince
the anti-GM crowd. Some are
opposed to this new technology
on the grounds that its likely benefits have been inflated by the biotechnology industry and that
its risks have been inadequately considered. These opponents
are worried, in other words, that GM foods have already caused
harm, or might prove to be harmful, to people or to the environment.18 Others are concerned about the principles at stake
in the production of these novel organisms, arguing that they
are “unnatural” or “against God.”19 A third line of opposition
focuses on the beneficiaries of GM technologies. These opponents suggest that expanded use of GM foods relies on deeply
problematic assumptions about the causes of hunger and the
plight of the environment, and claim that we should be wary of
the further consolidation of power in industrial agriculture, and
of the interests of the biotech companies that are pushing and
patenting their creations.20

sense, both the technophilic and technophobic positions are
“deterministic”—they imagine technology in the driver’s seat,
and assume that we are simply mute passengers along for the
ride.25
These two extreme options, though, are not our real alternatives at all. There are a wide range of possible technological
futures available to us, beyond moving ever forward on our present track or turning our backs on
all forms of technological progress. Those who argue against
GM foods are not really railing
against all technology; they are
simply pointing out problems
with this technology (or, more
broadly, with the technological
system of which GM foods are
a part). And they are suggesting
that rather than blindly accepting all technological innovations as right and good, we must develop more sophisticated
forms of technological analysis.
Too often our technological trajectory and the impacts of particular technological developments go largely unquestioned. The
most common way to think about technology is, after all, to give
it very little thought at all. Most of us are guilty of what Langdon
Winner once termed “technological somnambulism”26—we are
content to sleepwalk our way through technological decisionmaking. Of course there is always some general stir when a truly
remarkable new technology finds its way into the global marketplace or imagination, as we have seen with GM foods. Once we
become accustomed to any new technology, however, it is apt
to become naturalized and reified through its use, such that it
becomes largely immune to interrogation. The remarkable soon
becomes mundane in our fast-paced world.
In part, this is because the technologies in our lives are so
ubiquitous, and by now we are so used to even sweeping technological change and upheaval, that only rarely is our collective attention held for any length of time. This also reflects the
immense hold of the idea of “progress” and the technophilic orientation on contemporary social thought. By this view, technology is at the forefront of the quest for steady improvement of the
human condition.27 As such, we largely take it on faith that technology has a positive or, at least, benign influence on our lives
(often despite mounting environmental and other evidence to the
contrary). All of this leaves little scope for raising real questions
about our technologies and for the creation of alternative technological directions, since, as Andrew Feenberg characterizes this
position, we tend to believe that “technology’s advance is the
advance of the human species.”28
Those arguing against GM foods are asking us to question
these assumptions. They are pointing out, first of all, that the
idea that all technologies must be essentially good or essentially
bad is a myth without foundation. Rather than adopt the technophilic assumption that every new technology is a positive thing,
we should instead understand that different technologies can

GM foods ultimately
do nothing to address the
political roots of our
food crisis.

The Debate’s Technological Roots
At the root of this debate lie some vastly different understandings of technology. A simplistic reading of the debate
pigeonholes it as a disagreement between “technophiles” and
“technophobes.”21 Proponents of GM foods often cast themselves in the technophile role, as pro-technological problem
solvers, striving to find real, practical solutions to the world’s
pressing agricultural challenges.22 By contrast, those who raise
questions about GM foods are pegged as anti-technological
Luddites—“skeptics” who are intent on halting even the most
beneficial uses of all new technologies.23
There is a grain of truth to this reading. Those who are
strongly for the use of GM foods tend to be optimistic about
the ability of new technologies to resolve complex problems,
while those who argue against GM foods tend to be pessimistic about such claims.24 However, this caricature of the debate,
though widespread, actually obscures more than it reveals. This
is because it would have us believe that there are only two technological paths open to us: either we wholeheartedly embrace
our present technological trajectory, or we turn our backs on
all technology and wander back into the Stone Age. In this
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have different effects and implications. At the same time, the
critics of GM foods are arguing that technological artifacts are
not merely neutral tools. Moving away from food for a moment,
take the old adage, a favorite of the National Rifle Association,
that “guns don’t kill people; people kill people.” This entirely
misses the fact that guns are designed with killing in mind, that
the availability of guns gives power to some and takes it from
others, and that their widespread availability makes purposeful and accidental death more likely. Another way to say this is
that guns, like every other technology, have political and social
effects built into their very fabric. GM foods are no different.
To look at a technology like a GM seed through the limited
technophilia vs. technophobia debate ultimately does not get us
very far. We are much better off considering and judging each
technology within its social and historic context, as both a product and purveyor of politics. This means considering where a
particular technology comes from, whom and what ends it benefits, and what kinds of social and ecological relations it produces
or holds in place.

GM Foods and Global Hunger
For those who raise questions about GM foods, then, truly
understanding this novel technology requires thinking about
things like the context from which it has emerged, and the type
of agricultural system that its use promotes. With this in mind,
let us consider in more detail the arguments currently being
made in favor of GM foods. Remember, we are being told that
we need biotechnology to feed the world and slow the environmental degradation caused by mainstream industrial farming.29
The implication is that the few multinational companies that
largely control the development of GM seeds and the chemicals
that they require are best situated to lead us out of our current
predicament, and that hunger is at base a technical problem to be
resolved by the deployment of technological fixes.30
In the wake of the recent food price increases, there are now
more than 920 million people around the world who are chronically hungry.31 The proximate causes of this recent spike in hunger are now well known, and can be recited briefly. In our highly
industrialized global food system, crop prices are closely tied to
oil prices, and with the price of a barrel of oil recently topping
out at close to $150 per barrel, the fossil-fuel energy price surge
has placed significant upward pressure on food costs.32 Another
factor contributing to high food prices has been the near-drought
conditions seen in Australia and much of Europe over recent
growing seasons.33 These abnormal weather patterns have dramatically suppressed crop yields, particularly for wheat and
rice.34 Since commodity crops like these are now sold on global
markets, a significant food production shortfall in one region has
worldwide implications.35
At the same time, increased demand for meat in China and
a handful of other rapidly expanding economies have driven up
demand for grains, while the collapse of home equity markets in
the United States and elsewhere has driven speculative capital
into food commodities markets, inflating the value of food in
futures exchanges.36 Biofuels policies in Europe and the United
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States have also played a significant part in recent food price
hikes by siphoning off increasing amounts of corn and other
food crops for use in gas tanks.37
GM foods are supposed to help alleviate all of these pressures, principally by raising grain yields. If GM crops could
consistently produce increased grain yields (itself a questionable assumption) then this would presumably help us overcome
the relative food shortages produced by the drought, demand for
meat, corn-hungry biofuels mandates, and other factors outlined
above.38
However, there is a serious flaw in this argument. To imagine
that hunger is a short-term problem, and to focus solely on technological responses to the proximate drivers of the recent food
price crisis, is to miss a big part of the story. Hunger is hardly
a new thing. Even in the few years before the 2008 price hikes,
when food was cheap and the global food system was widely
thought to be working effectively, there were an estimated 850
million chronically hungry people around the world.39 This is
something that tends to be lost and forgotten in current coverage
of the food crisis. Yet try as we might to attribute conditions of
hunger to short-term factors, this is clearly a long-term, structural problem.
People have been going hungry in recent years despite
the fact that we have a food system that produces roughly two
pounds of grain per person each day.40 This is 3,000 kilocalories
of food for each individual on the planet—more than enough to
meet every person’s energy requirements, even before we take
into account all of the nuts, fruits, and vegetables that our food
system also provides.41 We live in a world of abundant food, yet
millions go without adequate nutrition. How can this be?42
Here’s the punch-line, and it’s one that, thanks principally
to the work of Amartya Sen, we have known for some time: in
our age of abundance, hunger is ultimately not a function of a
lack of food, but rather a function of a lack of access to food.43
To push this argument further, framing hunger as something
technical—to be resolved by the application of a simple technological fix—obscures the hidden workings of the global industrial food system, drawing our attention away from the means
by which our food system operates to produce hunger. Through
the dominant technophilic lens, we tend to view hunger as something short-term and inadvertent. This is a mistake. It makes
more analytic sense to see hunger as something that is a natural
product of our organization of food production.44 When the food
system produces hunger it is not failing, it is operating precisely
as it has been developed to operate.
This is not to say that the people and organizations that
have the most power in our contemporary food system go out
of their way to create hunger and suffering. Yet in the push for
profit and control that the industrial food system demands, some
people win big and some people lose. The technologies we have
developed to grow, process, package, and distribute food are a
big part of why the food system now looks the way it does, and
why its benefits accrue disproportionately to a shrinking number
of large corporate actors. Certain Green Revolution technologies—combine harvesters, hybrid seeds, and chemical fertilizers
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and pesticides, for instance—in combination with rich-country
government policies and a range of other factors have helped
to create our modern system of food production, and function
now to hold it in place.45 With these technologies and in this
environment a few farmers in rich countries are now able to
produce truly extraordinary
quantities of food. And yet the
style of farming it encourages
has had tragic environmental,
economic, and social consequences.46 Intractable chronic
hunger is but one product of
this system—a product that
GM foods can never hope to
magically abolish.
Viewing the food crisis
through this lens raises big
questions about the claim
that spreading biotechnology
will feed the hungry and spur
development in the world’s
poorest regions. Instead, this
analysis suggests that the
more widespread use of GM foods may actually make things
worse. Even should GM foods raise levels of food production,
the structures and dynamics of food production and consumption that are currently producing hunger go unchecked, and will
in fact receive a boost from biotechnology. How will GM foods
tackle the political roots of hunger and underdevelopment if
through their development and deployment they serve to further
entrench the very industrial food system that is giving rise to
these problems?
Some officials and commentators have described the recent
food price hikes as a “silent tsunami.”47 There is some truth
in this description. For one thing, the manner in which rising
food costs have decimated lives and livelihoods calls to mind
a marauding natural disaster.48 And, like the Indian Ocean tsunami of 2004, the tragedy of global food riots has temporarily
refocused attention on some of the world’s poorest regions.49
After that, though, the metaphor breaks down. The global
hunger and economic inequality that the food price crisis has
exacerbated are not new things, brought on by a sudden catastrophe. Rather, they are old things made worse by new circumstances. Further, these recent food price increases are not acts
of God. Instead, they represent a human-made tragedy. What I
mean is that blame for the food price crisis lies not with nature
or with other forces beyond our control, but ultimately with the
constitution of our political and economic systems. Through
political choices, institutional development, and technological
design, we have developed a global food system that provides
bountiful food to some while condemning others to lives of suffering and deprivation. In this sense hunger is not natural; hunger
is always political. GM foods ultimately do nothing to address
these political roots of our food crisis.

Understanding Technology
Let me try to be clear that this is not meant to be an antitechnology commentary. I think it’s abundantly obvious that for
humanity to thrive in ways that respect the rest of the natural
world, we need a widespread technological revolution. In industrialized countries and around the
globe, we must find or recover
more effective ways to produce
and use energy, land, water, and
the earth’s other scarce resources
and sinks, in agriculture and in
all other areas of life. The myriad
challenges we face demand technological transformation on scales
never before seen and experts and
innovators to develop and distribute these new systems. Technology will always be front and
center in any action to create a better world.
However, our current forms
of technological engagement are
insufficient to achieve global sustainability. The notion that there are just two extreme options
open to us—unhindered technological development along our
present path or a retreat into our ancestral caves—is a dangerous misinterpretation of what technology is, how technological
change works, and what our options really look like. Instead of
perpetuating this notion, we need to craft forms of technological
engagement that are at once receptive to the promises of technological development and cognizant of challenges. This starts
with understanding technology as an object not just of technical
but of political study. It then means asking tough questions about
contemporary technological life, and developing institutions that
support such questioning. At the broadest level this means asking, what kind of world are we trying to create? What kinds of
technologies will best help us create that world?
There is no such thing as a one-shot, sacrifice-free solution
to the food crisis, environmental crisis, or to any of the myriad
other crises that contemporary life throws at us. And if the technological horrors of the twentieth century, from nuclear accidents
and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, to genocide and environmental devastation, have taught us anything, it
is that with technological promise often comes great peril. Selfprofessed technophiles promise that through the application of
technological fixes we can consistently overcome ecological
limits.50 A far more promising tack, though, may be to appreciate ecological limits and strive for rich lives within them. This
is not an argument against technology and “progress,” as much
as technophiles may wish to paint it in those terms. Rather, it’s
a reiteration of an old environmental argument for technology in
the service of a progress differently defined.51
This means that instead of employing technologies to work
against natural processes and bring them under a human yoke, we

People have been going
hungry in recent years
despite the fact that
we have a food system that
produces roughly
two pounds of grain per
person each day.
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can and must strive to develop technologies that help us engage
with natural processes in ways that are productive and restoring.
Consider that the fastest-growing segment of the food economy
in the United States is farmers’ markets, and particularly those
markets that support local and regional organic produce.52 The
farmers who grow food for these local organic markets are not
scratching in the ground with sticks. Many of these operations
are incredibly high-tech.53 However, rather than depending on
industrial technologies like GM crops, successful farms in this
ilk depend on a mastery of the local, and on the development of
technologies that accommodate cooperation with the land.54
Some of this growing movement relies on the rediscovery
of technologies and techniques from long ago. Intercropping different plant species and their successful rotation, managing the
interplay between different aspects of the farm, drawing on local
resources to develop and sustain the fertility of land through
time—all are basic to the organic farmer’s tool kit.55 These are
things that were known by the successful societies that came
before our own, but have been largely lost in an age of industrial
farming. These are lessons that are slowly being relearned, as a
new wave of eager farmers taps into knowledge from a disappearing breed, and the repositories of knowledge that exist in
other places.56
Much of the success of this emerging food system, though,
depends not on the recovery of older farming forms, but on
entirely new research. Finding alternatives to rampant industrialism is not just about turning backwards, but looking forwards
along a new path. For instance, Wes Jackson and his team at
the Land Institute in Kansas have developed highly productive
perennial crop growing systems that provide a host of ecological
benefits, without fostering a dependence on irreplaceable fossil
fuels.57 Urban farmers across the United States are discovering
new ways to grow food on roof-tops, on fire escapes, and on
abandoned lots, and in the process are revitalizing neighborhoods and transforming communities.58 More and more consumers are discovering new connections to other people and to
the environment through the simple act of eating delicious foods
light on processing. This is a set of technologies—indeed, an
expanding technological system—turned to a very different set
of ends than that suggested by GM foods. This is technology in
the service of human well-being, rather than a dangerous, shortsighted industrial ideology.

Conclusion
We are, as Harriett Friedman has reminded us, eating animals.59 The search for sustainability is rooted in our food system. With that in mind, our goal should not just be short-term
fixes via an entrenchment of industrial farming methods. Rather,
we should be striving to build an agricultural economy that gives
us abundant healthful food while creating meaningful jobs,
respects the land and the human and non-human organisms that
depend on it, and views food as sustenance rather than simply as
a collection of nutrients. To achieve this goal requires a technology-based revolution that, at the same time, considers the deep
contradictions in our social and economic condition. GM foods,
in their present guise, as products of expanding corporate power,
offer nothing of this sort. Rather, GM foods promise to further
the present industrial food system, by affording more and more
control to fewer and fewer players, by increasing the dependencies of farmers and consumers, and by further clouding the relationships we have with our food and those who grow it.
The GM foods debate reminds us that all technologies are
ultimately products of political contestation, operating to the
benefit of some and the exclusion and detriment of others. The
more particular lesson is that hunger and the other problems that
characterize the industrial food system are not the products of
a shortage of food production, but rather a shortage of prudent,
democratic engagement with the technological systems that
comprise modern life. To build a sustainable food system, we
need to find wiser ways to engage with our technological systems. Wisdom demands that we appreciate and work within the
conflict between the contradictions of modernity and the comforts that it affords.60 There is no benefit in turning away from
all of technology and all of the wonders that technological life
provides us with. Nor is there real benefit in uncritically accepting all technological developments. Either option is to deny our
ability to shape our technological future.
Transformation of our food system is basic to the revitalization of our material economy, and of our moral sensibilities.
Technology must be at the heart of this transformation, but the
form that this technology will take is not set in stone. The choice
is not between bioengineering or mass starvation. Instead, there
is a rich array of options open to us, ours for the making.
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Legislative Update
Country-of-Origin Labeling
by Anastasia Lewandoski*

S

ince 1949, the Farm Bill has been updated every four
to six years to reflect the evolving needs of the nation,
addressing various topics from food stamps to agricultural subsidies to natural disaster insurance. Section 11002 of
the 2008 Farm Bill mandates country-of-origin labels for certain
food products. This section amends the Agricultural Marketing
Act of 1946, which gave prerequisites for producers of certain
products only if they chose to put a USA label on their product.1 The 2008 amendments to § 11002 now require countryof-origin labels on goat meat, chicken, ginseng, pecans, and
macadamia nuts. These are additions to the products which were
already required to have country-of-origin labels. This prior list
contained beef, lamb, pork, fish, peanuts, and perishable agricultural commodities such as fruits and vegetables.2 Although these
labels provide useful information to consumers, they come at a
heavy price and still have loopholes allowing many food products to remain unlabeled.
Country-of-origin labels will help consumers make informed
decisions about the products they buy. Many consumers prefer
American over foreign products. Also, in the event that foreign
food products become somehow tainted, country-of-origin labels
could reassure worried consumers. A good illustration of the
utility of country-of-origin labeling comes from past outbreaks
of bovine spongiform encephalopathy, commonly called “mad
cow disease,” which may be present in cattle from England and
Ireland.3 Outbreaks 1992 and 1993, where almost one thousand
cases of mad cow disease were diagnosed in Great Britain each
week,4 caused great fear among consumers of beef in the United
States.
Some producers will enjoy decreased competition as a result
of the 2008 amendment to § 11002. For example, the amendment
adds macadamia nuts which are domestically grown in Hawaii.5
They have also been imported from Australia—where they are
more cheaply produced—and then packaged in Hawaii and sold
as Hawaiian macadamia nuts for a lower price than those actually grown in Hawaii.6 Under the new law, these producers will
have to market their nuts as products of Australia because nuts
can only be labeled as American if they were produced exclusively in the United States.7
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While the amendment will give consumers new knowledge, the substantial costs of the labeling program will likely be
passed on to consumers. The Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs estimates that labeling will cost producers, retailers,
and packers anywhere from $500 million to $4 billion during
the first year of implementation, and cost between $100 million
and $600 million per year after the practice has been in place
for ten years, making this “one of the most burdensome rules to
be reviewed by the Administration.”8 The U.S. Department of
Agriculture, which underestimated costs when country-of-origin
labels for fish were implemented in 2005, estimated a cost of
$2.52 billion for producers, packers, and retailers during the first
year.9 These costs come from producing new labels for all the
products, segregating American from Canadian cattle in slaughterhouses where they would otherwise be grouped together,
and costs for some producers to find new domestic sources.10
Furthermore, food retailers will face an estimated $952 million
expense during the first year of implementation.11 When this
price is handed down to consumers, this equates to an increase
of seven cents a pound for beef and four cents a pound for pork,
lamb, and goat.12
Although it is more comprehensive, the amendment does
contain holes. For instance, labels do not apply to all food products. Processed foods are exempted,13 removing a huge portion of the overall food consumed in the United States. The
exemption uses a broad interpretation of what is “processed,”
and includes foods that have been cooked, cured, smoked, or
restructured.14 The processed food exemption is also nonsensical as applied to certain products, like vegetables, which need
labels when sold in separate packages but not if sold in a mixed
bag.15 It only seems logical that if a consumer is entitled to know
the origin of a bag of peas or carrots, the consumer should also
be entitled to know the origin of a bag of peas and carrots. Other
exemptions undermine the intended purpose of the rule. Roasted
products, for example, are exempt from labeling, and as many
nuts are sold roasted, this exemption will remove foods that the

* Anastasia Lewandoski is a JD candidate, May 2010, at American University
Washington College of Law.
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bill otherwise purports to regulate. Finally, restaurants and cafeterias are not required to inform their customers where their
food originated.16
With these large exceptions, the country-of-origin requirement cannot be completely effective in informing American consumers of the origin of their food. Consumers are left
guessing the origin of many products. Additionally, the costs to
consumers may be larger than the value of the information. In
short, although the amendment is a step in the right direction
for consumer information and food safety, it remains severely
flawed.
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Book Review
Earth: The Sequel
The Race to Reinvent Energy and Stop Global Warming
by Fred Krupp and Miriam Horn

E

arth: The Sequel is an optimistic attempt at invigorating
the debate over a cap-and-trade system for green house gas
emissions. The book could not have come at a better time.
Surging oil prices brought energy consumption and production to the forefront of the presidential election campaign this
summer, resulting in proposals for gas tax holidays and increased
domestic production. Deregulation and the once-venerable free
market are now slandered daily after the big business bailouts
on Wall Street. A prevailing consensus of sorts has emerged
about the need to invest in alternative energy, thereby creating
millions of high-wage “green collar” jobs.1 It’s not surprising,
however, that doubts remain about exactly where those millions
of jobs will come from, and whether alternative fuels can rival
their conventional fossil-based counterparts, or even whether it
is advisable to place the future of the environment in the invisible hands of the free market.
This book seeks to alleviate those types of doubts. For
authors Fred Krupp and Miriam Horn, the goal is stopping
global warming. They see innovation and capitalism as the
means to that end. They contend that the free market, along with
a “technology neutral” price on carbon, is the fastest and most
efficient tool for weaning ourselves off an unhealthy reliance
on petroleum and diversifying our energy portfolio with clean,
renewable resources. Krupp and Horn do not rely on graphs and
spreadsheets to support their thesis. Instead, they provide anecdotal evidence drawn from the whole of the United States, from
the sun-drenched west, to coal-rich Appalachia, to the dauntless
Silicon Valley. To demonstrate that the country lacks appropriate policy, not capable technology, the authors survey state-ofthe-art energy production in the fields of solar, tidal, geothermal,
biofuels, and, yes, even coal. They argue that policy and not
technology is holding back meaningful progress in the fight
against global warming.
The protagonists in Krupp and Horn’s stories are the engineers, venture capitalists, and oilmen-turned-environmentalists
that are on the verge of kick-starting a “new industrial revolution.” One colorful example is the story of Bernie Karl, of Chena
Hot Springs, Alaska, whose ice hotel was dubbed “the dumbest
business idea of the year” by Forbes Magazine when it melted
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Reviewed by John R. Shackelford*
in 2004. Just two years later, Karl and the United Technologies
Corporation opened a successful geothermal plant powered by
water at temperatures so low that experts had previously written
the source off for geothermal use. This renewable energy source
now keeps Karl’s ice museum frozen during the summer, and it
powers the rest of his resort all year long.
Importantly, Krupp and Horn do not get lost in their descriptions of science fiction-like technology or ignore the potential
contribution in the fight against global warming from developing
countries. Perhaps the most inspirational story comes from the
edge of the Brazilian Amazon, where an illiterate farmer named
Herculano Porto rallied his neighbors to stand up to the loggers,
ranchers, and armed gangs that raze the rainforest. His defiance
led to the creation of “extractive reserves,” which eliminate the
economic incentives behind rampant deforestation while allowing those who rely on the forest to continue to use it sustainably.
Earth: The Sequel only dabbles in the macroeconomic concerns that pose a challenge to a national cap and trade system
and does not devote much attention to the short-term effects
such a policy might have on the deficit, the employment rate, or
the prices of goods and services. It does, however, answer the
fundamental underlying question driving the debate—whether
we have the capacity and scientific know-how to combat global
climate change—with an emphatic “yes!” This answer is both
informative and inspiring. All that is left to be seen is whether
the United States has the political will to implement a cap and
trade system and the good sense to stop holding the green revolution back.
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